Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[MR. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Oral Answers to Questions — ENERGY

Coal Industry Dispute

Mr. Adley: asked the Secretary of State for Energy if he will make a statement on the coal strike.

Mr. Nellist: asked the Secretary of State for Energy if he will make a statement on the miners' strike.

Mr. Proctor: asked the Secretary of State for Energy if he will make a statement on the current situation in the coalmining industry.

Mr. Douglas: asked the Secretary of State for Energy if he will make a statement on the current situation in the mining industry.

Mr. Dormand: asked the Secretary of State for Energy if he will make a statement on the latest position in the coal industry dispute.

Mr. Strang: asked the Secretary of State for Energy if he will make a statement on the dispute in the mining industry.

Mr. Parry: asked the Secretary of State for Energy if he will make a statement on the current situation in the mining industry.

Sir William van Straubenzee: asked the Secretary of State for Energy whether he will make a statement on the current dispute in the coal industry.

Mr. Barron: asked the Secretary of State for Energy if he will make a statement on the mining industry.

The Secretary of State for Energy (Mr. Peter Walker): Since I last made a statement to the House, more pits have returned to normal working, more pits have started to produce coal, and so far during the first few weeks of 1985 more than 17,000 miners have returned to work. Movements of coal and coal stocks at the power stations have remained at a very high level. Sixty-one coal faces have, unfortunately, been lost since the start of the dispute, including 38 working faces.
During the past week Mr. Norman Willis, on behalf of the TUC, has held a series of talks with the chairman of the National Coal Board. As a result of those talks a document was prepared which dealt with a number of crucial matters in connection with the dispute. The National Coal Board stated that it was willing to accept

this. The document outlined the duty of the NCB to manage the industry efficiently, it recognised the responsibilities and rights of the unions in representing their members' interests, it outlined a plan to prepare a revised "Plan for Coal" within six months, it set out the need for urgent talks to create the early establishment of the modified procedures agreed with NACODS, and it stipulated that any future closures for any reason would thereafter take place under the modified colliery review procedures, and that all parties would be committed to give full weight to the view of the independent review body.
Unfortunately, this statement was not acceptable to the National Union of Mineworkers, and Mr. Willis outlined to the Coal Board changes that it would seek in such a statement. In the view of the board those changes would have meant that the document failed to meet the main issue of the dispute, and I regret that only yesterday Mr. Scargill, as president of the NUM, made it clear that he would never agree to any closures.
The Government naturally regret that the latest efforts have failed to bring an end to the dispute, particularly as there is on offer a substantial investment programme, good pay for miners, a closure procedure better than has ever been previously available, generous early retirement provisions and substantial resources to bring new enterprises and businesses to mining communities. The Government continue to hope that the damaging industrial action which has taken place without a ballot will swiftly be ended.

Mr. Adley: My right hon. Friend says that the document is not acceptable to the National Union of Mineworkers. Is it not more accurate to say that it is not acceptable to Mr. Scargill? Is it not a tragedy for the miners that he has been unwilling or unable to see the immense benefits that the latest offer gives to the members of his union?
I welcome the efforts of Mr. Willis and his meeting with the Prime Minister, but will my right hon. Friend agree that from now on the less Mr. Scargill is involved in the negotiations, the greater the chance of a negotiated settlement?

Mr. Walker: The past year, during which hundreds of millions of pounds of capital investment has not taken place, markets have been lost and pit faces destroyed, has been a tragedy for the industry. That is why the offer—probably the best since nationalisation — should be accepted quickly.

Mr. Nellist: How does the Secretary of State define "uneconomic"? Does he hold to the definition that he gave to Members of Parliament in July last year, that it was intended to close 12 per cent. of capacity in the industry to save £275 million? If that is the definition, how does he explain his toytown economics of the past 11 months in which he has spent £5,500 million in trying to save the country £275 million?

Mr. Walker: If the hon. Gentleman's economics include the belief that when any militant leader decides to use mob methods he should be given whatever he demands, that would be the most lunatic form of economics that any country could pursue. May I say how pleased I am that last week the Coventry pit returned to normal working.

Mr. Proctor: When my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister meets leaders of the TUC to discuss these matters, will she impress upon them the need for the leadership of the NUM to live in the real world, by accepting the code of practice on picketing, the widely accepted provision for balloting, and the necessity for the closure of uneconomic resources?

Mr. Walker: As my hon. Friend knows, that is the view of many of us, and was demonstrated by what happened in the one third of Britain's coalfields that did have a ballot. If the NUM's normal procedures on having a ballot and on peaceful picketing had operated throughout the dispute, it would have ended a long time ago.

Mr. Douglas: Will the Secretary of State resist some of the more outlandish views put to him by his right hon. and hon. Friends, and recognise that it is time for conciliation and a constructive settlement of the dispute, which we all desire? Is he aware that any desire on his part or on the part of his right hon. Friend the Prime Minister to have Mr. Scargill's head will be decidedly misplaced and will reverberate against a settlement, so we should be constructive and conciliatory, and not vindictive?

Mr. Walker: I have no desire to have Mr. Scargill's head or any other part of his anatomy. A great deal of patience and effort was put into the talks that took place last week, and anybody who studies the statement that was prepared will recognise that it is a constructive and objective statement, which should have been the basis for a settlement.

Mr. Dormand: Does the Secretary of State accept last week's figures from the Department of Trade and Industry, which show that the cost of importing oil and coal has risen by 42 per cent. to £10 billion in 1984, the highest figure ever recorded? Does he further accept the Central Statistical Office's figure of £3·5 billion for the cost of the strike until January? If he does, what possible justification can there be for his boasting of the miserly £10 million that has been given for new jobs in coal mining areas? This dispute is about jobs.

Mr. Walker: I have repeated constantly that the £10 million for the new enterprise company is all that is required at the commencement of its activity. The NCB and I have made it clear that the NCB will review that ceiling when it becomes necessary and there are more applications. If the figures that the hon. Gentleman gave were published, obviously they are accurate, but no one regrets more than I do that this form of industrial action without a ballot has resulted in us importing coal instead of producing our own.

Mr. Strang: Is the Secretary of State aware that his description of the NCB's document would be contradicted by not only the NUM but NACODS? Will he comment on the fact that both Mr. McNestry and Mr. Sampey, the NACODS leaders, stated at the weekend that the Coal Board document involved breaching the NACODS-NCB agreement?

Mr. Walker: The Coal Board has made it clear to NACODS that it is keeping to the sanctity of that agreement. NACODS was concerned with the item that said that normal colliery review procedures would continue until the new modified procedure had been put into place. I am certain that if it were left to NACODS, the Government and the Coal Board, the new procedure

would come into place virtually immediately. However, one could not have a situation in which, if the NUM decided to veto the details of such an organisation, there would be no procedures in place whatsoever.

Mr. Parry: Now that the strike is in its 50th week, will the Secretary of State urge his right hon. Friend the Prime Minister to have an early meeting with TUC leaders to see whether an agreement can be reached with honour, whereby the gallant miners, who have defended their jobs and communities for nearly a year will not be brutally crushed into submission?

Mr. Walker: Certainly, there is no desire to see miners who have been prevented from having a ballot being in any way humiliated as a result of what has occurred during this period. The Prime Minister has agreed to meet the TUC tomorrow at 11.30 am, and will listen to what it has to say.

Sir William van Straubenzee: Is not the evidence clear that, since we have been talking about cost, the personal cost is not so much to some of those who are on strike but to those who supply them, such as the small shopkeepers and so on and those who supply the industry? Does my right hon. Friend accept that it is very much in the interests of those people that the terms that are now on the table are taken up?

Mr. Walker: There is no doubt that jobs have been lost in many parts of the country, especially by firms supplying the coal industry and those connected with mining communities. One deeply regrets that, and I am sure that those firms join the Government in wishing that there had been a ballot at the outset, which would almost certainly have resulted in there being no dispute.

Mr. Barron: Does the Minister accept that there is a contradiction between his statement that NACODS is happy with its agreement and the NACODS statement several times last week that it is not happy about it because it is not happy at what the NUM is being asked to accept? Will the Minister now be honest enough to admit that the NCB is trying to lay down preconditions which will undermine any agreement with NACODS?

Mr. Walker: The statement prepared following the talks between Mr. Willis and the NCB carries a clause which makes it clear that the procedures agreed with NACODS should be implemented with the greatest possible speed. It is certainly the hope of the Government, the NCB and NACODS that that should happen. I only hope that that is also the object of the NUM.

Mr. Patrick McNair-Wilson: Does my right hon. Friend agree that a negotiated settlement is essential if an orderly return to work is to be achieved and anarchy avoided in the future? Will he clear up a matter that concerns many people about the latest NCB document? Does it represent an agenda for discussion or a final take-it-or-leave-it offer?

Mr. Walker: Mr. Willis's objective in seeking such a document was to ensure that the crunch issue of the dispute was agreed and settled. There will, of course, be other items and issues that both sides will wish to discuss.

Mrs. Currie: Has my right hon. Friend noticed that the miners of south Derbyshire, who have worked normally throughout the strike, have just voted by 78·4 per cent. to give their local leaders the power to defy the national executive if necessary? Does that not show that most


mineworkers want the right to go to work in peace and a free and democratic union to look after their interests, not one that wishes to play revolutionary political games?

Mr. Walker: The dispute has undoubtedly done considerable damage to NUM unity both locally and nationally. I am sure that many members of the union regret that.

Mr. Rost: Instead of the inquiry demanded by Mr. Scargill, will my right hon. Friend prepare a White Paper acknowledging that because the nationalised monopoly has failed the economy, the consumer and the miners, it is now time for the Government to put privatisation of the coal industry at the top of their priorities?

Mr. Walker: No. It has been perfectly clear throughout the dispute that the Government's intention has been to ensure that the industry in its present form has a stable and prosperous future. I am sure that that is the first priority.

Mr. Foot: Is the right hon. Gentleman really implying that he understands the NACODS agreement better than the NACODS leaders understand it? Why does he not use his influence to get the NACODS agreement properly understood by the NCB?

Mr. Walker: There is no misunderstanding about the agreement. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will use his influence to ensure that the NUM agrees speedily to the details of the NACODS agreement.

Mr. Gregory: If the learned judge was correct in his comment the other day that six pickets was the maximum permitted, will my right hon. Friend have discussions with his colleagues to ensure that that is implemented wherever possible in the coalfields so that the dispute can be resolved at the earliest possible opportunity?

Mr. Walker: The judgment related to certain pits and certain local conditions. It will be necessary to examine the national implications of that judgment.

Mr. Wrigglesworth: Why has the Prime Minister now agreed to meet the TUC to discuss a dispute that has been running for 11 months? Have circumstances changed to alter her view and that of other Ministers that the Government should not be involved in negotiations relating to the dispute? If the Prime Minister has anything to contribute towards a settlement, why did she not become involved at a much earlier stage?

Mr. Walker: My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has, rightly, always agreed to see the TUC or any major trade union leader if they request her to do so, and she has done so on this occasion.

Sir John Wells: Can my right hon. Friend make any specific statement about future proposals for the Kent coalfield, which is in a somewhat different position from the monolithic coalfields in the rest of the country?

Mr. Walker: No, Sir. The future of any individual pit or coalfield is a matter for negotiation at regional level.

Mr. Mason: Has the Secretary of State carried out the promise that he made to me on 28 January that he would convey to the chairman of the NCB the request that the future of those miners arrested on the picket line and since then completely acquitted—there are now 1,190 of them

—should not be imperilled when the strike is over, or, in other words, that there should be an amnesty for those men? What was the NCB's reply?

Mr. Walker: Yes, I have conveyed that point. I have not yet received a detailed reply from the NCB. When I do, I shall certainly let the right hon. Gentleman have it.

Mr. Powley: In view of the substantial number of miners who have gone back to work of their own free will, will my right hon. Friend consider discussing with the NCB the possibility of the board making a statement to the effect that those miners who choose to stay on strike after a predetermined date — say, in three weeks' time —should be told that their services are no longer required in the industry?

Mr. Walker: No, Sir.

Mr. Lofthouse: Is the Secretary of State aware of the statement made by Mr. Willis on breakfast television this morning that the gap between the two parties is now very small? Will he request his right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, when she meets the TUC, to consider the miners and the miners' wishes? If the Prime Minister is to bridge that gap—which she certainly has the authority to do—she should base her judgment not on revenge on personalities but on the needs and wishes of the miners, who want a fair and honourable settlement.

Mr. Walker: Yes, Sir. There has been no stage in the dispute when the offer available has not been to the advantage of the miners and their families and communities.

Mr. Spencer: Is my right hon. Friend aware of the words of Mr. Jack Jones, the leader of the Leicestershire NUM, today? He said that the economy of pits has always been a subject that he has discussed both locally and at regional level. If that is good enough for Leicestershire, is it not good enough at national level.

Mr. Walker: Yes, Sir. Not only that, but Mr. Lawrence Daly has put in writing that when he occupied a vital post in the NUM he accepted the essential nature of the need to close uneconomic pits. With the Coal Industry Act 1977, the last Labour Government also made provision for the eradication of uneconomic pits.

Mr. Benn: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Government's decision to abandon the requirement that the NUM should sign a document before talks could begin is welcome, as is the Prime Minister's final realisation that she must meet the TUC in order to bring the dispute to an end? However, is he also aware that despite his regular statements in the House over the past six or eight months to the effect that the strike was crumbling, the Government have not succeeded in getting a majority of NUM members to return to work? Those who have returned have done so because they have been starved into submission. Like the majority of the British people, as revealed in the polls, NACODS and BACM—many senior managers—do not regard the Government's handling of the dispute as in any way creditable.

Mr. Walker: The Government's handling of the dispute cannot be compared with that of the right hon. Gentleman's which, from the beginning, has been full of wholly wrong predictions. Last November, there were 94 pits where no one was present. Today, there are nine. I can make clear the impact of that change upon those whose


views are close to those of the right hon. Gentleman by saying that last week Coventry and Bolsover collieries returned to normal working.
Mr. Peter Bruinvels: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the majority of people in this country are fed up to the teeth with hearing about what Mr. Scargill says or believes? Is it not a fact that with 46 per cent. of the miners back at work the battle is already over, and the rest of the miners should go back to work, too, because that is where the future lies?

Mr. Walker: Yes, Sir. The longer the dispute continues, the more damage is done to productive coal faces and to prospective markets. As I said in my statement, the Government hope that the dispute will quickly be ended.

Mr. Skinner: Is the Secretary of State aware that, on a day such as today, it would be regarded as more than a little insecure for a Minister to mislead the House? I have been trying since 14 January to ascertain the size of coal stocks, distributed and undistributed, for the end of the year 1984, and have been unable to get any further than 31 October. Perhaps the Secretary of State should now have the guts to tell the nation just what the coal stocks are so that he cannot be accused of misleading anyone.
Will the Secretary of State also take into account the fact that it would be a good idea if, instead of waiting——

Hon. Members: Too long.

Mr. Speaker: Order.

Mr. Skinner: Rather than waiting for the Chairman of the Select Committee to tell the nation the real truth about the loss of £2,000 million to the Central Electricity Generating Board, ought not the Secretary of State to admit that the strike has cost more than £100 apiece for every man, woman and child in the country?

Mr. Walker: I can confirm that the strike has been costly and a great tragedy, but it has been most costly to the coal industry, to coal miners and to miners' families. As to stocks, I know that when the January figures are published, the hon. Gentleman will be delighted at how very little they have fallen. I originally gave an assurance that there would be no power cuts in 1985, and I am glad to say that I can now give an assurance that there will be none until well into 1986.

Mr. Skinner: We have had some.

Mr. Walker: It is time that the hon. Gentleman listened to the 90 per cent. of NUM members who are at work in the Bolsover pit.

Mr. Skinner: It does not matter to me if they all go back—I am not giving in.

Mr. Willie W. Hamilton: Will the Secretary of State care to comment on an article in The Times this morning which suggests that he has taken over the role of negotiator for the NCB? On a local matter, will he consider the claim by local people in Fife for assistance from the EEC to restore work in the Seafield and Frances collieries?

Mr. Walker: Yes, several forms of help from the EEC are being examined actively by the Coal Board.

Mr. Orme: Will the Secretary of State confirm that Mr. Willis stated during the weekend that the document

was not a joint document but was prepared basically by the NCB? Will the Secretary of State ask the Prime Minister to facilitate direct negotiations between the NUM and the Coal Board so that a negotiated, honourable settlement that is acceptable to the NUM and NCB can be arrived at?

Mr. Walker: I think the right hon. Gentleman knows —I made it clear in my statement—that this was not a document prepared by the TUC. I never claimed that. I have claimed, and I am sure that Mr. Willis agrees, that the document was prepared after considerable detailed negotiations and talks with Mr. Willis in an attempt to create conditions in which a settlement could take place. That was the basis of the document, which I think was good. I very much regret that it was not accepted.

Electricity Generation

Mr. Ron Davies: asked the Secretary of State for Energy what percentage of national electric power was supplied by coal-burning, oil-burning and nuclear power stations over the past 12 months; and how this compares with the previous 12 months.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Energy (Mr. Alastair Goodlad): The last 12 months for which figures are available cover the period December 1983 to November 1984. During that period, on a fuel used basis, the electricity boards in the United Kingdom produced 53 per cent. of electricity from coal, 29 per cent. from oil and 16 per cent. from nuclear. The respective percentages in the previous 12-month period were 75 per cent., 8 per cent. and 15 per cent.

Mr. Davies: I am grateful to the Minister for his reply. Will he now care to estimate the cost to the electricity supply industry of those changed percentages?

Mr. Goodlad: We shall have to wait until the strike ends before the total costs can be assessed.

Mr. Michael Morris: Is my hon. Friend aware that the figures that he has given demonstrate the flexibility of the electricity supply industry in meeting our worst winter since 1947? With regard to cost, does he agree that coal now released from pit heads becomes a positive cash flow to the NCB and that therefore the costs are not as high as some have led us to believe?

Mr. Goodlad: Yes, Sir.

Mrs. Clwyd: Will the Minister confirm that the promotion of the idea of uneconomic pits is linked with a pro-nuclear bias which, if it succeeds, will mean longer dole queues and a commitment to a nuclear future because, if pits are closed, the Government will be able to argue that there is no alternative?

Mr. Goodlad: No. The Government, like their predecessors who enjoyed the support of the hon. Lady, expect the electricity supply industry to pay due regard in its planning to the need for diversity in and security of supply, including an appropriate nuclear component. I hope that its commitment to the future of coal is beyond doubt.

Mr. Kenneth Carlisle: Do not the figures show that ther is a good argument for more electricity from nuclear power? Is not French electricity among the cheapest in Europe precisely because more than half of it comes from


nuclear power? Furthermore, would not more electricity from nuclear power help us to solve the problem of sulphur dioxide emissions and the resulting acid rain?

Mr. Goodlad: Yes.

Mr. Eadie: Further to the Minister's answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Davies) on the question of cost, is he not falling into the bad habit of denying matters that have been widely publicised in the press—namely, that there have been additional costs of £2 billion? Is that denial similar to the earlier denial of his right hon. Friend, who tried to suggest that the document produced by the National Coal Board was a negotiating document, which it is not? The national executive of the NUM was told that the words of the document were set in concrete and could not be amended. How in the name of God can that be a negotiating document?

Mr. Goodlad: Like the hon. Gentleman, I am keen to avoid all bad habits. I repeat, we shall wait until the end of the dispute to assess the costs of the oil burn.

Coal Imports

Mr. Loyden: asked the Secretary of State for Energy what was the amount of coal imported into the United Kingdom during January.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Energy (Mr. David Hunt): The information is not yet available.

Mr. Loyden: Does the Minister agree that it is patently clear from the answers given this afternoon that the Government are prepared to absorb the high cost of imported coal and all other elements that contribute towards the cost of the dispute because, as the Institute of Directors said at the weekend—it has been far more forthcoming than the Government — before the Government can carry out their economic and other policies, it is necessary to crush the trade union movement?

Mr. Hunt: When the Government came to office the United Kingdom was a net importer of 2 million tonnes of coal a year. By 1983 the position had been reversed, and the nation had become a net exporter of 2 million tonnes. Sadly, that position has now been reversed because of the dispute, and again the country is a net importer. That is yet another example of the enormous damage that the dispute has done.

Mr. Hannam: Will my hon. Friend confirm that the Central Electicity Generating Board has not imported any coal during the dispute? Is that not a further tribute to the flexibility that is built into our electricity generating system?

Mr. Hunt: My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The CEGB has not imported any foreign coal since the strike began, because it has not needed to do so. The best way for our great coal industry to proceed and to preserve markets is to return to full production at competitive prices.

Mr. Ashdown: Is the Minister aware that much of the imported coal that is being sold for heating domestic appliances will not burn in them and that that therefore adds considerably to the problems of old-age pensioners,

especially those in my area? Will he undertake to look at the calorific value of that coal to ensure that it does the job that it is supposed to do?

Mr. Hunt: Yes, deliberate disruption of supply has caused and inevitably leads to hardship for many customers. I pay tribute to the coal distributive trades for having done their best to care for those who need looking after in our society. That is yet another example of the damage caused by the dispute.

Mr. Woodall: Will the Minister confirm the statement that he gave in reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Garston (Mr. Loyden)? Is he aware of the grave concern that is being expressed by many domestic consumers about the quality of the coal that is now being delivered to them by distributors? Is he further aware that that coal is nothing but muck, that it spits, causes a great deal of hardship and anxiety, and is not worth the money that is being paid for it, which is almost twice as much as the price for domestically produced coal?

Mr. Hunt: For many consumers it is better to have this dirty coal than to have no coal. This country produces very good quality coal, and it is about time that we returned to full production.

Mr. Marlow: Is any restriction imposed on either the private or public sectors with regard to the importation of coal?

Mr. Hunt: I shall look into that question as soon as possible.

Mr. Rowlands: Has the Minister read reports of the evidence that the CEGB has most recently produced for the Sizewell inquiry about forecasts for future international coal prices, which show that they might virtually double within the next five years? If so, does it not cast doubt on the so-called criteria for uneconomic pits and revalue our coal reserves? Does it not also suggest that we should treat premature pit closures with caution?

Mr. Hunt: I reiterate the words of the chairman of the NCB to the annual conference of BACM, when even at that stage he stressed that there is tremendous potential for increasing the future markets available to the coal industry. Those great markets for exports exist, but we can hardly take advantage of them when we are not producing coal.

Energy Efficiency Office

Mr. Chapman: asked the Secretary of State for Energy if he will make a statement on progress of his Energy Efficiency Office.

Mr. Speller: asked the Secretary of State for Energy how many firms are known to be participating in energy efficiency schemes following contact with the Energy Efficiency Office.

Mr. Peter Walker: The office continues to provide valuable support in my campaign. It has stimulated an upsurge of interest in energy efficiency measures. From the early morning briefings alone, contacts have been made with 13,000 senior executives, of whom the great majority have gone on to take action to improve their energy efficiency.

Mr. Chapman: Does my right hon. Friend have any more precise estimates of the total energy waste in


different classifications of energy building? Can he confirm that inefficient energy use in buildings can add up to no less than £1 per sq ft in such buildings?

Mr. Walker: I can confirm that, and I am pleased to say that the various parts of the building industry and the architects are co-operating with us to a great extent to try to see that much more is done in this sphere.

Mr. Speller: I congratulate my right hon. Friend on the number of contacts made, but in future does he expect to produce a realistic number of positive responses from people engaged in energy efficiency operations? Has he any idea of the amount of savings to be made in respect of CEGB sites?

Mr. Walker: We think that many savings can be made in almost every sphere. In total, we believe that savings of £7 billion can be achieved in this country. The returns that we are receiving following our major demonstration schemes and the briefing of senior executives are very encouraging.

Mr. Boyes: Is the Secretary of State aware that just before Christmas 300 men in my constituency, who produced insulation to reduce the cost of energy, lost their jobs? Is not this office just a big con and a cover for the Government to pretend that they are doing something, when they are really throwing men on the dole? Would not that money be better spent on buying insulation for old folks' homes, thereby keeping men in jobs to produce the stuff?

Mr. Walker: The leaders of the insulation industry have expressed their considerable gratitude and enthusiasm for all that we are doing.

Mr. Bermingham: Does the Secretary of State agree that the Budget changes last year, which imposed VAT on double glazing and other insulation, have proved to be a disincentive to industry and to the private sector to put insulation measures into effect, and that this is completely contrary to the policies of his Department?

Mr. Walker: It is true that VAT measures have an adverse effect on a whole range of spending, but that spending is spread widely throughout the economy. I can only say that total activity which is now taking place within these industries has substantially increased compared with a year ago.

Coal Industry Dispute

Mr. Peter Bruinvels: asked the Secretary of State for Energy how many miners have returned to work since January 1985.

Mr. David Hunt: I understand from the National Coal Board that, since 1 January, nearly 18,000 ex-strikers have returned to work.

Mr. Bruinvels: Will my hon. Friend join me in congratulating all those 18,000 courageous miners who have gone back to work? Is this not an example of miners voting with their feet, showing without doubt that they wish to work because they want to keep the industry secure?

Mr. Hunt: Since the last negotiations broke down, more than 34,000 miners have returned to work, thereby showing that they want the NUM president to move. When will he begin to listen?

Mr. Campbell-Savours: Has the move in sterling made all pits more economic?

Mr. Hunt: The economics of a particular pit are a matter for consideration by the NCB on a whole range of issues. One of the important ingredients in the offer now before the NUM is the introduction of a modified colliery review procedure which will enable all those considerations to be taken into account.

North Sea Oil Production

Mr. Malone: asked the Secretary of State for Energy if he has any plans to control the production of North sea oil.

The Minister of State, Department of Energy (Mr. Alick Buchanan-Smith): I have no plans to do so.

Mr. Malone: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the Leader of the Opposition gave the clearest indication recently that the Labour party was intent on pursuing a policy to control depletion of oil in the North sea? As the oil companies assume at present that they will be investing between £50 billion and £60 billion in production facilities over the next 15 or 16 years, does my right hon. Friend agree that a policy of controlling depletion could scupper those plans and damage investment, especially in the north-east of Scotland?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I was surprised to read the recent remarks of the Leader of the Opposition, because they showed ignorance of the characteristics of our industry, and of the best interests of the economy. I agree with my hon. Friend, not least because he is my constituency neighbour.

Mr. Rowlands: Given that the Government have decided against the Sleipner contract and that there will be a need for condensate gas in the near future, will there not have to be some kind of balance between oil and gas production in the North sea?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman did not notice what was said last week about Sleipner. The tremendous increase in our reserves is almost as great as that of the Sleipner deal itself. In those circumstances, I hope that the hon. Gentleman shares my confidence that the industry has a very bright future indeed.

Homes Insulation Scheme

Mr. Rost: asked the Secretary of State for Energy if he is satisfied with the funding allocated for 1985–86 towards the homes insulation programme.

Mr. David Hunt: Yes, Sir.

Mr. Rost: As the funding for the homes insulation programme is being cut from £31·5 million this year to £21 million next year, with an additional £7 million held back in reserve, what does my hon. Friend propose to do to ensure that those people who apply for home grants are not disappointed?

Mr. Hunt: The 1985–86 allocation of £31 million for England is in line with the estimated spend in the current financial year. The 25 per cent. reserve referred to by my hon. Friend is designed to ensure that funds allocated to the scheme can be sent where they are needed and therefore are fully spent.

Oral Answers to Questions — HOUSE OF COMMONS

New Parliamentary Buildings

Mr. Yeo: asked the Lord Privy Seal when the Select Committee on House of Commons (Services) consideration of the plans for phase 1 of the new parliamentary building will be completed.

The Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. John Biffen): The New Building Sub-Committee is now considering the preliminary sketch plans report. I expect the Services Committee to have approved the final sketch plans before the summer recess.

Mr. Yeo: Is my right hon. Friend aware that many hon. Members who, like myself, are sufficiently recently arrived in this place to remember what it was like to enjoy normal working conditions in other occupations, believe that the improvement in facilities would greatly contribute to improving the efficiency of hon. Members?

Mr. Biffen: My advice to my hon. Friend is to make the most of his memories. Even so, the plans for phase 1 are up to schedule.

Mr. Allan Roberts: Will the Leader of the House disabuse those of his hon. Friends who believe that when the GLC is abolished they will get office space across the river? Will he tell them that that office space, and more, will be needed for the quangos and joint bodies that will be set up to replace the GLC?

Mr. Biffen: I must confess that if the House is to acquire outbuildings around Westminster, it would have all the disadvantages of a split-site comprehensive. Therefore, I am happy for once to agree with the hon. Gentleman that the GLC buildings across the river do not come into our thinking.

Sir John Biggs-Davison: Is there not a danger that the proliferation of parliamentary buildings will denude the Chamber and detract from the corporate life of the House of Commons?

Mr. Biffen: On an afternoon when the Chamber is likely to be pretty lively, I agree with my hon. Friend.

Statutory Instruments (Prayers)

Mr. Beith: asked the Lord Privy Seal whether it is his policy to provide time for debate on the Floor of the House on all prayers against statutory instruments for which such a debate is actively sought by hon. Members.

Mr. Biffen: I seek to meet the wishes of hon. Members whenever possible, but it would not be practicable to find time to debate every prayer on the Floor of the House without major repercussions on other business.

Mr. Beith: Why is that so, given that if a prayer is taken in Committee upstairs, the House has no right to vote on it, even when the Government suffered an adverse vote in the Committee?

Mr. Biffen: I can remember that occurring once since I have been Leader of the House. However, the hon. Member makes a fair point that could be considered.

Parliamentary Papers (Delivery)

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg: asked the Lord Privy Seal what steps he is taking to ensure that hon. Members receive their Votes within the walk area on time and not by post the following day.

Mr. Biffen: A small number of hon. Members have had their Votes delivered by post since Christmas due to an unprecedented degree of sickness among the delivery staff in the Vote Office.
Two extra staff have been employed since January in an attempt to ensure that the Votes are delivered on time.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg: I thank my right hon. Friend for that helpful response. Does he agree that, in the outside world to which my hon. Friend the Member for Suffolk, South (Mr. Yeo) referred, temporary staff would have been engaged on a day-to-day basis to do this work, as I understand they used to be? Will my right hon. Friend consider whether that can be done rather than increase the permanent establishment?

Mr. Biffen: I shall have my hon. Friend's point examined.

Mr. Mikardo: Will the Leader of the House ask his Committee to look into the problem of communications with hon. Members in the House? Is it not nonsense that, when nearly every other establishment of this size has radio paging or a similar system, hon. Members still sometimes receive notices of meetings hours after the meetings have finished and green cards from constituents hours after the constituents have gone home?

Mr. Biffen: Radio paging has been considered recently by the relevant Sub-Committee of the Services Committee. But I take note of the hon. Gentleman's question, which goes very much wider than the original question, and I shall refer it to the Services Committee.

Mr. Beaumont-Dark: Why in this modern day and age does there need to be such a service in any event? If hon. Members who live within walking distance of the House, as I do, cannot be here on time, what precious benefit is there in keeping this archaic system going?

Mr. Biffen: My hon. Friend is politically long enough in the tooth to know that the withdrawal of any service, however meritorious, and can be sustained, gives rise to such an outcry that no one will lightly undertake it.

Mr. Rogers: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that it would be far better if hon. Members came into the House to collect their Votes rather than have them delivered to their banks and private law offices? When will Conservative Members recognise that being a Member of Parliament should be a full-time job?

Mr. Biffen: The hon. Gentleman is making the same point, only less elegantly, as that made by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Mr. Beaumont-Dark). This service is widely appreciated in the House, and I have some sympathy for my hon. Friend the Member for Hampstead and Highgate (Sir G. Finsberg), who wants matters improved.

Mr. Peter Bruinvels: I do not wish to strike a discordant note, but surely the best way is to deliver the Votes direct to hon. Members' offices in the House or, if they work outside the House, to their addresses outside.
More importantly, will my right hon. Friend check on the speed of deliveries? I was informed that I had been selected to serve on the Committee which was to consider the Local Government (Access to Information) Bill eight days after my appointment. There is something wrong with communications in the House.

Mr. Biffen: My hon. Friend's second point goes very much wider than the original question, but I shall consider his first one.

Mr. Skinner: If the delivering of the Votes had to abide by the same kind of philosophy as that espoused by the Prime Minister and her colleagues, especially the Secretary of State for Energy, about whether a service was making a profit, would not this one come under the category of an uneconomic unit of production and have to close down? If that philosophy can apply to coal mines, why should it not apply to this service as well?

Mr. Biffen: Delivering the Votes is a non-economic activity. Therefore, it is a call upon the resources which have to be created by the productive sector of the economy, which ought to include the coal industry.

Oral Answers to Questions — CIVIL SERVICE

Unions (Ministerial Meetings)

Mr. Terry Davis: asked the Minister for the Civil Service when he last met Civil Service unions; and what subjects were discussed.

Mr. Parry: asked the Minister for the Civil Service what subjects were discussed at his last meeting with representatives of the Civil Service unions.

The Minister of State, Treasury (Mr. Barney Hayhoe): I last met the Civil Service unions on 4 December 1984 to discuss the Government's decisions on the 1984 report of the Top Salaries Review Body. The unions also took the opportunity to discuss with me some recent changes in travel and subsistence provisions.

Mr. Davis: Is it not surprising that the Minister did not take the opportunity to discuss the problem of low pay and low morale in the Civil Service? Will he take this opportunity to deny the reports in last week's newspapers that if a civil servant engages in industrial action it will affect his promotion prospects?

Mr. Hayhoe: I did not discuss low pay and the other matter that the hon. Gentleman raised because it was not on the agenda for the meeting, nor was it raised by the representatives of the Civil Service unions.
As for the report to which the hon. Gentleman refers, I can deny that any new proposals are being brought forward. There is no general ban upon and no bar to the promotion of civil servants who may take part in industrial action, but, of course, this may be taken into account by those concerned as one of the factors that will determine their decision.

Mr. Parry: Have there been any recent discussions or consultations with the Civil Service unions concerning the use of computers in passport offices? If so, what has been the reaction of the unions?

Mr. Hayhoe: That question ought to be addressed to my right hon. and learned Friend the Home Secretary, who is now responsible for the Passport Office.

Dr. Mawhinney: Did my hon. Friend raise with the Civil Service unions the increased effectiveness of Customs and Excise staff in preventing the illegal importation of drugs into this country and express to them the appreciation of the House? Do not these increased seizures justify and vindicate the Government's decision to use Customs and Excise staff more flexibly?

Mr. Hayhoe: That matter was not discussed, but I am willing to follow my hon. Friend's invitation to pay tribute, which I hope I can do on behalf of all hon. Members, to the splendid work done by Customs and Excise staff over drugs seizures.

Sir Anthony Grant: Did my hon. Friend discuss with the Civil Service unions those civil servants who were dismissed for breaking the rules of confidence of the Civil Service, such as my constituent, Mr. Robin Page, who was dismissed by a previous Labour Government for exposing the way in which Labour Ministers were misleading the House?

Mr. Hayhoe: That matter was not discussed, but it puts into better perspective some of the hypocritical comments that we have heard from Opposition Members.

Dr. McDonald: Will the Minister ensure that discussions with the Civil Service unions continue in order to draw up a new code of ethics to ensure civil liberties for civil servants? Will he also consider adopting as his model the American code of ethics, which asks civil servants to expose corruption wherever it occurs and to put loyalty to the highest moral principles and to the country above loyalty to persons, party or Government Departments?

Mr. Hayhoe: The rules and guidance for civil servants remain as they have been for many years under successive Governments. Those rules certainly forbid breaches of trust, such as we have seen recently. If there is any need to reinforce those rules to make them clear to existing civil servants and future recruits, that will be done.

Recruits (Quality)

Mr. Chapman: asked the Minister for the Civil Service if he is satisfied with the level and quality of new recruits into the non-industrial sectors of the Civil Service.

Mr. Hayhoe: Generally, recruitment to the non-industrial grades of the Civil Service is going well, but we are experiencing continuing difficulty in recruiting the numbers and quality that we need in some specialist areas, particularly where there is a national shortage of people with the relevant qualifications.

Mr. Chapman: Is my hon. Friend satisfied that new recruits are adequately informed about the need to respect the confidential nature of much of their work and about the correct procedures to take if, rightly or wrongly, they feel that they are being asked to mislead the public?

Mr. Hayhoe: Yes, I can assure my hon. Friend that proper guidance on all those matters is available.

Mr. Robert Sheldon: Is it surprising that there is difficulty in attracting the right calibre of person when the demoralisation of the Civil Service is so obvious, when opportunities for advancement are few, and when it is clear that the Government do not think highly of civil servants? Will the hon. Gentleman take the earliest


opportunity to make it clear that he respects and admires the qualities of civil servants who have contributed so much to our past and to our future?

Mr. Hayhoe: Again, I am happy to accept the right hon. Gentleman's invitation and pay tribute, as I have done many times before, to the overwhelming majority of civil servants who behave with loyalty and the highest integrity. As a country, we should be proud of them. That is perhaps why one lapse from those high standards excites a great deal of criticism and comment.

Mr. Stokes: Is my hon. Friend aware that Britain has one of the best Civil Services in the world, but that those who have the great responsibility for choosing new members must surely ensure that loyalty and trust are the first things to look for and that character counts as much as brains?

Mr. Hayhoe: All those matters must be taken into account; and we must follow the time-honoured arrangements, which are that ability, qualifications and the rightness for the job must be the qualities looked for by the Civil Service Commission in appointing new members to the Civil Service.

Mr. Wrigglesworth: Is the Minister aware that his tribute to the work of the Civil Service will be much appreciated, but will he ask his colleagues, in particular the Prime Minister as head of the Civil Service and other senior colleagues, to make similar remarks about the Civil Service? Is he further aware that there is grave anxiety about the calibre of recruits to the Civil Service and the future of the Civil Service if morale stays at rock bottom as a result of constant attacks upon it by senior Ministers and the present policies on pay and cutbacks?

Mr. Hayhoe: Constant attacks are not being made. Rather, constant tributes are being paid to the civil servants who carry out their work with great dedication.

Unions (Ministerial Meetings)

Mr. Soley: asked the Minister for the Civil Service when he next plans to meet the Civil Service trade unions; and if staffing matters will be discussed.

Mr. Hayhoe: I have at present no plans to meet the Civil Service trade unions, but my right hon. and noble Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster has agreed to meet representatives of the Society of Civil and Public Servants on Monday 25 February to hear their views on the extension of unified grading in the Civil Service.

Mr. Soley: When the Minister does meet them, will he take the opportunity to clarify his answer a few moments ago to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill (Mr. Davis) and explain what he means when he says that industrial action will be taken into account in promotion? Does that not mean that the Government are trying to act yet again as judge, jury and prosecution? Surely it means that if a person has been involved in industrial action, that will be taken into account and used against him when considering promotion prospects.

Mr. Hayhoe: I should be happy to discuss such matters with the representatives of the Civil Service unions, if they so wish. But I do not think that the hon. Gentleman's clarification or interpretation of my earlier remarks stands up.

Equal Opportunities

Mr. Janner: asked the Minister for the Civil Service whether he will now institute measures for sex monitoring in the Civil Service in accordance with the recommendations made in the revised draft code of the Equal Opportunities Commission.

Mr. Hayhoe: Arrangements which accord with the monitoring recommendations of the code are already in hand.

Mr. Janner: I thank the Minister for that reply. May I seek his assurance that now that the EOC's code has been laid before Parliament, the Civil Service will lead the effort to achieve equal opportunities for women in employment?

Mr. Hayhoe: We shall certainly be following the code's conditions and seeking to implement the code to the best of our ability.

Questions to Ministers

Mr. Allan Roberts: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I apologise for raising this point of order today, but this is a very important issue. Last week I tried to table two questions: one to the Attorney-General, and one to the Secretary of State. They were both refused. The first question to the Attorney-General asked what his recommendations—

Mr. Speaker: I must stop the hon. Gentleman, because he knows the rule. It is not in order to rehearse in the Chamber questions that have been turned down by the Table Office. If the hon. Gentleman wishes to raise that matter, he should tell the Table Office and get in touch with me, and I shall then look into it.

Guinness Bottling Plant, Liverpool

Mr. Robert Parry: I beg to move the Adjournment of the House, under Standing Order No. 10, for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter that should have urgent consideration, namely,
the decision by the Guinness company to close its bottling plant in Liverpool.
In view of the high level of unemployment, particularly in constituencies such as mine, I believe that there should be a debate on the loss of several hundred jobs on Merseyside. The company's decision means that 200 jobs will be lost in the Toxteth area of my constituency. Several jobs will be lost in the Speke constituency, which is represented by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Garston (Mr. Loyden), and 70 jobs will be lost at Runcorn. This is the second Guinness factory to close in my constituency in the last couple of years. As my constituency—[Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order. Hon. Members should listen with care to what the hon. Gentleman is saying.

Mr. Parry: Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
As my constituency has the highest level of male unemployment in the United Kingdom, approaching 40 per cent., I submit that the Guinness closure is a serious matter. In the past week or so we have also been hit by news of the withdrawal of the Liverpool to Isle of Man crossing, and by news that the Cammell Laird plant is to shed more than 400 jobs. Thus, in the course of a week or so we have received news that more than 700 jobs are to be lost. Incidentally, those job losses will mean that 100,000 jobs will have been lost on Merseyside in the last five years under this Government. That is why, Mr. Speaker, I am asking you, to accept my application.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Gentleman seeks leave to move the Adjournment of the House for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter that he thinks should have urgent consideration, namely,
the proposed closure of the Guinness plant in Liverpool.
The hon. Gentleman knows well that the only decision for me is whether to give this matter precedence over the business set down for today or tomorrow. I have listened to what he has said, but I regret that I do not consider the matter that he has raised appropriate for discussion under Standing Order No. 10, and I cannot, therefore, submit his application to the House.

Severe Weather Payments

Mr. Paddy Ashdown: I beg to ask leave to move the Adjournment of the House, under Standing Order No. 10, for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter that should have urgent consideration, namely,
the allocation of exceptionally severe weather payments
The matter is specific, because it concerns the way in which the exceptionally severe weather payment is operated. It is urgent, because old people in my constituency and elsewhere in Britain who should qualify, but do not do so, are suffering now as a result of the scheme's operation. Indeed, two old people in my constituency, one in South Chard and the other in Seavington, have died from hypothermia in recent weeks. If a method cannot be found to alter the way in which the scheme is operated, there will be more suffering, and possibly even more deaths.
My area of the south-west of England has been among the worst affected by the recent cold spell — [Interruption.] Conservative Members may consider this to be a joke, but I assure them that it is not. Needless to say, the weather is no respecter of DHSS boundaries. The whole of my constituency has suffered equally from the cold, yet not all of my constituents are entitled to severe weather payments.
About half of my constituency falls within the Bournemouth DHSS area. The entitlement of those who live in that area to severe weather payments depends on what has happened 40 miles away to the south, at the Bournemouth weather station. The other half of my constituency falls within the Bristol DHSS area. The entitlement of the people in that half is measured by what has happened 40 miles away to the north, at the Bristol weather station. As a result those who live in one half of my constituency are entitled to payment, while those who live in the other half are not.
We have the ludicrous situation that one old person can get the allowance, while another old person living 100 yd distant cannot get it. What logic is there in that? Thanks to inadequate housing, insufficient insulation and the astronomical price of coal, many old people are now having to pay £15 a week for the heat they require to keep alive.
The exceptional weather payment offers such people the only means of coping, yet many are denied help

because of the ludicrous bureaucracy of the present situation. There are more tragic deaths from cold waiting to happen unless the Government can be persuaded—[Interruption.]—to alter—

Mr. Speaker: Order. The Standing Order No. 10 application procedure is a cherished Back-Bench opportunity to raise important matters. I must be able to hear what the hon. Member is saying.

Mr. Ashdown: Many tragic deaths resulting from the cold will happen unless the Government can be persuaded to alter the regulations to cope with the realities of the situation, rather than taking refuge behind the "Mad Hatter" regulations of the DHSS. We need urgently to debate this matter if the lives of many old people are not to be further endangered.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Ashdown) asks leave to move the Adjournment of the House for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter that he believes should have urgent consideration, namely,
the allocation of exceptionally severe weather payments following the death recently of two of his constituents from hypothermia.
I have listened with care to what the hon. Member said, but I regret that I must give him the same answer as I gave to the hon. Member for Liverpool, Riverside (Mr. Parry). I do not consider that the matter which he has raised is appropriate for discussion under Standing Order No. 10, and I cannot, therefore, submit his application to the House.

BILL PRESENTED

TRADE UNION AND EMPLOYMENT ACTS (REPEAL)

Mr. Ron Lewis, supported by Mr. Harry Ewing, Mr. Roy Hughes, Mr. Ken Eastham, Mr. Robert Parry, Mr. Ted Garrett, Mr. Ray Powell, Mr. Don Dixon and Mr. Sydney Bidwell, presented a Bill to repeal the Employment Acts 1980 and 1982 and the Trade Union Act 1984: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 88.]

INSURANCE (FEES) BILL

Ordered,
That the Insurance (Fees) Bill be referred to a Second Reading Committee.— [Mr. Durant.]

Sinking of the General Belgrano

Mr. Speaker: Before we enter upon this important debate, I quote some wise words from "Erskine May":
Good temper and moderation are the characteristics of parliamentary language. Parliamentary language is never more desirable than when a Member is canvassing the opinions and conduct of his opponents in debate.
Today's debate raises very important issues on which hon. Members feel strongly. I hope that they can be fully discussed within our long-established rules governing orderly debate.
I have selected the amendment standing in the name of the Leader of the Opposition. I propose to apply the 10-minute limit on speeches between 7 pm and 8·50 pm.

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Michael Heseltine): I beg to move,
That this House recognises that the sinking of the General Belgrano was a necessary and legitimate action in the Falklands Campaign; and agrees that the protection of our Armed Forces must be the prime consideration in determining how far matters involving national security and the conduct of military operations can be disclosed.
The House will understand that I must make a lengthy and detailed speech on what is an important issue involving the rights of Parliament and the duties of Ministers, our national security, and the relationship between Ministers, their colleagues, and civil servants.
It may be helpful if I summarise at once the ground that I intend to cover and the approach that I intend to adopt. I intend to outline the background that led to the decision to sink the Belgrano. I shall set out rather more fully the events that surrounded the decision itself.
I was not involved in the decision to prosecute Mr. Ponting. Neither I nor my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces had any contact, directly or indirectly, with the Law Officers or their officials in that context. In general, with one exception, we were not consulted about the case or the papers submitted to the court. The Attorney-General has set out the position to the House in the clearest language. I have nothing to add to his statement.
My only involvement in the conduct of the case came many months later, when it was necessary to consider requests from Mr. Ponting's lawyers that classified documents belonging to my Department should be disclosed to the court. I was consulted over the disclosure of one of those documents—the one now known as the "Crown Jewels". After consultation with senior colleagues and the Government's security advisers, it was decided to provide that document under special conditions.
The disclosure of a number of internal Ministry of Defence documents to the court creates a most unusual situation. Advice to Ministers on policy matters is disclosed to this House only in carefully defined areas, such as the outcome of studies related to efficiency. It is a wholly necessary position carefully to restrict such disclosures.
If civil servants are to have confidence that they can put their views fully and honestly to Ministers, if the concept that advice given to one Government is not made available to another is to be maintained, and if the proper accountability of Ministers—and not civil servants—to Parliament is to be preserved, we must maintain that

position. Failure to do so would change fundamentally the position of the Civil Service. Particularly, it would rapidly lead to the politicisation of the Civil Service, which very few would want. [Interruption.]
The essence of the debate centres on the allegations made by a civil servant about the behaviour of Ministers. Mr. Ponting has made the most serious allegations—many of them repeated yesterday—about my conduct in discharging my responsibilities as the Secretary of State for Defence. Most extreme and unfounded allegations have been made about the Prime Minister and about my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces. [Interruption.] In those quite deplorable circumstances, the Government have decided — exceptionally — to reveal the advice given to Ministers by officials. I have no option but to quote from the advice that Mr. Ponting gave me. When I do so I shall make available the full text of his advice to the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs and place copies in the Library of the House.
I further intend to enable members of the Foreign Affairs Committee to have access to the document known as the "Crown Jewels", under appropriate security arrangements, and I propose to discuss with the Chairman of that Committee how best that can be done.
The House will want to judge Mr. Ponting's claims in the light of the advice that he gave to Ministers at the time. I shall deal specifically with the events associated with the letter written on behalf of the shadow Cabinet by the right hon. Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies), the letter that I received in March from the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell), the preparation, in the light of those letters, of the document known as the "Crown Jewels", and the subsequent handling of the questions of the hon. Member for Linlithgow. I shall refer in particular to the suggestion that has been made, quite wrongly, that Ministers misled the House in May in answer to parliamentary questions.
I shall want to deal also with the events that occurred later, when the Foreign Affairs Committee requested a note of all changes in the rules of engagement issued to Her Majesty's forces in the South Atlantic in the Falklands campaign. Our response to that request, which has become known as the "Stanley Memorandum" — although the request and the reply were approved personally by me—is that specific subject of the Opposition amendment today. It is that memorandum which, until yesterday, Mr. Ponting appeared to argue had finally persuaded him to leak documents and breach the trust of a civil servant to Ministers. For him, that memorandum was apparently the straw that broke the camel's back. On that basis the Opposition have been persuaded, I presume, to draft their rather narrow amendment. We shall see whether the House believes that it was any better served by Mr. Ponting than I was.
When I first became personally involved in this matter I had no first hand knowledge of the events that had taken place in the South Atlantic in 1982, save as a member of the Cabinet involved in general policy discussions, or as a result of media coverage. I recall that the decision to send the task force was given all-party support by the House in 1982. However, the House will also remember that the hon. Member for Linlithgow never agreed with that judgment. Some would regard that independence of mind on his part as an act of personal courage. No one would


question his right to reach such a view, however much one disagreed with it, and no one could disagree with it more profoundly that I did, and still do.
The views of the hon. Member for Linlithgow were clear from the outset. On 7 April 1982 he told the House:
Some of us believe that the fleet should turn round and come back to Portsmouth and Rosyth as soon as possible." —[Official Report, 7 April 1982; Vol. 21, c. 1037.]
On 19 April the hon. Gentleman told the House:
Is it not an illusion to think that the Amercans will be less than evenhanded".—[Official Report, 19 April 1982; Vol. 22, c. 25.]
On 13 May the hon. Gentleman told the House:
The Argentines have a very tough marine corps of at least 6,000 officers and men who are highly regarded by professional marines in this country. The conscripts will fight as if they are fighting in a holy war. There will be massive casualties; that fact should be faced."—[Official Report, 13 May 1982; Vol. 23, c. 983.]
On 8 June the hon. Gentleman suggested that Britain was
slithering into a British Vietnam in the South Atlantic."—[Official Report, 8 June 1982; Vol. 25, c. 32.]
By 21 December 1982 the hon. Gentleman was telling the House:
The sinking of the Belgrano, when the right hon. Lady knew what she did about peace proposals, was an evil decision of an order that it would not have occurred to me to attribute to any other … politician of any party since I have been in the House".—[Official Report, 21 December 1982; Vol. 34, c. 901.]
During my earlier days as Secretary of State for Defence, from the beginning of 1983, it was the hon. Gentleman alone who pursued a campaign based upon that hostility and with changing centres of attack. The Government's position was clear. Towards the end of April 1982 the first elements of the task force were moving towards the Falkland Islands. As they moved southwards from Ascension Island, they were vulnerable to attack. While an exclusion zone had been established around the Falkland Islands to avoid Argentina consolidating her illegal occupation, measures to defend our own forces had overriding priority.
On 23 April the Government issued a warning to the Argentine Government which was conveyed to them by the Swiss. I shall read it in full. It was as follows:
In announcing the establishment of a maritime Exclusion zone around the Falkland Islands, Her Majesty's Government made it clear that this measure was without prejudice to the right of the United Kingdom to take whatever additional measures may be needed in the exercise of its right of self-defence under article '51 of the United Nations Charter. In this connection, Her Majesty's Government now wishes to make clear that any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries, or military aircraft which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British Forces in the South Atlantic will encounter the appropriate response. All Argentine aircraft including civil aircraft engaging in surveillance of these British Forces will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly.
That was the end of the warning.

Mr. Tam Dalyell: From that time on, why were the rules of engagement changed at all if they were so clear?

Mr. Heseltine: The rules of engagement govern the orders and discipline within which the British Fleet operates. The warning that I have read was given to the Argentines.
At the end of April the task force was close to the Falkland Islands. It had limited defences against attack, particularly from the air. It was operating 8,000 miles away from home against forces operating close to their

own mainland. Argentina could bring to bear both land-based aircraft and those on the aircraft carrier the 25th of May, which greatly increased the reach and flexibility of the Argentine air threat. Argentine ships could move quickly from the safe haven of areas close to the Argentine coast to positions where they could threaten our forces. The Royal Navy had no such easy options.
The first hostilities around the Falkland Islands took place on 1 May. That day Vulcan and Sea Harrier aircraft attacked Argentine positions on Stanley airfield to enforce the total exclusion zone. The task force itself came under attack for the first time from the Argentine air force and some Argentine aircraft were shot down. There was no doubt in Argentina about what was happening. Argentine radio on 1 May claimed that they had attacked the task force.
On 2 May there were clear and unequivocal indications that the task force was under further threat from a strong and co-ordinated pincer movement by the major units of the Argentine navy, including the cruiser General Belgrano and the aircraft carrier. The Prime Minister and her War Cabinet were advised of the threat in the light of the best military and intelligence assessments and were advised by the Chief of the Defence Staff that the rules of engagement should be changed to permit attacks on Argentine warships outside the exclusion zone.
No Prime Minister could have hesitated in the face of that advice. The rules of engagement were changed, not only to cope with the threat from the Belgrano but to cope with that from other Argentine warships on the high seas. Argentina had been clearly warned on 23 April that a threat to interfere with the mission of British forces would encounter the appropriate response.
On 4 May, Sir John Nott described to the House the circumstances of the attack on the Belgrano, saying that she had been detected at 8 pm on 2 May when the group of ships of which she was a part was closing on elements of our task force. Both the Falkland campaign White Paper and Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse's official dispatch also referred to detection on 2 May. We know that, in fact, she was sighted on 1 May. I will explain how the Prime Minister and I came to address this error in March of this year. The Prime Minister in her letter to the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) has fully explained the background to Sir John Nott's statement on 4 May.
Interest in these and other questions was heightened by the publication of a book on the sinking of the General Belgrano by Messrs Gayshon and Rice. From the time of publication in March 1984 a range of detail was available that raised a host of issues and questions. Two particular issues emerged: first, the date on which the Belgrano was detected; secondly, the course of the Belgrano and the orders under which she was operating from the time when she was first picked up by HMS Conqueror to that when she was sunk.
The right hon. Member for Llanelli wrote on behalf of the shadow Cabinet to the Prime Minister on 6 March 1984. His letter focused mainly on the issue of when the Belgrano had first been located and sighted, but also asked about the ship's course when it was sunk. His letter was referred to Mr. Ponting as the head of the appropriate division for advice and for a draft reply. I personally gave no guidance to Mr. Ponting about the advice that he should provide. My right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces went further and asked that the option of


admitting for the first time that the Belgrano was sighted on 1 May and not 2 May should be addressed. Mr. Ponting submitted his advice through my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces and it reached my office on 21 March. I intend to quote from Mr. Ponting's advice and also from the manuscript note written on that advice by my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces. I will, as I have said, make these documents available.
Mr. Ponting wrote:
You asked for a draft reply to send to No. 10 for the Prime Minister to send to Denzil Davies and the Shadow Cabinet. Minister (AF) asked me to prepare a draft admitting for the first time that the Belgrano was sighted on 1st May and not 2nd May, this is draft 2 attached. I have however prepared an alternative reply, draft 1, which maintains the existing public line. There are no operational or intelligence reasons for withholding the 1st May date and the choice between the drafts is therefore essentially political".

Mr. Ponting went on to set out the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative course, but left the issue to me. He said in his advice that the choice was "essentially political". My right hon. Friend added a manuscript note making it clear that it was he who had sought drafts on both bases in referring the matter to me.
It is plain beyond doubt that my right hon. Friend was determined that I, not he, should be able to make a proper judgment about how the Prime Minister should be advised to reply to the shadow Cabinet. It is also clear that the Minister of State for the Armed Forces was the first person whose name is associated with a policy of more, not less, disclosure. The Minister of State for the Armed Forces did not seek to take the decision, and merely ensured that I had the options in front of me.
In practice, I did not put either of Mr. Ponting's alternative drafts to the Prime Minister. The explanation is simple. On 19 March the hon. Member for Linlithgow wrote me a letter asking nine questions. In one respect the hon. Gentleman repeated the question about the date of the detection of the Belgrano, as had the letter from the right hon. Member for Llanelli. But the hon. Gentleman went on to ask a number of other questions concerning the course followed by the Belgrano, the details of the attack on her, and others relating to the Argentine aircraft carrier.
I decided that, as a result of the events that I have described, I could not properly discharge my duty to Parliament unless I had before me an account of events in the South Atlantic in a detail that no one until that time had considered necessary. Mr. Ponting was asked to prepare that document—the document known as the "Crown Jewels".
I must now read to the House the instructions that were sent to Mr. Ponting about what was required. The House will remember that the central issue of this debate is whether Ministers sought to cover up the events that we are discussing. My private secretary, Richard Mottram, wrote to Mr. Ponting on 22 March. I quote two passages of his minute:
The Secretary of State wishes to know the substance of what happened at the beginning of May 1982 in relation to the Belgrano and the Argentine aircraft carrier in order to judge how much of this can properly be made public without security implications. For the purpose of considering the substance, he would be grateful for a detailed chronology of the events leading up to the sinking of the Belgrano. This should cover the answers to the questions raised by Mr. Dalyell in his latest letter together with those to the following questions.

Having listed a range of other questions that might be worth exploring, Richard Mottram went on:
This list of questions"—
that is, his list of questions—
is simply those which occur to me and is not meant to be exhaustive. What the Secretary of State is seeking is a comprehensive account of events which covers all the information and not just that which underpins the main defensive line we have used hitherto. I would be happy to have this in log form with the relevant documents enclosed — given the possible sensitivity of some of the information involved there would be no need of course to copy it widely within the Department.

Additionally, I should be grateful for a draft reply to Mr. Dalyell's latest letter together with advice on whether the line proposed to be taken with Dalyell affects the line proposed to be taken with Denzil Davies.
Mr. Ponting's reply—[Interruption.] The House is fully aware that it would be inconceivable if the Civil Service were not to ensure that, if the Prime Minister is answering specialist questions, what she says is consistent with the advice from the specialist Department concerned. Mr. Ponting's reply to the minute is the document which is publicly known as the "Crown Jewels". It consists of Mr. Ponting's advice, an unclassified draft reply to the letter of the hon. Member for Linlithgow and a log, and supporting documentation, dealing with highly sensitive operational and intelligence aspects of the sinking of the Belgrano. The document is classified "Top Secret. Codeword". That classification would have been applied by Mr. Ponting, reflecting the classification of some of its source material.

Mr. Eric S. Heifer: What is the difference between determining the line and telling the truth?

Mr. Heseltine: "Determining the line" is simply the language that is commonly used in the Civil Service to describe the advice that Ministers are given for public disclosure. The hon. Gentleman will remember those words from his experience as a Minister in the Labour Government.
I should like to deal first with the conclusions which Mr. Ponting reached. He concluded that, on the basis of the information in the "Crown Jewels", the arguments put forward by the hon. Member for Linlithgow and his supporters could be refuted, but, because of the classification of the material, it was not possible to use it in public to refute detailed allegations.
As to what should be said to the hon. Member for Linlithgow, Mr. Ponting's advice was that the draft reply was simple because, whatever general line was taken, these issues related to detailed operational and intelligence information. He therefore submitted a draft reply to the hon. Member for Linlithgow, which read as follows:
Thank you for your letter of 19th March.

As I expect you know the Prime Minister has, in a letter to Denzil Davies, confirmed that the Belgrano was sighted on 1st May. However, the other questions you have raised in your letter all concern detailed operational and intelligence matters on which I am not prepared to comment.
Those are not my words, but Mr. Ponting's. They represent Mr. Ponting's considered advice to me on 29 March as to how I should reply to the hon. Member for Linlithgow. That advice presented me with difficult problems in carrying out my responsibilities to Parliament for the defence interests of the country and my responsibility to Parliament to provide it with as much information as is compatible with that security.
Mr. Ponting's role in the "Crown Jewels" is clear. He informed me that the long running arguments of the hon. Member for Linlithgow did not stand, that an effective negation of his case was incompatible with national security and that the hon. Gentleman should be sent a six-line reply closing down that line of inquiry. I could simply have accepted Mr. Ponting's advice that day and sent a reply on the basis that he proposed, but I refused to accept his advice.
I was scheduled to leave for a NATO meeting the following Monday, so there was therefore great urgency. I called a series of meetings on Friday 30 March and Sunday 1 April. Their purpose was to address how far information could be disclosed in answer to the right hon. Member for Llanelli and the hon. Member for Linlithgow without security implications. We had before us Mr. Ponting's advice, which leaned towards disclosure on when the Belgrano was sighted, but which was categorically opposed to answering the questions asked by the hon. Member for Linlithgow, on grounds of operational and intelligence security.
The first meeting ended inconclusively. I decided that I would report matters to the Prime Minister. However, after the meeting broke up, I discussed further the form of my advice to the Prime Minister with my permanent secretary, Sir Clive Whitmore. My private secretary was also present. The conclusion that was reached was recorded and I am making available a copy of that record. My problem was to define as responsibly as I could the line up to which I could reveal information to Parliament, but beyond which I could not go without damaging national security.
The conclusion that I reached provisionally was that it might well now be possible to reveal that the Conqueror first detected the Belgrano group on 30 April 1982, and first sighted the Belgrano itself on 1 May, but that the Government should not allow themselves to be driven beyond that point, whatever the pressures. Those conclusions were made known to Mr. Ponting at that time. He never queried them. They are totally inconsistent with Mr. Ponting's account in The Observer yesterday.

Mr. Dalyell: If this is the line that the Secretary of State is taking in relation to Mr. Ponting, as counsel said in court, he was not counsel for Mr. Dalyell but counsel for Mr. Ponting. Nevertheless, if this is the line, does the Secretary of State not think that he ought to have gone to court No. 2 at the Old Bailey himself, rather than send Richard Mottram, and submitted himself to examination by counsel?

Mr. Heseltine: I think the hon. Gentleman will understand on reflection that, as I and my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General have made clear, I had no part to play in the conduct of the case against Mr. Ponting. With the sole exception of the question arising out of the release of the "Crown Jewels" on security grounds, if it had been considered necessary or desirable by those conducting the case to have called me to the court, I should, of course, have been prepared to go. They did not ask me to go or consult me about whether they should ask me to go, and I was not called. I believe that that is a complete answer to the hon. Gentleman's question.
I reported my preliminary conclusions that Friday afternoon to the Prime Minister, but I was still not wholly

satisfied. I was determined to talk to the head of the appropriate intelligence agency and other intelligence experts outside the Ministry of Defence, in addition to my own advisers on these matters. That I did on the afternoon of Sunday 1 April. That meeting addressed in full the intelligence background to the action taken by the Government on 2 May 1982 and what might be said in response to the claims which were being made by the hon. Member for Linlithgow, Messrs. Gayshon and Rice and others about the interception of Argentine orders to its fleet. The House will appreciate that the information then appearing in the British press and in the books that I have mentioned was largely the product of Argentine sources, which were anxious, no doubt, to probe the scale of our understanding of their activities.
It was obvious that once the Government had confirmed that the Belgrano had reversed course at 9 am on 2 May and had headed for a number of hours in a westerly direction, the focus of attention would be on the intelligence assessment which led to the decision to sink the ship and upon allegations about Argentine orders to recall the fleet to port, and whether these had any connection with the so-called Peruvian peace initiative.
It is possible to answer a question on a matter of fact which is not of itself classified, but if that single answer then becomes, as one would anticipate that it might, a precedent for a series of similar questions, that series could lead rapidly into matters that are classified. As events have shown, the disclosure of information about the movements of the Belgrano has led precisely to detailed questions, the answers to which would breach national security. The advice put to me by the Government's intelligence authorities at the time was that it would not be possible safely to comment on these matters. They gave me their reasons, which were compelling, and Mr. Ponting was present. I concluded, therefore, that the preliminary judgment that I had reached on Friday 30 March should stand—that we should not enter into a debate with the hon. Member for Linlithgow about events at the beginning of May 1982. That judgment reflected Mr. Ponting's advice.
It has now been alleged that that decision was to do with political embarrassment. I deny that allegation utterly. At that time I recommended that we should face political embarrassment involved in correcting the date when the Belgrano had been detected. I concluded that to maintain the statement made originally to the House by Sir John Nott was no longer right. I therefore advised the Prime Minister, who immediately and without qualification agreed.
Consequently, the Prime Minister replied to the right hon. Member for Llanelli on 4 April essentially on the basis of the advice that I had given the previous Friday. I had a further brief word with my right hon. Friend on Monday 2 April, at which my right hon. Friend the Minister for State for the Armed Forces was present. That was the only occasion on which he discussed these matters with the Prime Minister. He did so at my invitation and in my presence. The Prime Minister's reply was in much fuller terms than Mr. Ponting had originally recommended and along the lines that I had suggested.
The dispatch by the Prime Minister of her letter to the right hon. Member for Llanelli opened the way for me to deal with the original nine questions of the hon. Member for Linlithgow in his letter to me of 19 March. I was about to do that when the hon. Gentleman wrote to the Prime


Minister pursuing issues raised in her letter to the right hon. Member for Llanelli. The hon. Member for Linlithgow wrote a four-page letter which covered the Belgrano's course, our intelligence capability, the motivation behind the decisions and issues concerning the rules of engagement. When referring to the Prime Minister's letter the hon. Gentleman said:
You stressed that on 2nd May we had indications about the movements of the Argentine fleet which lead to Admiral Woodward's request for a change in the Rules of Engagement. What precisely were those indications? … My information is that the Argentine fleet was by that time under orders to return to base and you knew that. Gayshon and Rice in their book set precise times (2007 hours on 1st May and 0119 hours on 2nd May) when those orders were sent by Admiral Allara, and by the Naval Command in Buenos Aires. The text of one of those messages is included in their book.
The hon. Member for Linlithgow, within one day of the Government's response to the shadow Cabinet, was attempting to draw us precisely into those areas of security which we had anticipated he would and on which we knew we would not be able to comment. We could not have had a speedier or clearer vindication of our judgment that the hon. Gentleman would not rest until our security and intelligence protection was stripped away.
In line with the approach that I had previously discussed with the Prime Minister, it was suggested that my right hon. Friend should reply very briefly to the hon. Member for Linlithgow, making it clear that his purpose in asking these questions was to establish his contention that the attack on the Belgrano was related to Peruvian peace proposals—all of the allegations appeared yet again in his letter. In those circumstances, it was not useful to prolong the exchanges. That was what Ministers decided. The Prime Minister replied along those lines on 12 April, but before she did so, Mr. Ponting, as one of the responsible officials, was invited to comment on the approach that she was considering. On 10 April he said that he would not dissent from the suggestion that the Prime Minister should avoid detailed exchanges with the hon. Member for Linlithgow and that a general reply would be sufficient.
The House will realise that, because the hon. Member for Linlithgow had written on 5 April to the Prime Minister and attention was focused on her reply, I had at this stage yet to reply to the nine questions in the hon. Gentleman's earlier letter of 19 March, which had been at the heart of the "Crown Jewels" exercise, during which Mr. Ponting had already submitted to me one draft reply, which I have read to the House.
On the same day that the Prime Minister sent her general reply to the hon. Member for Linlithgow —1 April — Mr. Ponting submitted further advice on the questions put to me on 19 March.

Mr. Robert Sheldon: rose——

Mr. Heseltine: The advice that Mr. Ponting gave me was diametrically opposed to that in his earlier draft. Although he told me on 29 March that it was not possible to answer the questions of the hon. Member for Linlithgow because they touched on operational and intelligence matters, on 12 April he told me that the answers were not classified and should therefore be given.
My right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, having read Mr. Ponting's advice, minuted

me to point out that it was inconsistent with the line that the Prime Minister had just taken with the agreement of all involved, including Mr. Ponting, in her reply to the hon. Member for Linlithgow.

Mr. Sheldon: rose——

Mr. Heseltine: I shall give way, but not in the middle of a sequence of events which it is important for the House to hear in one piece.
My right hon. Friend the Minister could not have behaved more properly or more speedily. But it would not have made any difference if he had not sent me a minute, because I was already fully aware of the background to these issues and that for no apparent reason Mr. Ponting had changed his advice and now sought to reverse my earlier decision.

Mr. Sheldon: The right hon. Gentleman is making a great deal of the fact that Mr. Ponting was giving advice of a kind that fitted in exactly with what the right hon. Gentleman wished. Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that civil servants do that all the time? When I was on the Fulton committee, I saw that happening all the time. Parliamentary secretaries always provide the sort of information that they know will be required by a Minister. That happens all the time and is not a cause for surprise.

Mr. Heseltine: That is one of the most scurrilous attacks on the Civil Service that I have ever heard. [Interruption.]
Mr. Speaker: Order. I call the Secretary of State.

Mr. Heseltine: The House has heard me read my private secretary's instructions to Mr. Ponting to provide me with the truth. There was no possible, conceivable pressure on Mr. Ponting to do anything but to tell me the whole story at the time.
As I said, Mr. Ponting, for no apparent reason, had changed his advice and sought to reverse my earlier decision based on that advice. I therefore replied in general terms to the hon. Member for Linlithgow on 18 April in line with the decision which the Prime Minister and I had taken on the basis of the advice of our most senior advisers on matters affecting national security, and in conformity with Mr. Ponting's earlier advice and agreement. Mr. Ponting made no protest about my answer, either to me or to his superiors through the established channels of complaint open to members of Her Majesty's Civil Service.
Neither I nor my right hon. Friend the Minister ever had a coherent explanation for Mr. Ponting's change of advice, until yesterday. In The Sunday Times Mr. Ponting gave his explanation. He stated:
When the 'Crown Jewels' were actually written, I had four days to do it in. It was very complex and I did not have time for analysis. It was only later that I realised that much of the information was not classified and could be released.
For the House to judge the credibility of this explanation, I shall set out the actual time scale of Mr. Ponting's involvement. Mr. Ponting had been looking into some of these issues since the letter of the right hon. Member for Llanelli was referred to his division at the beginning of March. Certainly he had been the head of the division only since 9 March, but he was an experienced official and could draw on the advice of other experienced officials. He had far more time to analyse these matters than the Ministers who had to account to Parliament and to draw on his advice and the advice of the other experts


concerned. In any case, on 10 April, after about five weeks in the job, he was advising that the Prime Minister should send a general reply, and two days later he proposed that I should do the exact opposite.
We should now move on to the heart of the Opposition's amendment—that my memorandum to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee provided a misleading account of changes in the rules of engagement during the Falklands campaign. We should move on, not only because it is specifically referred to in the Opposition's amendment, but because until very recently it was said to have been Mr. Ponting's shock at Ministers' handling of that evidence to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee that forced him to overturn all the instincts, after 14 years in the Civil Service, that told him that loyalty was to Ministers and to the Department. Those words came from The Observer yesterday. We should move on if we accept Mr. Ponting's version of events—that is, his version of events until a week ago.
Far from acting in protest against the Foreign Affairs Select Committee memorandum, we were still 11 weeks away from the submission of that memorandum. Far from being driven to near breaking point by ministerial consideration of the handling of parliamentary questions in mid-May, Mr. Ponting began the process of breaking his loyalty to Ministers and to the ethics of Her Majesty's Civil Service on 24 April, when he sent an anonymous letter to the hon. Member for Linlithgow. As I have told the House, I had replied to the hon. Member for Linlithgow on 18 April in line with the policy advice that Mr. Ponting himself had originated, and which the Prime Minister and I had accepted. For no good reason, Mr. Ponting later tried to persuade me to change that position. He failed. Within days of receiving a copy of my letter to the hon. Member for Linlithgow, he began the process of feeding ideas and questions to the hon. Member for Linlithgow anonymously.

Mr. Dalyell: The ideas on the rules of engagement came from me, as will be witnessed by the discussions that I had with Professor John Erickson of the University of Edinburgh. As we are on this subject, let me quote a letter from the hon. Member for Stroud (Sir A. Kershaw), Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee — [HON. MEMBERS: "When?"]—1 June 1984. It stated:
Dear Tam, Thank you for your letter of 19 May, to which I am sorry not to have been able to reply sooner. I will certainly keep confidential the letter you were kind enough to send me. I would doubt whether it really alters the situation. That situation will be reflected in the answers to your questions and I regard the letter as more in the nature of an encouragement than a breach of any confidence.
That was the view of a senior member of the Conservative party.

Mr. Heseltine: In no way would I wish to misrepresent the hon. Gentleman. I think I heard him say that the letter he wrote was dated 19 May, but the anonymous letter that he received was on 24 April. I think the hon. Gentleman said that the ideas about the rules of engagement were his. I hope the House will remember that the hon. Gentleman has claimed those ideas for his own, when later I explain certain factual contributions. I shall take the opportunity to remind the House of that precise intervention later in my speech.

Mr. Dalyell: The right hon. Gentleman should get his officials to phone Erickson.

Mr. Heseltine: As I said, within days of receiving a copy of my letter to the hon. Member for Linlithgow, Mr. Ponting began the process of feeding ideas and questions to the hon. Gentleman anonymously.
On 19 August 1984 the hon. Member for Linlithgow was quoted in The Observer as having received three documents, the first of which was dated 24 April and sent to him at the House of Commons in a plain envelope similar to that containing the other papers which he subsequently received in mid-July. When this article appeared in August, there was little that those concerned with security in my Department could be expected to do. No one knew at the time where that anonymous letter had originated.
On the night of Mr. Ponting's acquittal—a week ago today, on Monday 11 February—"News at Ten" carried an interview with Mr. Ponting which was, I believe, a shortened version of one shown earlier that evening on Channel 4. The film showed Mr. Ponting typing a letter. It showed the envelope in which it was sent, addressed to the hon. Member for Linlithgow and postmarked 24 April. I shall place in the Library of the House a copy of the contents of that letter transcribed from the copy shown on the television screen.
I shall now read the contents of that letter — [Interruption.] I should alert the House to the fact that the envelope on the screen was clearly dated 24 April. Again, I do not want to misrepresent the hon. Member for Linlithgow. He says that the letter was undated, but the envelope was dated by the post officials, and I think I am right in saying that the hon. Gentleman later admitted that he had the letter on 24 April. I do not think that there is any difference between us on the technical question of when he got the letter, although there may be differences between us about what happened as a consequence.
In reading this letter I must now fulfil my undertaking to remind the House of what the hon. Member for Linlithgow said a few minutes ago—that the ideas about the rules of engagement originated with him. The letter stated:
Dear Mr. Dalyell, For what I hope will be obvious reasons I cannot give you my name but I can tell that I have full access to exactly what happened to the Belgrano. You have probably seen by now that Michael Heseltine has not covered any of the questions that you posed in your letter in March. This was against the advice of officials but in line with what John Stanley recommended. None of the information is classified and to get answers you should put the questions down as PQs. The answers will be quite interesting. In addition you might like to consider another linked question. Did the change in the Rules of Engagement on 2nd May refer only to the Belgrano or did they go wider? When were the Rules of Engagement changed to allow an attack on the 25 de Mayo? Was this on 2nd May or was it earlier. If so, when?

You are on the right track. Keep going."
It will be seen that this letter was sent on 24 April. If Mr. Ponting is the author, as he claims he is, it is not consistent with his argument that he was driven to leak by my behaviour or by the behaviour of my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces in May or July. In the news programmes in which it was shown, the impression was created that he was forced to write anonymously because of the exchanges that he had had with the Minister of State for the Armed Forces in May about the handling of parliamentary questions. I shall come to that issue in a moment. The only problem with this version of events is that not even my right hon. Friend can take actions in May which provoke a civil servant to


write anonymously in April. I know that my right hon. Friend is regarded in some quarters as having the most extraordinary powers. He was even accused two weeks ago by the hon. Member for Linlithgow of managing to doctor Admiral Fieldhouse's official dispatch in 1982, while at the time he was serving the Government as a highly successful Minister for Housing and Construction.

Mr. Dalyell: Remember his Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies' connections.

Mr. Heseltine: We have the highest regard for my right hon. Friend, but even we do not think that he has powers of this supernatural quality.
What was the true sequence of events? As I have said, Mr. Ponting appears to have written anonymously to the hon. Member for Linlithgow very soon after he had seen the terms in which I had written to the hon. Member. There was not much time devoted to agonising. As we know, since the full text of the letter became available a week ago, he suggested that the hon. Member for Linlithgow should do two things: first, that he should put down for answer in Parliament the unanswered questions from his letter of 19 March; secondly, that he should ask some new questions about changes in the rules of engagement.
As we now know, the hon. Member for Linlithgow acted on the first suggestion separately from the second. He put down as questions to me some of those left over from his earlier letter. He also asked a related question to the Prime Minister about how many times contact was made and lost between Conqueror and the Belgrano on 1 and 2 May, what were the reasons for the loss of contact on each occasion, and if she would make a statement. At the same time, on 1 May, he wrote me a further letter asking me to answer his questions.
The answers to the parliamentary questions were addressed first and came in the normal way to my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces. All but one of the questions in the event fell by the wayside because the hon. Member for Linlithgow was suspended from the House. The one that remained was to the Prime Minister. Not surprisingly, my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces was in touch with No. 10 Downing street about it.
My right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces asked for Mr. Ponting's views on 9 May on the suggestion that the Prime Minister should reply in part:
It is not our practice to comment on military operational matters or the details of military operations.
Those who regard that phrase as sinister might reflect that Mr. Ponting himself had recommended some six weeks previously that the hon. Member for Linlithgow's questions should not be answered because:
all concerned detailed operational and intelligence matters on which I am not prepared to comment.
The hon. Member's question, if answered in full, would have gone to the heart of our submarine capability. An answer, if given, would add nothing to the essential story about why and how the Belgrano was sunk. Mr. Ponting put up advice on 9 May saying that the formula suggested by my right hon. Friend could not be sustained and recommended again that I should answer the hon. Member for Linlithgow's questions.
There was no reason to change the approach agreed earlier. It misled no one—certainly the hon. Member

for Linlithgow was under no illusions about what it meant. It was not necessary to deploy the sentence to which Mr. Ponting objected. It is ridiculous to suggest that there was no operational sensitivity about disclosing details of Conqueror's sonar stalk of the Belgrano. Therefore, when my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister answered the question on 17 May, she followed the strategic approach which I had agreed with her, but the sentence to which Mr. Ponting objected was not in the answer. In other words, the real lesson of these events is that I and my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces went to some lengths to consult Mr. Ponting and to try to take account of his views. He, meanwhile, was conducting an argument with us, having already started writing anonymously to the hon. Member for Linlithgow.
Before we leave the anonymous letter of 24 April, it is worth recalling the second of Mr. Ponting's suggestions. This is the point at which the hon. Member for Linlithgow was telling us that he had originated the process of interrogation. Mr. Ponting offered the hon. Member for Linlithgow some new questions on rules of engagement. When the hon. Gentleman wrote to me again on 27 May, there, as large as life, were Mr. Ponting's anonymous questions repeated word for word. So much for the suggestion that it was the hon. Gentleman who conceived that these were questions that should be asked.
The constitutional novelty that the House is expected to support, if the Opposition have their way, is that the most trusted civil servants, in the most secure parts of our defence establishments, should be free anonymously to draft questions for Opposition Back Benchers to submit to Ministers on which the self-same leaking civil servants may then brief the Ministers on the answers which they consider appropriate. The Opposition may perhaps be beginning to wonder whether they have been any better served by Mr. Ponting than I was. I now come, finally, to the issue of the memorandum that I submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee on rules of engagement.
I say "I submitted" deliberately, because that memorandum has come to be called the "Stanley Memorandum". The memorandum was presented to Ministers by Michael Legge, head of defence secretariat 11, and his minute is known as the "Legge Minute."

Mr. Dennis Skinner: Is the right hon. Gentleman sure about him?

Mr. Heseltine: If it helps the hon. Gentleman in his characteristic attempts to denigrate everything that is said in the House, I must tell him that Michael Legge is an exemplary and talented civil servant.
I made it clear to the Foreign Affairs Committee, when I gave evidence to it, that it was a memorandum which I approved and which is therefore my responsibility. My right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces certainly advised me—that is what he is there to do—but I decided to send in the memorandum, and I am wholly responsible for what happened.
So what did happen? The Foreign Affairs Committee was not investigating the sinking of the Belgrano. The terms of reference of its inquiry are clear. They were:
To examine progress towards the restoration of diplomatic and commercial relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina since June 1982; to examine the future constitutional and economic development of the Falkland Islands; and to


examine the prospects for a negotiated settlement of the UK/Argentine dispute over the Falkland Islands in the light of the establishment of a democratic regime in Buenos Aires and in the light of previous failures to secure such a settlement.
In his letter of 28 June the Clerk of the Foreign Affairs Committee——

Mr. Ian Mikardo: Surely the right hon. Gentleman is aware that the Select Committee decided to conduct two inquiries, one with the terms of reference that he has just quoted, and the other on the events arising out of the happenings on 1 and 2 May. There were two separate inquiries.

Mr. Heseltine: If what the hon. Gentleman says is the case, I unreservedly accept that point. [Interruption.] However, that does not change the significance of the letter that we received in the Department from the Clerk of the Foreign Affairs Committee. This letter set the terms upon which the original advice and memorandum were placed. It asked for:
A note of all changes in the Rules of Engagement issued to HM Forces in the South Atlantic between 2nd April and 15th June 1982 and confinning the accuracy of Mr. Pym's statement to the Committee on 11th June that changes in the Rules of Engagement: 'happened quite a number of times in the course of the war.'
This request presented my Department with a difficulty. A comprehensive list of all the changes in the rules of engagement would have been classified, but we were advised that the Committee would prefer the note to be unclassified. Ministers therefore received a draft addressing the issue which had provoked the original inquiry, but in a document which was not in itself classified.
The memorandum was not misleading. It never purported to be a comprehensive list of all the changes in the rules of engagement, and it could never have been read as such. If the Foreign Affairs Committee wished, in the light of our advice, still to receive a comprehensive list, it had a simple remedy open to it, and that was to ask again for such a list. I would have supplied it on a classified basis and, indeed, subsequently I did.
The House will realise that I discussed the matter with the Foreign Affairs Committee when I appeared before it. It would be quite wrong of me to anticipate its views, but I must provide for the House my views on the significance of the so-called Legge minute advising me how to respond to the Select Committee's request.
Paragraph 1 of that minute sets out the basis of the request from the Committee which I have read to the House. Paragraph 2 gives five reasons why I should not comply with the Committee's request in full. The first reason transcends all the others, and I shall read it to the House:
Firstly, the rules of engagement themselves are classified and are drawn from the Fleet operating and tactical instructions, which is a classified document. The Committee has indicated that they would prefer the note to be unclassified.
The second reason leaves no responsible Secretary of State any discretion, and I shall read it to the House:
Secondly, some of the rules of engagement are still in force for our Falklands garrison. We run the risk of undermining their effectiveness if they were published and debated openly by the Foreign Affairs Committee.
The third and fourth reasons are about the time involved and the problems of converting the rules to layman's language. They are not compelling.
The fifth reason is presumably that which motivates the Opposition today. It reads:

In addition, a full list of changes would provide more information than Ministers have been prepared to reveal so far about the Belgrano affair.
Taken out of context by someone unaware of the circumstances, that sounds damaging. But in the context of the first two reasons it is clearly not the reason why I did not give the Foreign Affairs Committee a full list of rules of engagement changes. My duty, first and foremost, is to national security. The House will realise that in this case Ministers followed the official and expert military advice of the Department, and I have never doubted that it was right.
The House will know that as soon as the memorandum had been sent to the Select Committee, Mr. Ponting leaked it to the hon. Member for Linlithgow, who took to the Foreign Affairs Committee the document containing the advice of his, Mr. Ponting's, colleague, Michael Legge. Mr. Ponting's explanation is that this was the straw that broke the camel's back; that his sense of integrity no longer permitted him to hold back from sending papers that he leaked to a wider world. Of course, he had been writing anonymous letters before that, but that is the explanation about which we have been told.

Mr. Nigel Spearing: rose——

Mr. Heseltine: There is one small gap in the logic of Mr. Ponting's position. Perhaps it would have a momentary credibility if Mr. Ponting's first exposure of his colleague Michael Legge's work was when it was presented, beyond Mr. Ponting's influence, to the Foreign Affairs Committee. The facts are diametrically opposed to this version of events.

Mr. Spearing: rose——

Mr. Heseltine: Michael Legge's name appears at the bottom of the Legge memorandum. Michael Legge was the head of defence secretariat 11 at the time. But the memorandum was not the sole product of Michael Legge's division. It was the joint work of two civilian divisions, together with military advice. Michael Legge was one of those divisions.

Mr. Gerald Kaufman: Michael's leg was pulled.

Mr. Heseltine: It was, by Mr. Ponting. But the truth is that the leg that has been pulled further and faster in this debate is the leg of the Opposition, and it is not surprising that they have not even one leg left on which to stand.

Mr. Dalyell: rose——

Mr. Speaker: Order. The Secretary of State is not giving way.

Mr. Dalyell: rose——

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) can see for himself that the Secretary of State is not giving way.

Mr. Dalyell: rose—

Mr. Spearing: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. It may be that you can see that the Secretary of State is not giving way to my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow, (Mr. Dalyell). But, through you, may I ask whether the Secretary of State has seen me seeking to intervene?

Mr. Speaker: I think that the Secretary of State saw the hon. Gentleman rise, but he can say that for himself.

Mr. Spearing: Will the right hon. Gentleman allow me to intervene?

Mr. Heseltine: No. I hope the House will feel that I have given way to hon. Members at points which have not interrupted the flow of what is a complicated explanation. It is very important that the House hears this critical analysis, because this is at the heart of the Opposition's amendment.
As I was saying, this memorandum was the joint work of two civilian divisions, together with military advice. Michael Legge's was one of those divisions. The other division was Mr. Ponting's. Michael Legge submitted his first advice to my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces on 6 July. On the same day, he sent me a copy. He also sent a copy to Mr. Ponting, whose junior officials had co-operated in its production.
Ministers made no change to the basic approach in that draft memorandum. It was ready to be issued to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 16 July. Mr. Ponting, upon whom I was entitled to rely for advice, spent 10 days in absolute silence. He made no protest to my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces. He made no protest to me. He made no protest to any of his senior colleagues, only some of whom had been involved in earlier discussions. If he had had this sense of outrage about what his own colleagues were advising, why did he not challenge their advice? Why did he not try to stop the memorandum from going to the Foreign Affairs Committee in the first place?
I was entitled to expect that a man in such a position of trust would give me his full and dispassionate advice, but he did not. Parliament is expected to believe that, before Ministers make statements to the House or its Committees, civil servants in senior positions will advise on the text of such submissions. Mr. Ponting did not.
So we have another constitutional novelty. A senior and trusted civil servant upon whom Ministers were entitled to rely for loyal and conscientious service claims it proper to sit in silence believing that Ministers are deceiving Parliament so that at the moment that it happens he may leak anonymously the advice of his own Civil Service colleagues which he has done nothing to counter.
The Government, the Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces and I, and those official advisers with whom we have worked in a spirit of trust and mutual loyalty, have fully discharged their duties and have misled no one. The House will judge whether Mr. Ponting can say the same.
What lay, and still lies today, at the heart of these issues is the safety of British service men serving in the South Atlantic. Ministers were faced over the weekend of 1–2 May 1982 with clear evidence that the Argentine navy was planning to attack the task force. A major part of that threat was the General Belgrano. The task force commander decided that he must respond by attacking the Belgrano and so remove that source of danger to his ships. Exactly when the Belgrano was first sighted and exactly where she was when sunk were not relevant to the starkly dangerous and uncertain situation that our forces were in.
Ministers would have behaved with the utmost irresponsibility if they had rejected the advice of the Government's military advisers and not given the task force commander the authority that he had sought. They gave me that authority. HMS Conqueror sank the Belgrano. The Argentine navy was effectively knocked

out of the conflict. The Government have already published a great deal of information about these events of nearly three years ago. I should like to be able to give the House every single detail, but I cannot today, just as my predecessor could not at the time. Some of the crucial information came to us from the most sensitive sources. Those sources are as vital to us and to our armed forces now as they were in 1982.
I, as the Secretary of State for Defence, have to balance my responsibility to give information to this House with my duty to safeguard national security, and in particular the security of our forces. That is a difficult line to draw. But I and my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister have always made it clear that that was what we were doing. Ours have not been the actions of people engaged in a hole-in-the-corner cover-up, in an attempt to mislead this House. Ours have been the actions of Ministers exercising the highest and most difficult responsibilities of our office.

Mr. Denzil Davies: I beg to move, to leave out from "House" to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof:
believes that, by seeking to conceal information from, and to purvey distorted and misleading information to, the House of Commons and its Foreign Affairs Committee on the subject of the sinking of the General Belgrano, Ministers have betrayed their responsibility to Parliament.".

As was to be expected, the Secretary of State tried to carry out a character assassination of Mr. Ponting. Indeed, it was entirely to be expected because that, at the end of the day, is the only case which the Secretary of State can try to put at that Dispatch Box. He gave an account of a very unreal world in the Ministry of Defence. This terrible man Ponting, who had been given the Order of the British Empire on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, was trying to prevent information from being disclosed to Parliament when over a period of three years these innocent Ministers—the Secretary of State, the Minister of State for the Armed Forces and the Prime Minister—were desperately keen to let Parliament have all the information that they could about the Belgrano. That is the unreal world in which the Secretary of State seems to have been living, because the world at the Old Bailey a few weeks ago was quite different.
The Opposition do not condone breaches of trust by civil servants or by Ministers who have a duty to account to this House, but at the Old Bailey a civil servant, who had spent 14 years in the Civil Service, risked prosecution and a gaol sentence of at least six months. That was the kind of sentence that Sarah Tisdall received when she was prosecuted by the right hon. Gentleman's Government. This civil servant apparently did not want to disclose any information. He carried out the wishes of Ministers. Then, by some kind of magic catalyst, he ended up at the Old Bailey where his whole career and future were put in jeopardy. That is the kind of unreal and selective account which the Secretary of State has tried to put before the House this afternoon.
The Secretary of State referred to the trial. He could have challenged some of the evidence given by Mr. Ponting at his trial at the Old Bailey—[Horn. MEMBERS: "How?"] How? By calling witnesses to refute that evidence. Is the Secretary of State saying that counsel for the Crown and the Treasury Solicitor did not know what


evidence was being given when they sat in court day after day? The right hon. Gentleman could have refuted that evidence.

Mr. Heseltine: rose——

Mr. Davies: I shall give way to the Secretary of State in a moment.
That evidence could have been refuted where it should have been refuted. The first place to refute it was before an Old Bailey jury on oath. The right hon. Gentleman did not have the guts to go to the Old Bailey——

Mr. Heseltine: rose——

Mr. Davies: I shall give way when I have completed this part of my argument. The Secretary of State did not have the guts to go to the Old Bailey. Instead he sent his poor, unfortunate private secretary. Those of us who have served in Government know of the difficult and conflicting loyalties faced by a private secretary: that on the one hand he has a loyalty to his Minister and that on the other hand he is a member of the Civil Service. It is a very difficult job. The Secretary of State, in a cowardly way, sent his private secretary to give evidence for him at the Old Bailey.

Mr. Heseltine: I realise that the right hon. Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies) does not understand how — [Interruption.] I have no idea what papers were put before the court. I have not seen the transcript of the trial proceedings. I was not asked to go to the court. The conduct of these matters is wholly outside the influence or control of Ministers.

Mr. Davies: Nobody is asking Ministers to influence or control anything. My point is that if the Secretary of State objected to the evidence given by Mr. Ponting—and now he has objected to it—why was Mr. Ponting's evidence not objected to at the time it was given? Obviously the Secretary of State has not read the newspapers during the past few weeks. He did not know what was going on at the Old Bailey and it did not interest him, although his Department was heavily involved. Although his private secretary was at the Old Bailey, the Secretary of State knew nothing about it. I remind him of what was said at the Old Bailey by Queen's Counsel for Mr. Ponting at an early stage in the trial.

Mr. Tony Baldry: rose——

Mr. Davies: Mr. Ponting was acquitted by the Old Bailey jury. [Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order. The Secretary of State was heard in silence. If the shadow Minister does not give way, hon. Members must resume their seats.

Mr. Davies: Mr. Ponting was acquitted. I should have thought that the party of law and order would have some respect for courts of law and British juries.
Perhaps I may remind the Secretary of State and the Minister of State, who apparently did not read the newspapers, either, although he featured in them almost every day, of what Mr. Laughland, counsel for Mr. Ponting, said right at the beginning of the trial:
Let me make our position perfectly plain. This trial is not about spying. It is a matter of lying, of misleading Parliament.
That is what the trial at the Old Bailey was about. This debate is about the consequences of that trial and about the not guilty verdict; it is about the extraordinary revelations,

which the Secretary of State has not refuted, about the conduct of Ministers that came out at that trial; it is about a conspiracy to withhold information from this House for a period of almost three years; and it is about the breach by Ministers of the sacred trust of accountability which we believe they owe to this House. Let us be quite clear. The trial at the Old Bailey was not in reality the case of Regina against Ponting; it was the case of Thatcher, Heseltine and Stanley against Ponting. Much to the chagrin of the Secretary of State, the jury held for Ponting.
The Secretary of State went over the history of the matter and I shall try to do so, I hope, at shorter length, although I am not criticising him for the length of his speech. The whole tangled web, as the House knows, which the Government have sought to weave, as we believe, over almost three years in this matter follows from a statement that many of us in the House heard on that fateful day, 4 May 1982. Sir John Nott, the then Secretary of State for Defence, told the House that the battleship, the General Belgrano, had been first sighted on 2 May and was sunk the day it was sighted.

Mr. Richard Hickmet: rose——

Mr. Davies: No, I shall not give way at this stage. I should have thought that that is a fairly uncontroversial statement.

Mr. Peter Bruinvels: The General Belgrano was a cruiser, not a battleship.

Mr. Davies: I am sorry.
The statement which Sir John Nott made was untrue. But we have always accepted, and we say it again now, that that statement—that untruth—was a genuine error which was made without any bad faith, in the heat of armed conflict and armed battle.
I believe that there are few hon. Members—at least, I hope so—if any hon. Members who would argue that the high standards of accountability which the House demands of Ministers should be lower in time of war than in time of peace. But most hon. Members would also recognise that in time of war it may well be much more difficult to maintain those high standards. However, the duty on a democratic Government is to put the record straight immediately it is possible for them to do so, and, by putting the record straight, discharging that duty which a Government owe to the House of Commons.
It would be dangerous for our democracy if Governments felt that they did not have to put the record straight and it would be very dangerous if we in the House were to condone that behaviour, because then we would be saying that the standard of accountability is lower in times of war than in times of peace.
The first charge that we make against the Government is that the Government, and the Prime Minister in particular, fell down on that duty of accountability and failed to set the record straight as soon as it was possible to do so. There were plenty of opportunities to do so. There were plenty of opportunities for the Government to set the record straight about the incorrect date of 2 May which, as I have said, was not given in bad faith.
First of all—perhaps not first of all, but certainly there was the White Paper published in December 1982 which repeated the same false statement about the date of 2 May, although Ministers, certainly at the Ministry of


Defence if not other Ministers, knew at the time that that date was wrong and knew when the Belgrano was detected. Again, the same false statement was put into the London Gazette. We have read the accounts about Admiral Fieldhouse. Whether he wanted the date changed, I do not know, and I do not propose to go down that particular road.
Another 15 months went by during a period, as the Secretary of State has said, of controversy, of questions in the House, of statements by people outside the House, of letters to newspapers, articles and books written, and nothing at all was said or done about the matter. Finally, on 4 April 1984 the truth was dragged out of a reluctant Prime Minister—15 months after the White Paper which could have contained the statement.
As the Secretary of State has said, the truth came in a letter from the Prime Minister in response to a letter which I sent to her on behalf of the Shadow Cabinet. That letter said that an auxiliary oiler accompanying the Belgrano was spotted on 30 April 1982; the Belgrano group was detected on 1 May and the Belgrano was sunk on 2 May.

Mr. Hickmet: I thank the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. I want to ask him a serious question which is central to the motion and the amendment thereto. Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that there was no alternative but for the Conqueror to sink the Belgrano? Does he further accept that that ship was not sunk in an effort to scupper the so-called Peruvian peace proposals?

Mr. Davies: I do not think that the hon. Gentleman was in the House when the statement was made on 4 May but I shall answer his question. I made a statement on the BBC "Today" programme in my capacity as deputy defence spokesman for the Labour party the morning the Belgrano was sunk. When asked about the sinking, I said that if the General Belgrano was a threat to the Royal Navy and to our task force, appropriate action should be taken. But I said at the time that I did not know—I did not have the facts to know — whether it was a threat or not. Unfortunately, with all the prevarications and cover-ups that have been going on, we still do not have the facts. But when we get all the facts I shall make up my mind whether it was a threat. [Interruption.] I see that the Prime Minister finds this amusing. But let me return to the letter. She did not find the letter very amusing, as I shall try to show in a moment. During the whole two years, not only did the Government deliberately fail to give us those three dates instead of 2 May, but the Prime Minister had the effrontery to stand at that Dispatch Box on 21 February 1984 and try to pretend to the House that we had all the facts about that available to us in the House.
With your permission, Mr. Speaker, I shall read the exchanges which took place on 21 February at Prime Minister's Question Time between my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) and the Prime Minister on that very matter. My hon. Friend said:
As the captain of the Conquerer has said in print that he was following the General Belgrano for at least 30 hours and the Government persist in claiming that the General Belgrano was detected on the same day as it was sunk,"—
that is the very point—
who is telling the truth or, bluntly, is it the submarine commander or the Prime Minister who is lying?
Mr. Speaker said:

Order. The hon. Member must not use that word. I am sure that he will rephrase that final comment.
My hon. Friend is adept at rephrasing his questions, so he asked:
Is it the submarine commander or the Prime Minister who is telling the truth?
The Prime Minister said:
The full facts were given in several replies in the House and, I believe, in an Adjournment debate, in an article by my right hon. Friend the former Foreign Secretary and one by the former ambassador to the United States. All the facts are there. They support the Government's case." — [Official Report, 21 February 1984; Vol. 54, c. 695.]

I wrote to the Prime Minister on 6 March and she replied for the first time and gave the dates on 4 April. All the facts were not there. [Interruption.] Or perhaps all the facts were there, but they certainly were not here, in the House. Perhaps now at least—I put it very kindly—the Prime Minister will have the good grace to come to the Dispatch Box and say that on that occasion her statement was wrong—[Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order.

Mr. Davies: The right hon. Lady at least owes the House an apology for that. I was about to say what happened after that single revelation of the truth. However, according to the Secretary of State it was Mr. Ponting who was stopping Ministers from divulging any information. That terrible man Ponting again — the Secretary of State straining at the leash and Ponting holding him back. But the reality — not the unreal account that the Secretary of State gave us this afternoon —is that pretty soon afterwards Ministers decided that they would not really answer any more embarrassing questions about the Belgrano. Whatever the motive, that is what ultimately led to the sending of the Legge memorandum by Mr. Ponting to my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell), and to the prosecution and acquittal of Mr. Ponting at the Old Bailey.

Viscount Cranborne: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Davies: I shall not give way, as I wish to develop the point. It is worth recalling——

Viscount Cranborne: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Davies: I shall not give way.
Although the Secretary of State has been very reluctant even to look at the transcript of the trial, it is worth recalling what Mr. Ponting said on oath and under cross-examination on day seven of the trial about Ministers and the Legge report. Moreover, our court procedures are respected in this country. What Mr. Ponting said under oath about the Legge report sums up the whole problem facing the Government. He said:
I thought it
—the Legge report—
was clearly showing that ministers were misleading a Select Committee of the House of Commons, and that they had misled the House of Commons consistently for two years before that." The Secretary of State did not know that. Apparently he did not know that Mr. Ponting had said it. But there it is —he said it in the Old Bailey.

Several Hon. Members: rose——

Mr. Davies: There are no prizes for guessing who those Ministers were: the Secretary of State for Defence, the Minister of State for the Armed Forces and, indeed,


because of her ultimate responsibility, the Prime Minister. I do not think I need spend too much time on the position of the Minister of State for the Armed Forces. The trial evidence speaks out clearly and devastatingly about his position in all this. The Secretary of State did not try very hard to retrieve the Minister's position for him. He did not manage to do that this afternoon.
I shall quote further from the transcript. Incidentally, that trial was instigated, of course, by the Government and the Attorney-General. It was the Government's trial. They brought Mr. Ponting to court. Perhaps it was not the Prime Minister. She knew nothing about it. The Secretary of State did not know anything about it. No one else knew anything about it, but the Attorney-General did, and he decided, on behalf of the Government, to prosecute Mr. Ponting. Therefore, I think that I am entitled to read out Mr. Ponting's evidence, which was given on oath in that trial, as it directly relates to Government Ministers and to how they acted throughout this affair.
On day six, this is what happened:
Mr. Ponting described how Mr. Harford"—
we have not heard about him, but apparently he was Mr. Ponting's deputy—
told him that the government was concerned over a letter"—the famous letter again—
that had arrived from Mr. Denzil Davies, MP … Mr. Laughland"—
the Queen's Counsel defending Mr. Ponting—
asked Mr. Ponting what Mr. Harford, his subordinate, told him that he was doing about it … He told me that he was working on the two drafts as requested by Mr. Stanley … What had been—did he tell you—his instructions from the Minister for the Armed Forces?
I must say that the Secretary of State's account of minutes written by civil servants when he did not tell us what ministerial instructions they had received shows that he lives in an unreal world. I shall repeat that question again.
What had been—did he tell you—his instructions from the Minister for the Armed Forces?
The Minister of State will have his opportunity. He did not take it in court, but he will get his opportunity. Indeed, he did not take the opportunity to try to refute these statements. He did not adduce any evidence to try to refute them. The answer to the above question was:
That he was to prepare two draft replies, one of which would give a truthful account of the events and the correct date of sighting and detection and one of which would not, and Ministers wished to be able to choose which one they would use.
So there were to be two sets of replies, one true and one false, two sets of passports and two sets of accounts. According to evidence given on oath, that is apparently what civil servants are being asked to provide. The statement continues:
It was unusual; I had never come across such a practice before in my Civil Service career"—
Mr. Ponting had been in the Civil Service for 14 years—
Did Mr. Harford do as he was bidden? … Yes, he produced the two drafts for me, together with a covering letter, minute"—
to which the Secretary of State has, I believe, referred. Indeed, he received it. Later Mr. Ponting added, referring not simply to the letter but to other matters as well:
Because the line suggested by Mr. Stanley was neither truthful nor correct, and it was an attempt to refuse to answer any future parliamentary inquiries whether from the dreaded Mr. Dalyell or from any other Member of Parliament.
So there was a refusal to answer questions. That was what was said on oath at the Old Bailey, and it was not

challenged by any evidence called by the prosecution. That is the position — [Interruption.] Conservative Members are getting excited.

Dr. Keith Hampson: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Davies: I shall give way in a moment.
The House can judge between the Secretary of State's version this afternoon which was given after the trial, after the hoped-for conviction had not been obtained and after Mr. Pontin's acquittal, and the evidence that was given on oath at the trial. As far as I am concerned the answers given at the trial show that the Minister of State acted wholly dishonourably in this regard. After that, he cannot command the confidence of the whole House when he makes statements and——

Dr. Hampson: rose——

Mr. Davies: I shall give way in a moment, but this is an important part of my speech.
The Minister cannot command the confidence of the whole House when he makes statements, drafts answers and makes speeches. Without any personal malice or gratification on my part—there may be more malice on Conservative Benches — I say to the Minister that he should take the honourable course and resign the high office that he holds.

Dr. Hampson: The right hon. Gentleman is dealing with a central and critical point. Despite the recollections of Mr. Ponting in court, my right hon. Friend said what the instructions to civil servants were, that the documents would be published in this House and that we should then see exactly what was instructed to civil servants. It sounded to me—and I think that it would have sounded to most hon. Members in the Chamber today—that it was perfectly clear that the only reason why two drafts were done—one, in Mr. Ponting's words, more truthful than the other—was that the Minister for the Armed Forces asked for that second draft to be written.

Hon. Members: Hear, hear.

Mr. Davies: That is precisely the point we are making.

Mr. Speaker: Order. I urge Opposition Members to let the shadow Minister be heard.

Mr. Davies: I am sure that we are all grateful to the hon. Member for Leeds, North-West (Dr. Hampson), the Secretary of State's former Parliamentary Private Secretary, for helping us in the matter.
I now come to the part played by the Secretary of State for Defence who, rightly, gave an account of the letter of 6 March, a copy of which no doubt arrived on his desk from the Prime Minister's office, and presumably he was asked to prepare a draft. As he said today, the right hon. Gentleman then asked for an inquiry to be carried out into the whole matter, a perfectly proper thing for him to have done as he had not been Secretary of State at the time when these matters took place. He is reported to have said that he wanted to satisfy himself that there was "no Watergate here" — an interesting choice of phrase — and Mr. Ponting, the trusted civil servant, one of the faith, was put in charge of that general inquiry.
Eventually we got the truth. At the end of the day, after much beating of breasts and heart-searching, the correct date was given. I understand that so many problems were involved that even the hapless Lord Whitelaw was called


to Chequers on a Sunday to try to advise on these matters. I think that I see the Prime Minister shaking her head in dissent. Maybe that was not true, and she may wish to deny it. If the Prime Minister indicates dissent, I believe her. I had better believe her because I do not have the secretarial facilities to do otherwise. [Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order.

Mr. Davies: After that brief moment of candour, down came an iron curtain and it was decided, not by Mr. Ponting but by Ministers, that all further embarrassing information about the Belgrano, apparently even information which was not classified, was to be withheld from Parliament. No more embarrassing questions were to be answered, not from my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow or from anyone else. To borrow a phrase from Watergate, Ministers decided to "tough it out" and, on the subject of the Belgrano, to suspend all or most democratic and parliamentary accountability.
Who decided that? Was it the Secretary of State or the Prime Minister? Did the Minister of State, through the faithful former Parliamentary Private Secretary, relay all the requests and orders to the Secretary of State? I do not know the answer, but the Prime Minister must have known about them. She could not possibly not have known about the decision.
Thus, the decision was taken to "tough it out" after that one moment of revealing the truth. The Secretary of State did it quite well, although he tried to obfuscate matters and put out a bit of smoke this afternoon. His first act, as we know, was not to answer — he tried to pretend that somehow it was because of a letter that had gone to the Prime Minister — those nine questions from my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow.
We have been told an interesting doctrine about refusing to answer. It goes something like this: "We cannot answer this question because, if we do, this terrible fellow who is asking it and with whose views we do not agree may not be satisfied with our reply. He may make a speech about the matter. He may have the effrontery to stand up in the House of Commons and attack the Secretary of State. We cannot answer his question No. 1 because he may then ask question No. 2. Perhaps we shall not be able to answer that, or, if we are able to do so, question No. 3 could be difficult."
That was the strange, almost potentially dangerous, doctrine that apparently the Secretary of State enunciated from the Dispatch box this afternoon. It was extraordinary. Why not answer questions on their merits? Why not answer seven or eight, or however many, of the nine questions if certain of them involved classified information, and then worry about the other questions later? That would have been the proper way of doing things in this House.

Mr. Baldry: Will the right hon. Gentleman accept that a balance must be found between full accountability on the one hand and national security on the other? Where is that balance to be found?

Mr. Davies: I shall come to the question of national security shortly.
As well as blocking questions, the "Stanley memorandum", as it was called— as the Secretary of

State said, he approved it — went to the Select Committee. It was sparse and the Legge memorandum said, in effect, "We cannot send a more full account partly, though not entirely, because it would not be consistent with the line that Ministers have taken in the past." I accept that there were other reasons——

Mr. Heseltine: indicated dissent.

Mr. Davies: It is no good the Secretary of State shaking his head in dissent; it is in the Legge memorandum. One reason why there was not full disclosure was that Mr. Legge—and maybe Mr. Ponting as well — said that if the Select Committee got the information, then, to paraphrase, the line that Ministers had taken in the past would be breached.
It was not denied this afternoon that the Government were concerned to try to block questions and withhold information. Their case at the end of the day, as always, is, "We had to do those things. Government responsibility is difficult and there is the higher and greater good. It is all being done for the sake of that higher and greater good." Apparently the content and scope of that higher and greater good is to be decided solely by the Government, being judge and jury.
Let us consider what is this higher and greater good. It has had different incarnations from time to time. The first incarnation we could call national security. Mr. Amlott, the Government's prosecutor—I need not quote from his speech, it was reported widely in the newspapers —made it clear that national security was not involved.
We move on to the next issue, which is the terrible issue of intelligence, which presents a difficult problem. It is clear that there was a difficulty there——

Mr. Geoffrey Dickens: The right hon. Gentleman has a difficulty there.

Hon. Members: Hear, hear.

Mr. Speaker: Order.

Mr. Davies: Not as great a difficulty as I suspect the hon. Member for Littleborough and Saddleworth (Mr. Dickens) has.
In considering the question of intelligence, I quote for the last time from the Ponting trial. On day 7, Mr. Amlott, the Government's prosecutor, pressed Mr. Ponting hard. I could read five or six pages from the transcript on the subject of intelligence. Possibly the final question in the cross-examination was:
Do you accept that Mr. Heseltine was basing his decisions upon sound and sensible arguments that were put to him.
Mr. Ponting replied:
No, I do not. The basis of this decision was clearly political, that to reveal this information would compound the political difficulties that the Government were in in changing their explanation. Nowhere in any of the documents inside the Ministry of Defence or produced in this court
—I am sure that must be true—
is there any written explanation that the reason the Government will not reveal this information was that at some point it would touch on intelligence information. That explanation has been given only subsequently, namely, since September of this year.
Indeed, in the Prime Minister's letter to me of 4 April, where she tried to justify the change of date—the letter, according to evidence that was given, was beefed up a bit when it got to the Prime Minister's Office, but I do not make any criticism of that — did not mention


intelligence. On that occasion operational matters were the higher and greater good used to justify the failure to give information.
Then as the last refuge — it is in the motion—we have
the protection of our Armed Forces"——
[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear".] Yes, we all agree with that. But it was not protection of the armed forces: it was the protection of Ministers.
Ministers at various times over the two or three years have misled the House about the date of the detection of the Belgrano, about the course on which it was sailing when it was sunk, about its course 11 hours before it was sunk, and about the changes of course of the Belgrano. They have refused to answer legitimate questions where no matters of national security were involved, and they did not give full and frank information to the Select Committee. It was all about the protection of Ministers, the protection of the reputation of Ministers, and the protection of the reputation of the Prime Minister herself.

Dr. David Owen: To buttress the right hon. Gentleman's point, is it not a fact that if the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Fieldhouse, had thought it right to mention in his dispatch the true date of the first sighting and also of the detection of the General Belgrano, surely there could not possibly be any risk to the fleet or any security risk for the future. That is why the Prime Minister should have corrected the matter in the defence White Paper six months afterwards.

Mr. Davies: The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. If Admiral Fieldhouse felt that there was no problem, what were the operational matters 15 months later that apparently caused the Government to refuse to give the full information?
The Prime Minister must accept her full responsibility for the affair. She told this House—we have been over it and I mention it again—that we had all the facts when we did not. She failed to correct false statements in official documents. She said in a television interview, in the middle of the general election campaign, that the Belgrano was not sailing away from the Falklands when it was. She certainly was part of a decision—if not the instigator—to try to "tough it out". She has zig-zagged far more on this matter than the old General Belgrano ever did. The whole shameful business is a consequence of her style of government, I am sorry to say.

Mr. Heseltine: The right hon. Member suggested that the concept of intelligence arguments had not been brought into the justification until rather recently. I remind him of the letter that I quoted to the House. It was associated with Mr. Ponting's first findings on the matter—the draft letter that he wanted me to to send to the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell). In that letter he said that
the other questions you have raised in your letter all concern detailed operational and intelligence matters on which I am not prepared to comment.
It was on Mr. Ponting's advice that I took the original decision.

Mr. Davies: I did not say it; Mr. Ponting said it on oath. That evidence could have been produced in court but the prosecution failed to do so.
We have a style of government that demands total fealty from all individuals and all groups. It is a style of government that shows contempt—the Secretary of State

talked about the Civil Service—for civil servants and for their advice. [Interruption.] If the Prime Minister does not know it, perhaps she should start talking more widely among civil servants. If they have shown the faith, then they are all right. The irony was that Mr. Ponting had shown that he was one of the faith. Apparently Sir Derek Rayner gave him a book to read called "Your Disobedient Servant." Mr. Ponting read it rather too well, it seems. He was of the faith; in fact, he was apparently summoned to meet the presence in the inner sanctum. The trouble was that when he got there he did not like what he saw. It is a style of government that I believe will get shriller and more strident as Britain's economic decline sadly accelerates.
I suspect that the events of the past few weeks and the economic clouds that are gathering mark the beginning of the end for the Government, and I suspect that the Prime Minister in her heart knows it, too.

Mr. Julian Amery: The right hon. Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies) has missed a golden opportunity — one of the opportunities that probably come only once in a whole political lifetime. He heard the devastating exposition of the facts by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence. If the right hon. Gentleman had risen in a full House, with the country listening to the debate, and had asked leave to withdraw his party's amendment, he would have dispelled the largely unfair belief that the Labour party did not want to see us win the Falklands war. [Interruption.] He had the chance and he did not take it.
The right hon. Gentleman accused my right hon. Friend of character assassination against Mr. Ponting. In the remarks that followed, I shall not say that he condoned, but he went very far towards condoning, Mr. Ponting. Indeed, we have seen the spectacle of two Privy Councillors from the Opposition Benches appearing on the same platform as Mr. Ponting. Are we to have the canonisation of Mr. Ponting? Is he to be the next Labour candidate for Bethnal Green and Stepney?
I hope that the Labour party will forgive me if I venture to say that it has not conducted its campaign on the Belgrano issue with great skill. The Leader of the Opposition began by alleging that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister had exercised political pressure on the Attorney-General to bring the prosecution against Mr. Ponting. I should have thought that any leader of the Labour party would think twice about making such an allegation. After all, that is the charge that the Conservatives brought against the Labour party in 1924 in the Campbell case — that the Cabinet had exercised pressure on the Attorney-General not to bring the case. The difference between the right hon. Gentleman's tactics and ours is that we defeated the first Labour Government, and his torpedo misfired.
I shall deal now with the sinking of the Belgrano itself. There is not a great deal that one can say in detail about the problem of intelligence. I know that the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) is a man of honour. I can think only that he might have been naive in that matter. Had all the questions that he put been answered, it might have been of assistance to hostile forces. I can only hope, although I do not believe that it is so, that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has not already gone too far in meeting his requests.
With regard to the politics of the matter, only two charges could conceivably be made against the Government. One is that the sinking of the Belgrano scuppered the Peruvian talks, and the other is that the ship was outside the exclusion limit. The only thing that I ask right hon. and hon. Members to consider is this. Suppose my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and her colleagues in the War Cabinet had ordered the Conqueror not to torpedo the Belgrano; suppose, as a result, we had incurred heavy casualties, although not necessarily defeat; and suppose that some hon. Member with the assiduity of the hon. Member for Linlithgow had researched the matter and found that we had deliberately not taken the opportunity to sink the Belgrano. Can one imagine what the reaction of the House would have been if my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister had come to the Dispatch Box and said, "I did not do it because I hoped that we might get an agreement through Peru," or "I did not do it because it was just outside the legal exclusion limit."? Does the House think that the Leader of the Opposition would have hesitated to attack? I think that even he and the right hon. Member for Llanelli would have made mincemeat of us on such an occasion, not that their gladiatorial skills are all that great.

Mr. Dalyell: At all times the Government knew the position of the Belgrano. They knew that it had 6 inch guns with a range of 13 miles. They knew that the Hipolito Bouchard carried the M38 Exocet guidance system made by us, so they knew that the range was 20 miles. At all stages the capability of the Argentine service group was known, so what the right hon. Gentleman is saying is purely hypothetical.

Mr. Amery: I am sure the hon. Gentleman will know that war is a matter of risk. We had to take risks. We took a tremendous risk in launching an invasion of islands 8,000 miles away without proper air cover. In that case, we could not take any extra risks, just for the reasons that the hon. Gentleman has suggested.
I come to the matter that is of deep significance and underlies the debate. Regrettably, it has come to light in the debate. It is the relationship between Ministers and officials. It is a matter to which we must give important thought. Many of us in the House have held office of one kind or another, and we know what a strange experience it is when one is sent to help to preside, or to preside over a Department. One is a Member of Parliament. That is one's authority. One is responsible to the House. One is appointed by the Prime Minister, who has the support of the majority of the House. Two or three of us at the most go to the Department and find ourselves surrounded by hundreds or, in the case of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, thousands, of officials and officers.
Who are these officials and officers? They are not elected; they are selected. They are chosen by other officials. They are deployed and promoted by other officials. Of course, occasionally if some are more congenial than others, political favour gets them advanced to one place or another. Indeed, that happened to Mr. Ponting. But, by and large, they are an autonomous body. They are the servants of the Crown, on loan to the Ministers of the day. They enjoy very special privileges. Broadly speaking, they have a freehold on their job until the age of 60. They cannot be sacked unless convicted of

felony, habitual drunkenness or bankruptcy, or previously sodomy, but that does not apply any more. They cannot be dismissed; they are there until the age of 60 and at the end of it they have an indexed pension. Moreover, they enjoy great influence over the formation of national policy. And they are immune from criticism.
Anybody who has been through the experience of government knows that one can get things done only if a good relationship can be achieved between the Minister and his officials. It must be based on frankness and fullness of discussion, often late at night. It must be hardheaded, but also sometimes lighthearted. My hon. Friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Employment, the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton, (Mr. Clark), has been taken to task for talking about Bongo Bongo land at a private meeting. Unless one can do such a thing and talk on those terms with one's officials —[Interruption.] I hear some hon. Members laughing, but it is a great deal better than the Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer, the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), who talked in public about his critics being
stoned out of their tiny Chinese minds.
One must be able to talk absolutely off the record and absolutely frankly. If that breaks down and one no longer has the confidence that Ministers can discuss tactics and options with their officials, and their officials can do so equally with them, we come to a serious crisis in constitutional government. It is not just a question of confidentiality; it goes to the root of our parliamentary government.
What is the story? Over the years, the Sovereign has ceded almost the entirety of the power of decision to Ministers representing the majority in this Parliament. That is the way in which we are governed now. The prerogative, if it remains at all, is very small. The Sovereign has surrendered the power of decision, and so have the Sovereign's servants, the officials. They advise and carry out things, but the Ministers decide. An official who tries to override Ministers, whether subversively or openly, is trying to claw back some of the prerogative which, over the years, the Sovereign has surrendered to Parliament.
Therefore, when right hon. and hon. Members sit on the same platform as Mr. Ponting, they are lending themselves to condoning someone who has struck at not only the confidentiality between employer and employee, but at something which goes much deeper than that; indeed, the rights of Parliament. What we claim as Parliament is that we and we alone have the right finally to decide the policy of the nation. If we condone what has been done by Mr. Ponting, Miss Tisdall and the others, we are striking at the root of the privileges on which we depend as the elected representatives of the people. It is the coalition between the permanent Civil Service, descending from the Sovereign, and the temporarily elected majority of the country that is the basis of our current national unity.

Mr. David Steel: Very little has been said so far in the debate about the use of section 2 of the Official Secrets Act and the decision to prosecute Mr. Ponting. I want to begin by making it clear that when the Secretary of State said today that Mr. Ponting had betrayed a trust, that could not be denied. Of course, he betrayed a trust. Let us be clear about what he


did. He did not seek to betray his country. He was not seeking financial gain by selling stories to the newspapers. He was not giving away secret information. He was seeking to relay non-secret information to a Member of the House. So why was he betraying that trust? He was betraying it because he wished to expose what he believed to be a breach of a higher trust—that which should exist between Ministers and the House of Commons. It is important to put it in the right context. It is for that reason that I take the view that officials in the Ministry of Defence were right in their initial approach to Mr. Ponting, which was that he should be subject to disciplinary procedures within the service rather than prosecuted.
I do not want to go back over the ground of who did or did not authorise the prosecution, because it is consistent for Ministers to say that that matter was entirely for the Law Officers and they were not involved. Of course, I accept that. However, equally well known is the Prime Minister's view of such conduct. The Secretary of State was quoted by Sir Ewen Broadbent as saying that, if he had anything to do with it, he believed that the Director of Public Prosecutions should proceed to a prosecution. Therefore, it is clear that civil servants, Law Officers and the DDP were operating within a climate in which they knew that the political masters wanted to get Mr. Ponting through the courts. That was a mistake.

Mr. D. N. Campbell-Savours: In the light of what has happened and what we now know, if the right hon. Gentleman were a Minister, would he employ Mr. Ponting as a civil servant?

Mr. Steel: I have already dealt with that point. I have made it clear that Mr. Ponting was guilty of a breach of trust, so inevitably he would have to leave the service. I then went on to deal with the prosecution and use of section 2 of the Official Secrets Act. It is important to make a clear distinction between the action that should have been taken in each of those areas.
Second, I wish to consider the sinking of the Belgrano itself. It is a truism that in time of war unpleasant things happen. It is even more true that in time of war unpleasant decisions have to be taken. In time of war too the Government of the day are entitled to the benefit of the doubt and the support of the House. I hope that the Secretary of State accepts that the Government received the benefit of the doubt and the overwhelming support of the House throughout the operation of the task force. It is going slightly beyond that and something of a nerve, however, for the Government to ask the House in their motion tonight to recognise that the particular decision at a particular time to sink the Belgrano was necessary and legitimate when they have openly admitted that they are denying us the information on which the decision was taken.
The House was not told of the background to the War Cabinet's decision, so we must assume that the War Cabinet believed that it was important to immobilise a major section of the Argentine navy early in the dispute to protect the task force, that the original intention was to go for the aircraft carrier but that at the end of the day the Belgrano happened to be the chosen target. As we were not members of the War Cabinet, we do not know. That is merely one possible and logical explanation.

Mr. Heseltine: It may be possible and logical, but it is not the explanation that the Government have given. We

have made it clear that there was clear evidence that the Belgrano posed a threat. That is the explanation. The right hon. Gentleman is being very fair, but in doing so he must recognise that Governments sometimes have to take decisions and that the whole explanation can never be made public.

Mr. Steel: I accept that. That is why I say that those of us who were not in the War Cabinet could only wish Ministers well and hope that they took the right decisions. Of course, the Belgrano and other ships were a threat. I hope that the Secretary of State is not suggesting that the Belgrano was peculiar to that category.
The fact remains that in the heat of the battle the then Secretary of State, Sir John Non, gave the wrong information to the House. It is clear that that was not his fault. Nevertheless, Parliament was given the wrong information about the circumstances in which the Belgrano was sunk. It was after that—I do not know at what stage — that Ministers became culpable. In the White Paper published in the autumn the true facts were still concealed from the House. A year later, in a "Nationwide" question programme during the general election campaign in May 1983 the Prime Minister specifically said that the
Belgrano was not sailing away from the Falklands".

As we now know, that was the exact opposite of the truth.
Throughout 1983 and early 1984, in a whole series of answers given in the House, in broadcast interviews and in letters to Members, a familiar phrase appeared to the effect that the Belgrano and the task force could have been only a few hours apart converging on each other, leaving a somewhat ambiguous impression that they were in fact converging, although we now know that they were not.
The House is entitled to ask two questions which the Secretary of State has so far failed to answer. I hope that the Minister of State will answer them when he winds up the debate. First, at what point in the saga did Ministers discover that the information given to the House was wrong? Secondly, how long would they have continued to give the wrong information to the House if the truth had not been dragged out of them by a series of letters and questions from Members, with or without the assistance of Mr. Ponting? Those are the important issues on which the House should concentrate.

Dr. Alan Glyn: The right hon. Gentleman has already agreed that these things happen in war. Does he also agree that information which could on the face of it seem innocent may be impossible to disclose because it leads on to other information which could help the enemy?

Mr. Steel: I am coming to that. The House has never asked for intelligence information across the Floor, but that is a very different matter from the non-classified information that was constantly misdirected to us.
I believe that there are three important reasons why Ministers were wrong not to correct the information at the earliest opportunity. The first, putting it crudely, is the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell). As is well known and as the Secretary of State has fairly said, the hon. Member for Linlithgow has pursued a particular line of reasoning and attitude to what happened to the Belgrano. He has been virtually alone in the House—others may agree with him, although I do not know of many—in suggesting that the Belgrano was deliberately


sunk as a political act to prevent the conclusion of the Peruvian peace proposals. That is a very serious charge. Because wrong information was originally given to the House and bits of correct information dribbled out in subsequent months, credence has been given to the hon. Gentleman's charges and great damage has been done to the interests of the Government and of this country, especially in its relations with South America. Far from damage limitation, I believe that the Government have been guilty of causing damage in that respect.
The second reason is a parliamentary reason. I have always been a keen supporter of the Select Committee system. Looking back over the many years of the Falklands saga, I believe that if a Select Committee had considered the matter dispassionately some years ago a solution might have been found. The appointment of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs is most important, but it will be hobbled in its opportunities to work properly if Ministers refuse to produce the information that it requests. There is a well known tradition and precedent, that security information is sidelined when it comes before a Select Committee, so I see no reason why, as late as July 1984, the full information was still not volunteered to the Select Committee. The Secretary of State now says that he will talk to the Chairman of the Select Committee with a view to producing the information, but what is so different in the quality of that information as between July 1984 and February 1985? I believe that there is a very good parliamentary reason for concluding that the Government were wrong to continue to act as they did.

Mr. Heseltine: I went into this at some length and I quoted the request. We were asked for a non-classified response to be published. That is the point. Had we been asked for a classified account or one that could be sidelined, we would have provided it, as we subsequently did. The record is clear. We were asked for a non-classified document.

Mr. Steel: My experience of Select Committees is that a sidelined document is not a classified document. The Secretary of State should have responded with the quality of information sought by the Select Committee, removing security and intelligence matters from it.

Mr. Spearing: It is important to have the record straight. The request was made and inquiry was made of the Clerk, who said that the Committee would have preferred it to be non-classified, but that in no way excluded the possibility to which the right hon. Member for Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale (Mr. Steel) has referred.

Mr. Steel: I was not aware of that as my party is not represented on that Select Committee. Nevertheless, I have every confidance in it and I believe that its importance and its requests should have been more seriously heeded by Ministers.
Third, I believe that Ministers were wrong because the result of their attempt to conceal information from the House was that information on movements of the fleet, signals and so on — some from naval sources — was dragged into screaming headlines month after month. Far from the issue being disposed of once and for all last year, it has continued to be a running sore, not just in our

political system but in our military system. There is a clear analogy with the way in which the Government treated GCHQ. Until the Government started acting against it, GCHQ was a relatively secret headquarters. All that the Government achieved by blunderbussing away at union rights there was to advertise the place to the whole world. There is a clear analogy between their clumsy treatment of that issue and their clumsy treatment of this issue.
For those three reasons, I believe that Ministers acted incorrectly in misleading Parliament. I draw an important distinction. If the House had been given correct information from the beginning, it would have been quite fair for the Secretary of State to say at the Dispatch Box that at a certain point the Government must draw the line and that the House must accept that they cannot answer further on military and security matters. That would have been an honourable position. However, when the House has been given wrong information from the beginning, it is not honourable to hide behind a smokescreen of military operations and security. That is the difference. The House should not accept the use of such camouflage.
There are some lessons to be learnt from this escapade. First, national security simply cannot be what a Minister says it is. There must be some other way of judging what national security is. I do not wish to embarrass the Leader of the official Opposition, but I understood that the Leader of the official Opposition was always consulted on security matters. I very much hope that the poison penfriend correspondence of the last week or so will not endanger that tradition. Under the normal conventions of the House, the Leader of the official Opposition, at any rate, is entitled to be shown the full information, which he has not so far seen.
Second—we have argued on security matters before, and I am not making a new point—there is a case for a small committee of senior Privy Councillors representing the different parts of the House to overview security matters. That would give the House some confidence that national security is not the same as avoiding the political embarrassment of a Minister.
Third, after this case, we must surely see the last of section 2 of the Official Secrets Act. It is not good enough for the Government to say that others have tried to change the law before, that there have been White Papers, Green Papers and Bills, but that the matter is terribly difficult. There should be, in this country, a public right to information with certain specific and limited exempt categories such as national security. I hope that the Government will learn that lesson and comment on that point tonight.

Mr. Cranley Onslow: In a short speech, I wish to refer briefly to four of the personalities involved in the matters under discussion. First—to get him out of the way—I take the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell). I heard the hon. Gentleman on the radio this morning—when does one not?—saying that there would be no slanging from him today. I hope that that will turn out to be the case, but if it does, it will be a departure from form. This debate falls not long after yet another of the hon. Gentleman's vicious personal attacks on the Prime Minister.
I did the hon. Gentleman the courtesy of warning him that I would find it necessary to speak about him today.
When he made a personal attack on me on 8 June 1984, he showed me no similar courtesy. Nor, after that episode, did he make any apology to me.

Mr. Dalyell: rose——

Mr. Onslow: The hon. Gentleman need not apologise. I do not expect it from him.

Mr. Dalyell: On 12 or 13 May the hon. Gentleman had called me a political aerosol. That was my reason.

Mr. Onslow: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman remembers what he said to me on 8 June. If not, I will remind him. He said, having referred to me as having answered the Adjournment debate on 12 May 1983 on the sinking of the Belgrano:
He must be responsible for the whole cacophony of statements to the House that are turning out to be untrue. Indeed, the hon. Gentleman must have known while he spoke from the Dispatch Box that they were untrue." —[Official Report, 8 June 1984; Vol. 61, c. 609.]

That was a more serious charge than the—I confess—somewhat dismissive comparison that I made with reference to the hon. Gentleman. I do not insist on an apology, because I do not expect one. In what he has done in this affair, the hon. Gentleman carries no credibility and does not deserve a great deal of attention.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence has made it clear to the House what an obsessive campaign the hon. Member for Linlithgow has pursued on the sinking of the Belgrano. For once, perhaps, I may pray in aid Mr. Ponting, who made it clear that in his opinion—as in the opinion of a great many others—the whole idea of a link between the Peruvian peace proposals and the sinking of the Belgrano was totally ludicrous. I trust that the hon. Gentleman read the report of that part of the trial, and I trust also that in future he will stick to some harmless cause such as proving that Bacon wrote Shakespeare's plays. Inside and outside the House, the hon. Gentleman is generally recognised as being as daft as a brush.
The Leader of the Opposition would like to be taken somewhat more seriously. I hope that he will be kind enough to listen to me for a moment, because I wish to refer to his prepared and rehearsed response during Prime Minister's Question Time the other day. He said—and meant, in saying it, to be offensive —that he did not believe my right hon. Friend. Such words are, of course, in order, but I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman understands precisely how offensive they were. If the right hon. Gentleman were to say to the House that he confidently expected to be the next Prime Minister, most of us would say that we did not believe him, but there would be no offence. It would be a simple difference of opinion. There would be nothing unparliamentary or unusual there. However, let us suppose that I said that I believed that the right hon. Gentleman had been a party to the conspiracy to unseat the Labour Chief Whip from his constituency. The right hon. Gentleman would, I am sure, hotly deny it. If I were then to say to him, with no evidence one way or the other, that I simply did not believe him, he might think that I was being offensive. That comparison may help the right hon. Gentleman to understand how damned offensive he was the other day. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister had every right to be angry. Either the right hon. Gentleman did not

understand, or he did not care. In either case, he is clearly unfit for his office, which is taking him further and further out of his depth.
Thirdly, I wish to refer to a split, or dual, personality—to the leader of the Liberal party, and to the leader of the Social Democratic party, who is still with us. The right hon. Member for Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale (Mr. Steel) made a curious speech, in which he made some superficial and uninformed references to GCHQ. To suggest that the Government, by their actions against the unions, went out of their way to advertise the existence of GCHQ begs the question of what the unions themselves thought they were doing when they went on strike. The right hon. Gentleman is no great expert on such matters. He was the wrong chap to make the alliance speech.
If hon. Members study the Order Paper, they may also agree with me that the alliance has not been clever in framing its amendment. The alliance simply wishes to tag the official Opposition's amendment on to the Government's motion. That is a classic example of alliance politics, always trying to have everything both ways. It is a beautiful example of boneless wonderism, but no doubt the two right hon. Gentlemen consider that they have been very clever.
Of course the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) could have found words of his own. On 13 February he wrote an offensive letter to the Prime Minister. It did not attract much attention, but it is still on the record. Not for the first time, he accused my right hon. Friend of a systematic attempt to mislead the House. Despite my right hon. Friend's replies to the accusations, the right hon. Gentleman, like the hon. Member for Linlithgow, simply goes on repeating the same old dirt.
The right hon. Gentleman was Foreign Secretary for two years or so. It may be that he would not be included in any shortlist of great Foreign Secretaries, but that may be simply because he did not have very much to do. However, there was one matter which must have created a little work for him — attempting to achieve a settlement in Rhodesia. I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman would say of his conduct of those affairs that there was never an occasion on which he concealed or withheld a single fact from the House. Is he prepared to say that he never did that, even for good, understandable and entirely patriotic reasons? I doubt it very much. If he admits that there are times when concealment and the withholding of information are in the national interest, why does he prate so much about systematic attempts to conceal? He is too disingenuous by far, and the country is beginning to rumble him.
I should like now——

Mr. Allan Rogers: Come on, Scargill next.

Mr. Onslow: That comment is typical of the hon. Gentleman.
I should like now to consider Mr. Ponting. I imagine that the whole House, even the leader of the Liberal party, probably agrees that the Civil Service is better off without Mr. Ponting. A lot of his fellow civil servants think that he is no loss to them. Right hon. and hon. Members who have read today's Daily Telegraph will have seen that the general secretary of the Ministry of Defence Staff Association, Mr. John Wilks, has said some things in fairly clear terms about Mr. Ponting's conduct.

Mr. Robin Corbett: He would, wouldn't he?

Mr. Onslow: The hon. Gentleman has no knowledge of these matters, but he might be a great friend of Mandy Rice-Davies for all I know. He said:
it is the duty of MPs to control ministers,
and added:
It is not a duty of civil servants, however senior, because they are not elected by anyone. They are employed and paid to do the job defined by Ministers and Parliament. They are, and they should be, very much at the 'beck and call' of Ministers. The kind of reasoning which places the civil servant above his civil master is the kind of reasoning which is swiftly leading to the destruction of our system of demoratic elected government.
Mr. Ponting should take those words to heart.
It is not wholly unknown for people who join the Civil Service to change their views as they go through their career. There is more than one hon. Member who was formerly a civil servant and who must have taken a view about his position as a servant of government which led him to come here. Perhaps I can bore the House for a moment with my own experience. At the time of Suez, it became clear to me that there would be times during my Civil Service career when I might well find myself unable conscientiously to put forward the point of view of the Government of the day. It was a fairly short step from that to recognise that the right thing to do was to leave the Civil Service. I was fortunate enough to get here.
Perhaps Mr. Ponting also has ambitions to get here, but the Labour party has spurned him and the SDP has so far said nothing—it might be open to offer——

Mr. Bowen Wells: He is a member of the SDP.

Mr. Onslow: Is he? The point here is that Mr. Ponting should have thought these things through much earlier in his career. If he had done so, he should have been able to see that he too might have a crisis of conscience. In that case, he need never have undergone the conflict to which he now claims he had to submit himself. He is not a great loss. A man of greater intellectual honesty would not have brought any of this upon himself. The most important legacy he leaves us is the task of considering, not how to reform section 2 of the Official Secrets Act, but the essential feature of the conduct of government—how to re-establish the mutual trust and confidence between Ministers and their advisers, which Ponting has deliberately and arrogantly done so much to destroy.

Mr. Tam Dalyell: It was perfectly fair for the Secretary of State to outline my opposition to the Falklands war. It is quite true that, on 2 April, I contacted my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, Deptford (Mr. Silkin) about his being cornered by Brian Widlake on "The World at One" into saying that the Labour party would use force in certain circumstances. It is true that, on 3 April, I interrupted the Prime Minister during her speech to ask her who she imagined our friends were in Latin America on this issue. It is true that, on 4 April, I made a long and well-reported speech in Scotland to my constituency party in which I said that this was the most ill-conceived expedition to leave these shores since the Duke of Buckingham went to La Rochelle. It is also true that I went to see the Prime Minister on 21 April to express deep concern about air cover in the light of what happened to the Prince of Wales and the Repulse.
It is also true that I did not in early May get concerned with criticisms about the Belgrano. It so happened that, on 4 May, I had tabled the following question to the Prime Minister:
if she will make a statement on the Falkland Islands.
The Prime Minister replied:
My right hon. Friends the Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and for Defence will be making full statements after questions on recent diplomatic and military developments respectively.
I then asked:
When the Prime Minister referred to political control, did she herself, personally and explicitly, authorise the firing of the torpedoes at the General Belgrano?
The right hon. Lady answered:
I assure the hon. Gentleman that the task force is and was under full political control."—[Official Report, 4 May 1982; Vol. 23, c. 16.]

A lot of this is about crisis management. The truth is that I did not start asking questions about the Belgrano until early July, and I did so because there was a report in The Scotsman to the effect that, when he was asked a question that flowed exactly from what John Nott had told the House — why he had sunk the Belgrano — the submarine commander said that he had not sunk the Belgrano off his own bat, that he was a first-time submarine commander and that he did it on orders from Northwood.

Mr. John Wilkinson: Quite right, too.

Mr. Dalyell: Right. That is deeply different from the line of the statement that John Nott made in the House. We have checked the tapes, and John Nott's statement came over as the Belgrano was closing on the task force. "Elements of" the task force was added later. In view of what the hon. Member for Hampshire, East (Mr. Mates) has said, I should like some Government statement on the position of Glamorgan, Arrow and Ardent. That matter ought to be cleared up in the Minister's winding-up speech.
The sinking of the Belgrano was not simply a matter of 368 lives and the escalation of the Falklands war from second to fifth gear. She who ordered the sinking is also she who has her finger on nuclear weapons. As long as she remains our Head of Government, what happens at a moment of possible humiliation and defeat is a matter of lasting importance. We should therefore not have any of the argument, "This all happened three years ago."
The difficulty is that the truth was not told. For more than two years we were told repeatedly that the submarine Conqueror had detected the Belgrano on Sunday 2 May. I knew that that was not true, and I think that it is better to be completely candid with my parliamentary colleagues of all parties. In August 1982, I was told by a member of the family of one of the crew of the Conqueror that I had better delve into what happened. In September 1982, quite voluntarily, I must report to my colleagues, I was given the diaries of a member of the crew — Lieutenant Nahrendra Sethia. I must admit that I was a bit suspicious at first because they were beautifully written and I wondered how it was possible to write such a coherent account, given the circumstances of a submarine. However, I made cross-checks.
I should like to say something bluntly to all my parliamentary colleagues. The House might be wondering why the hon. Member for Linlithgow has been the


receptacle of so much information, only latterly from Mr. Ponting, but from many other sources, including members of the task force. It was not because of the colour of my politics. [Interruption.] I received the information because many people felt that the position was not quite right. Members of the Royal Navy said that the sinking of the Belgrano was not cricket.
It became clear to me from cross-checking that the diaries were right and that the Belgrano and her escorts, far from being detected on 2 May, were detected before 1600 hours on Friday 30 April on her passive sonar by the submarine Conqueror. That was later admitted in a letter to my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies). After 1600 hours, at periscope depth the Conqueror closed in on the Belgrano and her escorts. Throughout the morning of Saturday 1 May at a distance of 4,000 yd, the Conqueror monitored the Belgrano and her escorts "razzing"; that is, replenishing at sea. Therefore, the submarine had the Belgrano at her mercy. If it is true that the Belgrano had to be sunk because it was an immediate threat to the task force, why was it not done on that Saturday? Why was it postponed? That is the question the Prime Minister must answer.

Mr. Michael Mates: rose——

Mr. Dalyell: We had Admiral Lord Lewin's word on 30 January 1983 that there had been no communications difficulties.

Mr. Mates: This stake goes to the heart of the hon. Gentleman's point, as it is about political control. The captain of the Conqueror was not authorised to attack Argentine surface ships outside the exclusion zone on that day. For that reason, Admiral Woodward sent him home to Northwood, which sent him to the Chief of the Defence Staff, who asked the War Cabinet—the political control —to have the rules changed.

Mr. Dalyell: The Secretary of State knows that that is an own goal. The Secretary of State emphasised in his opening remarks that the original rules of engagement were to cover everything. Therefore, either the Secretary of State or the hon. Member for Hampshire, East is right.

Mr. Heseltine: I know that the hon. Gentleman takes this matter extremely seriously. The reason why there was no question of the sinking taking place when he described it was that the Government had not been advised by their military advisers to do so.

Mr. Dalyell: The difficulty is that, as one scrapes, all sorts of new creepy-crawlies come to light. The Belgrano was far more of a threat at that time than later. Therefore, why does the Prime Minister say that it was an immediate threat? The narrative is important— —

Mr. Heseltine: When the hon. Gentleman says that the Belgrano was far more of a threat at that time than later, to whom does he think the Government should listen—to the hon. Gentleman or to the Chief of the Defence Staff?

Mr. Dalyell: The right hon. Gentleman talks about listening. I suggest that he should listen to our excellent communications centre at GCHQ. That is where the listening must be done.
At a distance of 10,000 yd the Conqueror followed the Belgrano for more than 30 hours. If we are to be told that the Government did not know exactly what was happening, heaven help their political control. At 8.07

—the Secretary of State got it wrong, and we must be accurate—an order went out from Walter Allara, the operational commander on board the carrier on 25 May, to return to Statten Island. That was confirmed by the naval command in Buenos Aires at 1.19 the following morning. Both those orders, like every order, were intercepted and sent back to Ascension Island by AD470 high-frequency Marconi transceiver equipment, through Chile, and through the Americans, who had a satellite in polar orbit.
That brings me to a direct question. The Observer of 6 January states:
The intercepted Argentine signals were decoded and telexed at the time directly to Navy HQ at Northwood and to Mrs. Thatcher's office at Chequers.
The paper did not get that information from me. There were other sources. Indeed, it would have been odd if there had not been. Therefore, for more than five hours those at Chequers and the Prime Minister knew perfectly well what the orders to those ships were. The question therefore arises: why was the order given at lunchtime on 2 May when the Belgrano was far less of a threat that it had been earlier and when its direction was known? It was because—I disagree with the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Onslow) about this — the Prime Minister knew something else that Sunday morning — that the Government of Peru had put forward peace proposals.

Mr. Bowen Wells: rose——

Mr. Dalyell: For the sake of argument, I can concede that reasonable men can have differences of opinion about whether the Peruvian peace proposals would have worked. I believe, on the basis of a great deal of research and from talking to people, that they would have succeeded. Other reasonable people may not believe that. However, what the Prime Minster and the hon. Member for for Woking said in the debate was that no news of the Peruvian peace proposals reached London until three hours after the sinking of the Belgrano. Ever more precisely, in a letter to my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli and to the shadow Cabinet the Prime Minister said that the first sign of the Peruvian peace proposals reached London at 11.15 pm on Sunday evening. That is not true.

Mr. Bowen Wells: rose— —

Mr. Dalyell: On 21 October, after some correspondence and, in case there is any misunderstanding, at my own expense on an academic fare, I went to Lima for four days. I sat for 75 minutes in the office of Belaunde Terry, who told me that the Argentine had been extremely close to the British, that he had received great kindness from the British and that Peruvian and American troops were at first proposed. The Peruvians were not acceptable to us and the Americans were not acceptable to the Argentines and, therefore, the troops were to be Canadian, Mexican and West German. The Argentine soldiers were to leave the Falkland Islands, and the task force was to turn back. In that case the Prime Minister would have been deprived of her military victory, which the Falklands issue is all about, as I made plain at an early stage.
I sat in the house of Manuel Ulloa, the Prime Minister of Peru at the time, and the chairman of the development committee of the World Bank. There were no language problems as his daily reading was the Wall Street Journal. He said, "What do you take us for? We were negotiators, and as serious people we were in touch with both sides."


I specifically ask about the role of Lord Hugh Thomas. Oscar Mauortua, the head of the President's office, spent two years at Pembroke College, Oxford. There were no language problems there. He said that the whole Government of Peru came to a stop at that time, and added, "I know that your Government knew all about it all that Sunday and probably that Saturday."

Several Hon. Members: rose——

Mr. Dalyell: No, I shall not give way.
It may be that the Peruvian evidence is not sufficient. We should therefore look at the American evidence. In his memoirs, the Prime Minister's admirer, Alexander Haig, said that acceptance was gained in principle from both parties or, pressed by Emery, down to one or two words. We had better be clear about Gayshon. For 30 years he was head of Associated Press in London, and his interest in this subject was aroused because never in all that time had he known so many inconsistencies in British Government explanations.

Mr. Onslow: rose——

Mr. Dalyell: Haig was supported by other senior Americans. If Conservative Members do not like the American evidence, they should consider what happened here. I am sorry that the right hon. Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East (Mr. Pym) is not taking part in the debate, and I am particularly sorry that the right hon. Member for Hertsmere (Mr. Parkinson) is not present. It was the right hon. Member for Hertsmere who let the cat of of the bag. When pressed by Emery, he said that he knew all about the Peruvian peace proposals, and added, "Primarily those of President Belaunde." If the right hon. Member for Hertsmere knew, did the Prime Minister not know?

Mr. Onslow: rose— —

Mr. Dalyell: The hon. Member for Woking and I remember brass tacks. The hon. Gentleman let it out of the bag. I asked him about this and he told me that the Foreign Office knew on the Sunday morning. In that case, did not the Prime Minister know? Let us have an explanation.

Mr. Onslow: Now, as then, I must tell the hon. Gentleman that he does not listen to the answers that he is given. It is clear that he flatly refuses to accept my word about anything, and on that basis I am under no obligation to accept his. The hon. Gentleman knows that evidence on this whole matter has been taken by the Foreign Affairs Select Committee. Is he content to abide by its judgment, as I shall be?

Mr. Dalyell: Many of these issues cannot be decided tonight. In some ways it would have been wiser to await the report of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, but again I ask whether, if the Foreign Office knew, the Prime Minister knew.

Mr. Bowen Wells: rose——

Mr. Dalyell: It would have been much better had the Government come clean on these matters, because, who knows, there may be a diplomatic version of Clive Ponting. Certain people know the truth. [AN HON. MEMBER: "Traitors."] The word "Traitors" is not very sensible in relation to people whose priority is to Parliament rather than to Ministers.

Sir Peter Blaker: rose— —

Mr. Dalyell: People have asked, "Why rake all this up?" The least important reason is that we are spending £3 million a day, and, unless the truth is out, how will the Prime Minister and the Government ever be forced to change policy? There are other considerations.
The Argentines are now far better armed than they were in April 1982. They have the Otamelara and the Meko 360 frigates, powered by Rolls-Royce engines and using David Brown gearboxes, Decca navigation equipment — all made by us. They have the Israeli adapted Nesher 5s which can actually loiter and fight. Therefore, this is not a question of the past—[Interruption.] Alfonsin will not start another conflict—[Interruption.] That is the answer to the Falklands. Juan McCafferty and Pablo Llewelyn are the leaders of the Scottish and Welsh communities. I agree with our excellent ambassador in Peking, Sir Richard Evans, who said that the legacies of history should be solved by peaceful means. There are differences between Hong Kong and the Falklands. One is that there are 1,000 million Chinese and 3 million front-line soldiers, and one does not send a battle fleet against that.
Legitimate questions have been asked time and again, and we have seen the legacy of untruth. Exactly what is there to hide? What will we be if, as Members of Parliament, we do not insist on getting the truth when we know we are being lied to? If we do nothing, democracy itself is injured, and that is why some of us go on.

Mr. Mark Robinson: I welcome this opportunity to take part in the debate because I believe that we are tackling an issue that is central to the relationship between Ministers and their civil servants. I wonder whether at any stage following a war this House has ever considered in detail an action in that war in such detail as the action that we are again considering today.
The hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) again repeated nearly all the arguments that he has put before the House on previous occasions. It is regrettable that in doing so he should issue an open invitation to civil servants in the Foreign Office to come forward—presumably to him—with further leaked information. If I heard the hon. Gentleman correctly, he seemed to indicate that that might happen, and as well as saying that in his speech, I heard him say it last night on television.
The relationship between a civil servant and his Minister is very much under the microscope in this debate. If Mr. Clive Ponting really had his conversion on the road to Damascus at the moment the memorandum was to be presented to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, what on earth was he doing in April when he was playing with that typewriter? If this was a man of great integrity, why for two months did he embark on a process of obvious deception of Ministers for whom he was working and of civil servants with whom he was working? That question needs to be, and should be, answered.
If a Minister cannot trust his senior civil servants—and Mr. Clive Ponting was a senior civil servant—the corollary is that Ministers will start to look for people whom they can trust in senior positions. That is what happens in the United States, and that is why each time there is a change of Administration in that country there is a change in the entire top echelons of the civil service.
I do not believe that any hon. Member of any political party would like to see that situation prevail in the United Kingdom.
There has to be trust between Ministers and their civil servants. If civil servants disagree with their Ministers, procedures are open to them to make their views known. What is astonishing in what we have been told this afternoon by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence is that Mr. Clive Ponting at no stage seems to have recorded his reservations on, his objections to, or his displeasure with, what was going on. Far from it—he continued to advise Ministers and to put drafts in front of them which it now appears he may have believed were the drafts which the Ministers wanted to see. That can be the only explanation for his behaviour if, at the same time, he was putting contrary information into the hands of the hon. Member for Linlithgow.
We have also had, not quite so vociferously this afternoon following my right hon. Friend's speech, a concerted attack on my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces—we have had it in the media as well. We have been led to believe that my right hon. Friend was personally responsible for everything that is alleged to have been going on. We are told that he has been operating behind the back of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State in some kind of collusive arrangement and liaison with my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence left me in no doubt where responsibility for the decisions that have been made lies. It lies at his door, and he was at pains to point that out.
My right hon. Friend was also at pains to point out that my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces tendered his advice, as he should do as junior Minister, to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for his final decision. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence was able to weigh up the value of that advice, of the advice that he received from his civil servants and, in one instance, the value of the changed advice that he received from one particular civil servant.
The other issue that has come up, and the hon. Member for Linlithgow raised it in his speech yet again, is the Peruvian peace initiative. Having had the opportunity to work in the United Nations, in the Secretary-General's office, and to see how these negotiations go on, I find it incredible that this or any Government would conceive it necessary to take a decision to sink a cruiser purely to scupper a peace initiative that was reportedly going on in Peru. If our diplomats are not capable of dealing with such initiatives if our Governments disagree with them, what are they earning salaries for? It is absurd to pretend that negotiations of that nature could in some way bind a Government who were not a party to it. Any settlement of such a dispute can be achieved only if the two or three parties—in this case the two parties—concerned are in agreement with it.
At the time the discussions were going on, we were faced with the decision of what to do about the General Belgrano. I cannot believe, when the advice was that that cruiser was a threat to certain ships within the task force, that the Government would say that they would not listen to such advice because they felt that they should wait another 24 hours or 48 hours, even if it meant a ship being sunk, to see what the outcome of the Peruvian initiative would be. The Government and the War Cabinet had far more important issues on their minds. In the light of that

advice, I do not see how any Minister, or the Prime Minister, could have come to the House after the event to defend not sinking the cruiser if there had been some tragedy within the intervening period.
Another issue, which the right hon. Member for Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale (Mr. Steel) has already raised, is that of the Official Secrets Act, which has come under much scrutiny in recent weeks because of this case. It is suggested that the Government should look again at this Act to see whether section 2 should be scrapped and replaced. It is worth recalling that in 1979 the Protection of Official Information Bill failed in its passage through the House of Lords and had to be withdrawn. There is every reason for the Government to look at the Official Secrets Act afresh, because if they do not do so it is likely that in a few years' time we shall be confronted with another situation such as this.
The only sensible way forward would be for all parties to co-operate and try to decide what instrument needs to be put in its place. The confidential relationship between civil servant and Minister has to be protected if we want to continue with the type of Civil Service that we have, of which we are so proud, and which many other countries envy us for having.

Mr. Merlyn Rees: The point that the hon. Member for Newport, West (Mr. Robinson) has made about reform of the Official Secrets Act is important. It is sad that, in the light of the court's decision that Mr. Ponting was not guilty—although one would not have thought so — and the fact that the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General mounted the prosecution, the Government did not say anything about that this afternoon.
My hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell), in my time as an Army Minister 20 years ago, when I was in the Northern Ireland Office and then when I was Home Secretary, has chased me and was often a damn nuisance. The way that some Conservative Members who were tittering and giggling about the role of my hon. Friend is a reflection on them. If it had not been for him, this question would not have been discussed. He is an honourable man and some of those hon. Members who giggled are not fit to clean his boots. I could tell the House of the issues on which he has been wrong, but the best thing to tell the House is what he has been right on—and if he has forced civil servants to sit up and answer the question, he has done us all a service.
During the Crimean war, there was a radical, Independent Member of Parliament for Sheffield called John Roebuck. Some 110 years later, when Asa Briggs wrote his book about Victorian people, he reported there were still people in Sheffield who said to their kids when they kicked up rough, "Don't come the old John Roebuck with me." Not many of us will be remembered in 110 years' time for being in the awkward squad. My hon. Friend is in the awkward squad, and when I saw the Secretary of State for Defence giggling about him I felt slightly sick.
All this business started about nine months ago I know one thing, which is the beginning of the answer to the hon. Member for Newport, West. Ponting should not have been charged under section 2 of the Official Secrets Act. He should have been dealt with by the administrative procedures of the Civil Service—for the moment I am


begging the question of the House of Commons. If my right hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley, Central (Mr. Mason) or my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) had been Secretary of State for Defence when this happened, Ponting's feet would not have touched the ground as he left the Department. We should not have dealt with the matter under section 2 of the Official Secrets Act. There has been talk as though we were discussing Mata Hari, section 1 or spies, but as the Government said in the case, we are talking about an incident in which no security was involved. Mr. Ponting goes out into the world knowing that he was found not guilty by a jury at the Old Bailey, but found guilty today by the Secretary of State, with no suggestion that the right hon. Gentleman should be cross-questioned.
During the trial, I was asked to appear as an expert witness because I had served on the Franks committee in 1972 and had signed its report, just as I signed the report of the Franks committee about the origins of the war. It recommended that there should be only one narrow band in which anyone was prosecuted under the criminal law, and that the remainder should be dealt with by the due processes of the Civil Service.
I am not prepared to change my mind. I do not say that because I am in opposition. I told those who asked me to bear in mind three matters. First—and here I disagree with my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow—once the task force had sailed, the lives of service men should not have been put at risk. That is clear in my mind. My father died as a result of the first world war. I was brought up to despise flag-wagging politicians and flag-wagging newspaper proprietors. The right hon. and hon. Members who were shouting earlier in the debate are the ones who never heard a shot fired anywhere. I feel strongly about this matter.
If politicians send service men 10,000 miles from home, those men have to be protected. If my kids had been there, I would have expected the politicians to protect them. Like my hon. Friend, I accept that we do not know the half of it, but I know one thing, because I was on the Franks committee. It was the Argentine navy which "potched" around for those four or five days. No one knew what those ships were doing. They could quite easily have sent signals saying that they were going home, knowing by that time that their signals would be picked up. I would not have trusted the Argentine navy. I told the court that that had to be made absolutely clear, and incidentally I was told that Ponting felt exactly the same.
There is another reason for my view. I played a part in the Cabinet and the OPC in 1977 when my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Callaghan) and others, including the 'right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen), sent a submarine and two frigates to the South Atlantic with rules of engagement. The implication was clear. I knew what I was doing when I agreed. If it had gone wrong and there had been any action, they were there as a deterrent. I am not prepared to change my mind.
I am not involved in the Belgrano incident. I regard the first part of the Government's motion as irrelevant. I had to be clear that there was no security involved, and the man prosecuting on behalf of the Government admitted that no security was involved in any shape or form.
To me, security is of the greatest importance. When I became Home Secretary I realised that the problem with any official secrets legislation is who is to define what is and what is not security. However, there are matters which no parliamentary Committee would drag out of me. That will have to wait until the expiry of the 30-year rule or the 50-year rule. There are some matters on which I took personal decisions which were right, but I would not reveal them to anyone.
Security matters to me, but it did not matter here. There was no breach of security. So why all the fuss about the Select Committee having these documents? Now it can have them. But it could have had them in the first instance. When they get into the Old Bailey, there can be no security about them.
The Ponting case is not a security matter. I have told the House what was recommended by the Franks committee, but there is another reason why I say that. The right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) knows it, because I took the opportunity to raise it with him the other day.
On 22 November 1976 when I had been Home Secretary for two months, I announced in the House that the Government intended to legislate to repeal section 2 on the basis of the Franks report. It was my first policy in that office. I had Franks on my mind, and I wanted most of all to repeal section 2. I told the House so, but argued the case that there should be a degree of liberality about Cabinet documents.
Before I made that announcement, the Attorney-General of the day talked to me from that distance that all Attorneys-General talk. Everyone was in favour of my proposal. There had been previous debates. Right hon. and hon. Members in all parts of the House were in favour of it and it was not party political. The Attorney-General said to me that, just as the House had decided on a free vote against capital punishment and the Home Secretary had said that he would not be using his prerogative to recommend that anyone should be hanged, on the same basis I should tell the House that, when he looked at the public interest, there should be no prosecutions for anything other than serious breaches of security. Therefore, it is not surprising that I think exactly the same way now.
There is no Law Officer present today, and I understand why. However, Sam Silkin's letter to The Times last year was called in aid by the Prime Minister. Sam Silkin said that the Prime Minister asserted that
'the Law Officers did not seek the view of, or consult with, any other Minister, nor was the view of any other Minister conveyed to them, before they took their decision to prosecute Mr. Ponting'. As a statement of fact I do not question this assertion. Had it been incorrect the Law Officers would certainly have corrected it.
It is unfortunate that the impression has been given during the past 10 days that the Law Officers should not consult Ministers. According to Sam Silkin, this has been the convention for 50 years.
Sam Silkin came to me about two cases. I can remember the details of one because I have been writing about it quite recently. A Ministry of Defence official in Northern Ireland gave some documents to a civil servant. We did not know where they came from. As my mother used to say, "Sins catch you out", and the police found out. That man was not prosecuted. Sam Silkin came to me and asked me what I thought in the public interest. I replied,


"Leave it alone, Sam"—not "play it again, Sam." "It is not worth prosecuting." The outcome would have been exactly the same as the Ponting prosecution.
Then we had the ABC case. I was Home Secretary. I knew nothing about it. The idea that the police tell the Home Secretary about a case is not true. It was not my job as Home Secretary to know what it was about. Sam Silkin came to me in that same diffident way saying that he was considering the case. I asked whether it involved section 2 or section 1. He said that section 1 was involved. I replied that I did not want to know about section 1. I said that if it were section 2 and serious, on the basis of what had been said from the House the case should proceed. It did, and the men got off.
I do not understand what happened last week. It is quite proper for the Law Officers to say that they did not consult. The question is: why did not they consult? No one's views were sought. There was no consultation. Apparently no Private Office minutes went to No. 10 Downing street. Anyone who has been in government knows that a Minister does not breathe in his Department without news of it getting to No. 10. But apparently nothing was done in this case. Ewen Broadbent went to the Director of Public Prosecutions but did not say a word about the views of the Secretary of State. That is fair enough, but it is the first time that that has been done for a very long time.
As The Times said last week, what makes the Act work is that, unless great care is taken, everyone will be in court. It is only the Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General saying, "Don't be daft. Leave it alone as a matter of political judgment," as The Times described it—more correctly, "in the public interest"—that prevents a great many more prosecutions.
So what happened? Apparently the Solicitor-General sat in a room, pulled all the curtains, locked the door and considered the public interest. He would not talk to anyone. He decided to consider the public interest. But did he rely on political osmosis, or did he rely on extra-sensory political perception? In any event he got it wrong.
When I listened to what was said last week, it was a case not of the dog having barked in the night but of the dog not having barked in the night. The Government got it wrong. There should not have been a prosecution. The Government made a mistake. The Prime Minister and the whole bang shoot should have made their view known to the Attorney-General or to the Solicitor-General. The Solicitor-General should not have taken the decision by himself.
I want to ask one question. I have checked with Mr. Speaker that I can raise it. Lord Lewin is being investigated under section 2 of the Official Secrets Act. Right hon. and hon. Members on the Conservative Benches shouted today that male Mata Hari had been done and that Ponting should be crucified on the hill of Golgotha. Nobody would dream that the man had got off. I imagine that it was rather like what happened during the French Revolution. Those who shouted at that time had their heads cut off eventually. I have been looking at the Conservative Benches to see who is going to be done. Is it not the joke of the century that Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Lewin, is to be looked at because he has spoken to journalists and broken the Official Secrets Act? Even if one blows in the wind, one breaks section 2 of the Official Secrets Act. So Lord Lewin is going to be done. But the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General will not

consider the public interest. They will sit down close together and the answer will be that they will not prosecute.
There is a section of the Official Secrets Act that has not been mentioned by any hon. Member. Do hon. Members know that one can self-authorise oneself if one is a Cabinet Minister? Therefore, the Official Secrets Act is not being broken throughout all the chat on a Thursday afternoon, for when one gets up the line one is self-authorising. I say to the House that Admiral Lewin is also self-authorising. I shall not say what Admiral Lewin would say, because it would be unparliamentary. He is not going to be done, but the Government say that they are looking at it. How crazy can the Government be when they say that one of their trusted advisers, a man whom I greatly respect, is going to be looked at to find out whether he has broken the Official Secrets Act?
The whole Ponting affair was a grave mistake. It was wrong to prosecute. It was badly handled. The Government's attitude to secrecy has been completely revealed. This is no way to stop leaks. I do not enjoy leaks by civil servants. A day or so ago civil servants apparently leaked what had happened in a Cabinet sub-committee. They leaked that, as a result of what a general had said about chemical warfare, the Government had decided to reconsider it. It is indefensible that civil servants should have leaked that information, but I do not want those involved to appear at the Old Bailey on criminal charges. When the Government find out that something like this has happened, they ought to get shot of such persons. They ought to be moved.
I did not have the chance to argue this case in court. They did not ask me about it. There I was, all prepared, and nobody gave me the chance.

Mr. Baldry: rose——

Hon. Members: Sit down!

Mr. Rees: I have a question to put to the Minister of State for the Armed Forces. What a rotten title! I used to be Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Army, and then for the Royal Air Force, which was bad enough. Minister of State for the Armed Forces sounds like Chile or Czechoslovakia. It would be better if we returned to the system whereby somebody was responsible for individual services, for which one had an emotional responsibility. I know that the Minister of State for the Armed Forces will be more partial towards the Royal Air Force than towards any of the other services. I understand that, but it is a different matter.
It was announced over the weekend that the Ministry of Defence police are investigating whether Mr. Ponting committed perjury. That has nothing whatever to do with the Ministry of Defence police who are accountable to the Minister. The Metropolitan police are not accountable to the Home Secretary for operational matters. They are completely independent. Who told the Ministry of Defence police to investigate whether Mr. Ponting had perjured himself? It has nothing whatever to do with the Minister or with anybody else. Who told the information department at the Ministry of Defence to assume the sort of role played by Eastern European police forces? The great glory of our police system is that on operational matters they are independent. In Northern Ireland it was not always like that. We had to pull it back from political control.
Over the weekend another meeting took place. I am glad to see that the hon. Member for Hampshire, East (Mr. Mates) is here. Last night I watched him on television, and he said, "I've got a leak. I'm joining in." The press got on to the Ministry of Defence, which said, "It's got nothing to do with us. We never comment on leaks." We have been so immersed in this in our house over the last week that we said, "Poor old so-and-so, he's going to be up for breaking the Official Secrets Act as well."

Mr. Mates: I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman is entertaining the House hugely, but surely he is not trying to make a serious allegation. If he is, he is suggesting that it is one and the same thing for a private citizen, a Back-Bench Member of Parliament like myself or, indeed, the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell), to divulge information that has been brought to us. We are not civil servants or Ministers and therefore are not subject to the Official Secrets Act.—[Interruption.]

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Ernest Armstrong): Order. A great number of hon. Members are waiting to catch my eye. Long interventions make for long speeches.

Mr. Mates: A personal attack, Mr. Deputy Speaker, has just been made on me. Surely I am entitled to answer it. The right hon. Gentleman must understand that it is often our duty as Back-Bench Members of Parliament to bring into the public domain information which is of concern to one's own constituents. That is quite different from Mr. Ponting.

Mr. Rees: The hon. Gentleman is wrong. The Official Secrets Act covers every man and woman in this country. The hon. Gentleman broke the Official Secrets Act. Good luck to him. I say that because I was schooled to believe that if it is serious, let the law do what it likes with such people, but if it does not matter, do not potch around with the criminal law. Under the Official Secrets Act, if one reveals who supplies the cakes to the Ministry of Defence canteen, one can be done under section 2 of the Official Secrets Act. It is only the Attorney-General who can prevent that from happening. He can say that to prosecute is not in the public interest. Therefore, if the hon. Gentleman is prosecuted, I promise to go and give expert evidence at the Old Bailey when this person appears there.

Mr. Baldry: If the right hon. Gentleman finds the Official Secrets Act so abhorrent, I just cannot understand why the last Labour Government did not take steps either to repeal or to reform it.

Mr. Rees: I have had a note which says "Sit down," but very quickly I shall tell the House. First, we did not have a majority. Secondly, I said to my colleagues that there was no point in going ahead with it. I got into trouble in 1969 over the reform of the House of Lords, when the Home Secretary said to me "You take it, Merlyn. We have got an agreement with the Opposition". I ought to have known what that meant. He had been around a long time and the Bill was dead. The Opposition did not co-operate. I have been in Northern Ireland and the Opposition did not give us any help then over pairs and so on, and I was not prepared to take on the Official Secrets Act.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I am listening attentively and, indeed, I am very interested in the right hon. Gentleman's

speech, but the 10-minute rule is now in operation and the right hon. Gentleman has really reached the end of his time.

Mr. Rees: I simply say that there is good reason for not prosecuting Pouting. I have here notes from people who have written to me telling me about heads of the Civil Service who have done what Ponting did in the past 30 years. One of these thought that if he were caught he would get 14 years, which must have been for an offence under section 1, but he did not. There might come a time when a civil servant has to say that Parliament is being misled. Pouting is not on the scale of the big issues in Germany. I accept that. But the House had better put its mind to what will happen if the House is misled. Mr. Brian Walden says "Humbug." That tells us more about Mr. Walden than it does about his ministerial knowledge. The House was misled. The information was only dragged out. That is why I certainly will not vote for the first part of the first motion, but I shall vote gladly for the second.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I remind the House that the 10-minute limit is in operation. If hon. Members give way to interventions there will be no additions for injury time.

Mr. John Wilkinson: The speech of the right hon. Member for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) began well but the knock-about turn which constituted the last three quarters of it was, candidly, unworthy of him and unworthy of the importance of the occasion. I wonder whether the public at large will be satisfied with our proceedings today. We are discussing a matter of the utmost importance and it may well seem to the public that either we are raking over dead men's bones about the sinking of the Belgrano, or, perhaps, that Her Majesty's Opposition and the alliance parties have pursued the personal obsessions of the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) ad absurdum.
We should be discussing today how the House can seek to exercise a measure of parliamentary control and monitoring of the Executive in time of war and how Her Majesty's Government in time of war can exercise control on behalf of Parliament of operations conducted by Her Majesty's forces in the field.
I remember the first debate that we had on the Falklands war following the invasion of the islands when my boss, the then Secretary of State, John Nott, made perhaps the only major mistake in his reports to the House in that he adopted a partisan tone and it was fatal. From then on deliberations over the important matters that ensued were essentially bipartisan. This was one of the aspects of our parliamentary consideration that most impressed the British people. It saddens me that now, instead of drawing the appropriate conclusion, we have lapsed into the worst aspects of partisanship.
I do not want to go back in history too far, but it is worth recalling the immensity of the task that faced our armed forces. The armada that the King of Spain sent to the English shores in 1588 did not stand a lesser chance of success than our task force in setting off for the Falklands. We had no strike carriers. We were critically vulnerable to Argentine land-based air power and carrier-based air power. The Argentinian aircraft carrier The 25th of May was a major threat. In addition, we were operating at extremities of range with no bases of our own. In those


circumstances it was critically important to put the Argentine navy out of the war, to ensure the maximum air cover for our fleet in difficult circumstances and to provide a sufficiency of air superiority to enable our forces to be put ashore on what had then become hostile islands in adverse sea and climatic conditions.
On 1 May we already had the first sign of how extreme the threat was. The Argentine air force was thrown into action against the task force for the first time. There was a major air engagement. Winston Churchill said about our crews in the battle of Britain in August and September 1940:
Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.
The same applied in full measure to the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force Harrier crews embarked on HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible. They had only 19 aeroplanes, very few air crews and had to operate round the clock for considerable periods against repeated attack.
On 1 May the Glamorgan was bombed. Luckily, the bombs did not strike home. Arrow was strafed. The first personnel casualty was incurred and it was clear that unless a major Argentine capital vessel was put out of action and soon, the risk to Her Majesty's task force would grow. In those circumstances, the Cabinet was right to modify the rules of engagement to allow the commander of Conqueror, who had been shadowing the General Belgrano, to attack, sink and destroy the vessel. There is no doubt that the destruction of that ship, which was second only to the carrier The 25th of May in importance in the Argentine navy's order of battle, put the Argentine navy out of the war and constituted a dramatic turning point in the conduct of the operation.

Mr. Steel: Will the hon. Gentleman confirm that a second ago the Secretary of State for Defence interrupted me and denied that sequence of events? He said that the Belgrano was a threat. I put forward the same theory as the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Wilkinson: I regret that I gave way. The right hon. Gentleman's intervention was as inconsequential as his speech.
The point at issue is that throughout the war the Secretary of State had the difficult task of reporting to Parliament, often at extremely short notice because the Argentine radio and other propaganda media were transmitting their version of events. For example, when HMS Coventry went down we had the difficult decision of whether to make a report immediately to the House or whether to try to analyse such reports as could be obtained from the South Atlantic and to make a more considered report. The Secretary of State always tried to make a report at first opportunity.
At the instance of the sinking of the Belgrano there was an error both about the course being steamed by the Belgrano and about the timescale of the sighting and the attack. As the Argentine Government did not rescind the state of hostilities that, formally at least, still applied, Her Majesty's Government were right not to modify the statement that Sir John Nott made. The Government did so when it appeared later that the intelligence and security criteria were not as valid as had previously been the case. But we should not delude ourselves about the imporance of what is said and done here in the House.
My time is short but I want to make one observation. I well recall an occasion when John Nott came to my

party's defence committee. In the course of that meeting he made no reference to the future conduct of operations on East Falkland, and that was after the San Carlos landing had taken place.
Yet the next day it was suggested in the press that John Nott had perhaps hypothesised that the next line of advance might be to Goose Green. Then, of course, when Two Para had the very difficult engagement there and sustained heavy casualties while capturing Goose Green, it was alleged that it was because John Nott had leaked and divulged sensitive information to our Back-Bench defence committee, and that the Argentines had got wind of the line of our forces' advance and had been prepared for the attack. This, of course, was not so. It was purely a bit of conjecture on the part of a particular journalist, and demonstrates the importance of very strict security control over statements made to the House.
In the last analysis it should be remembered that the House is charged with great responsibility. If we had so voted, we could have prevented the task force from sailing and could have interrupted the course of operations. But once such operations are engaged upon, it is the duty of every hon. Member to act responsibly and to bear in mind security considerations. I believe that the Government have done that, and that the amendments of the Opposition and their alliance friends are wholly irresponsible.

Mr. Chris Smith: The debate focuses attention on the relationships between Ministers and their civil servants, between the Government and the House of Commons and between the Government and the country.
First, I must take issue with the Secretary of State, and with the way in which he tried to accuse Mr. Clive Ponting by using such phrases as badly serving both him and the House, making the most extreme and unfounded allegations, breaking his loyalty to Ministers and the ethics of the Civil Service, and so on. Mr. Ponting is one of my constituents. He did not act in a particularly saintly way, but he faced the genuine human dilemma of whether to keep silent or break the supposed trust that Ministers had in him. In my view he made the right decision. He should have been disciplined for it, but he should not have been prosecuted for it as a criminal. For the Secretary of State to come to the House and to try to portray him as some sort of criminal simply in order to deflect criticism away from the actions of Ministers is unworthy of his office and of the duty that he owes to the House.

Mr. Mark Robinson: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Smith: I shall not give way, as I have only a short time in which to speak, and there are important points to be made.
The Secretary of State indulged in a selective rewriting of history. I shall give a brief example. He spoke about the Legge memorandum and about the way in which it had supposedly been some sort of joint production between Mr. Ponting's department and that of Mr. Legge. Of course, there was some consultation with officers under Mr. Ponting in the course of drawing it up, but it is to rewrite history to try to extrapolate from that that there was a joint effort at work, and that Mr. Ponting was somehow putting his whole effort behind it while at the same time going behind the Minister's back to criticise it.
The Secretary of State made great play of the element of trust and loyalty that he expected from his civil servants. But one is entitled to ask, "Trust and loyalty to what?" It is one thing for a Minister to require trust and loyalty in the genuine service of the Government and the country in an honest way that demands integrity. That is the sort of loyalty that civil servants should display. But no Minister has a right to demand such trust and loyalty when it is required in order to aid and abet the deception of the House. That is the key point.
In that connection, it is worth reflecting on what the judge said at the trial. In his summing up he defined the interests of the state as being entirely and solely the policies of the Government of the day. That was the most dangerous thing that a judge could say in defining the interests of the state. I remind the judge of a pamphlet written by Sir Patrick Devlin, now Lord Devlin, in 1956. He wrote about judges and juries and said two extremely important things. First, he said:
the executive has found it much easier to find judges who will do what it wants than it has to find amenable juries.
Secondly, he said:
trial by jury … gives protection against laws which the ordinary man may regard as harsh and oppressive.
The jury decided to give Mr. Ponting protection not simply against the act that he had committed but against the nature and use of the provisions of the Official Secrets Act under which he was prosecuted. The judge said that the interests of the state were synonymous with the decisions of the Government of the day. Of course, if that doctrine was taken to its logical conclusion it would point the path of tyranny. As democrats, hon. Members on both sides of the House should be wary of that.
The arrogance of power which assumes that the Government are always right, and which dislikes and tries to clamp down on all sorts of dissent in a democracy, is aided and abetted by section 2 of the Official Secrets Act, and bears the stamp of everything that the Government have done in the past few years. It was that arrogance that led them to deceive the House and to prosecute Mr. Ponting. The lesson to be drawn is that when Governments try to withhold information and to treat Parliament and the nation with the arrogance that says that they and only they have the truth and are right, it is often impossible for the general public to make any assesment of the tangle that ensues, or of how right or wrong the Government and their decision-making processes are.
That is why section 2 is nonsense. It is not just nonsense because of its catch-all quality or because, as has been noted, someone can be prosecuted for revealing who supplies the tea to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, but because it can be used by the Government to defend their arrogance in power and to defend political decisions that have nothing to do with genuine national security. Of course, there must be protection for genuine national security matters, but everyone, including the prosecution in the Ponting trial, agrees that on the two occasions when Mr. Ponting leaked information, national security was not in any way involved. That is the point.
Perhaps section 1 of the Official Secrets Act should be more clearly defined and tightened up in case national security is at stake, but let us get rid of section 2 and the uses to which it is put, including the use to which it has

been put by this Government. They have used it purely for political ends and have not used it in the interests of the nation as a whole.

Mr. Tony Baldry: In recent days, when I have seen accusations in certain national newspapers that the Prime Minister and others have been misleading Parliament and the people, I have kept hearing the words of a hymn that we used to sing at school:

"Once to every man and nation,
Comes the moment to decide,
Between the sides of truth and falsehood,
Between the good and evil sides."

Tonight the House must make something of that choice, and there seem to be some inescapable truths which we must take into account.
When the Argentines invaded the Falkland Islands it was the first time, perhaps since the Nazis were expelled from the Channel Islands, that an alien power, by force of arms, had sought to invade sovereign British territory and to subjugate fellow British subjects under the rule of a foreign flag.
Argentina acted with unqualified aggression; aggression which had no possible excuse or justification. At the darkest of moments the people of the Falkland Islands were entitled to look to us in Britain, to defend their freedoms, to come to their rescue and to restore to them our protection.
A moment of decision had come in our nation's history. We could have fudged it. Perhaps under less resolute leadership, we might have fudged it. But the inescapable truth was that, at that moment, we had a clear duty to the men and women of the Falkland Islands and, further, a clear duty to the people of the whole world to demonstrate that aggression would not succeed. That duty demanded, if all else failed, a determination and willingness to use force to free the Falklands. Some could not see the clearness of the choice.
When, on 7 April 1982, Sir John Nott told the House of the sailing of the task force — of ships such as Brilliant and Broadsword, Hermes and Invincible, Alacrity, and Apple Leaf departing—and even as our sailors were setting forth for the South Atlantic, the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) was asking what was the cost of it all. What is the cost of freedom? Would we be free today if our fathers and forefathers had tried to give freedom a price? Freedom is beyond cost.
When our sailors, soldiers and airmen were in the South Atlantic, there were those such as the hon. Member for Linlithgow who spared no opportunity to encourage despair, despond and defeatism. On 7 April 1982, as the nation was praying God speed to the task force, the hon. Gentleman said:
Some of us believe that the fleet should turn round and come back to Portsmouth … as soon as possible." — [Official Report, 7 April 1982; Vol. 21 c. 1037.]

On 14 April the hon. Gentleman questioned our air cover, spoke in detail of the planes in the Argentinian air force and reminded the House of the fate of HMS Prince of Wales. He recalled that the original Scharnhorst was sunk in the battle of the Falkland Islands and that, because of those seas, there had been few survivors. He asked for how long we could maintain a blockade 8,000 miles away from base in the Roaring Forties at the beginning of an Antarctic winter. We know the answer to that question. It was until we had won through. But what comfort those


statements must have been to the enemy and what chill they must have caused to the families of those in the task force.
On 10 May the hon. Member called into question the support that we could expect from our European partners. On 13 May he told the House that the Argentine had a tough marine corps and that there would be massive casualties. On 20 May he sought to warn of defeat of the first magnitude and on 24 May he called into question the support we could expect from our American allies.
The hon. Gentleman must answer to history and his conscience for his statements. I say that we would do well to be wary as to how much credence we give to the accusations of those who seek to give freedom a price and whose words must have given comfort only to Britain's enemies.
We then come to the inescapable truth of the sinking of the Belgrano—that it was sunk solely because it was a threat to the task force and a threat to the lives of our sailors and soldiers.
As Mr. Ponting acknowledged at his trial, there was a clear military case for attacking the Belgrano. He said that he had seen the Foreign Office papers and he had seen nothing to suggest the contention that the ship was sunk to end any Peruvian peace plan.
Indeed, as the right hon. Member for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) told the same court with candour:
if 10,000 men were 8,000 miles from home, the politicians had to act quickly to protect them, even if that meant sinking the Belgrano.
The simple and inescapable truth is that the sinking of the Belgrano was a necessary and legitimate act to protect British lives.
Contemplate the reaction of Parliament and people if the Belgrano had not been sunk and if the Belgrano had then attacked our ships, causing casualties and loss of life among our sailors. Is that what some hon. Members would have preferred? Because an enemy ship was sunk, many British service men are alive today who might otherwise have been at the bottom of the south Atlantic.
It then being clear that the sinking of the Belgrano was a legitimate and necessary act, it follows that there was no action that needed to be covered up.
The next inescapable truth is that, in dealing with the facts surrounding the sinking of the Belgrano, or with any other defence matter, we will always have to balance national security with public accountability. It is clear that any effective rebuttal of the case of the hon. Member for Linlithgow was incompatible with Britain's national security. That is because the hon. Gentleman was clearly determined to tear away all of this country's security and intelligence protection — a nine-question letter to the Secretary of State, for example, the answers to which could have been of considerable assistance to our enemies.
Later, the hon. Gentleman wrote:
My information is that the Argentinian fleet was, by that time, under orders to return to base".

One can only speculate as to where that information came from. He continued:
You state that on 2nd May we had an indication about the movements of the Argentinian fleet … what precisely were those indications?
Confronted with such questions, the answers to which could only have compromised our nation's present and future security, Ministers properly limited the scope of their replies. They would have been failing the nation if they had done otherwise.
The last inescapable truth is that the motivation for these attacks by the Opposition, including the Social Democrats, is not because they really believe that Parliament has at any time been deliberately misled, but because of their desire to try to impugn the integrity of the Prime Minister.
The former Speaker of the House, Viscount Tonypandy, reminded us yesterday aptly of the Prime Minister's courage:
I think that, had a man been Prime Minister, he would probably have lost his nerve long before. Any man would have gone back to the United Nations to make sure that he was not going to be ostracised by the world community, in much the same way as the Opposition were putting themselves in the clear if things went wrong.

Britain would have lost all influence in international affairs if Mrs. Thatcher had submitted to the pressure and gone back to the UN.

It would have meant that, never again, would Britain take any decisive action to defend her people. The Prime Minister showed remarkable courage and determination throughout … By her action, she saved the good name of Britain.
We know that, the people of Britain know that, but the Opposition, realising the strength of her integrity, seek, by whisper and innuendo, to impugn that integrity.
That is what today's debate is all about. The Opposition will fail because the people of Britain will say of them as they have said of others before them:
Frustrate their knavish tricks. Confound their politics.

Mr. Tony Benn: I doubt whether this is a good occasion on which to refight the naval strategy of the Falklands war, first because the Ministers now responsible were not in office at the time.
I doubt whether it is a good idea, either, to try to reopen the Ponting case, because the jury has acquitted him. I doubt whether we are doing justice to the importance of the issues that face us if we think that the responsibility can be placed simply on the shoulders of what are quite minor figures in the story.
I shall, therefore, draw attention to what I believe to be the real importance of the debate, for which it will be studied in future years, long after the names of the participants, and maybe even the Falklands war are forgotten. That is that we are discussing today a central question, which must be decided, as to the proper relationship between the Cabinet, the Commons and the courts. That is what the debate is about—[Interruption.] —and if the House will listen, I will establish the point.
It arose, in the first instance, because the Cabinet, who are there by virtue of having won the election, and exercise the prerogatives of the Crown, believe, and have argued, that civil servants, once appointed, are bound in duty simply to work for the Ministers of the day, and that point was put powerfully by the Secretary of State in his speech.
I wonder whether hon. Members think that what happened in the Ponting case happened there for the first time. I remind the House of a report in the Daily Telegraph on 13 November 1976. Under the heading:
Whitehall spies fed Churchill secrets in the 1930s" the article stated:
Sir Winston Churchill received hundreds of secret documents surreptitiously removed from official files sent to him in breach of the Official Secrets Act when he was fighting appeasement as a back bench MP. Mr. Martin Gilbert, Sir Winston's biographer, reported that these documents had been found in the Churchill Archives at Chartwell and said 'there was total, consistent and persistent breach of the Official Secrets Act'.


I do not know, looking at it now, whether Conservative Members think that it was wrong for senior civil servants to keep Mr. Churchill informed when he was a Back Bencher. I remember, as a boy, in 1937, seeing Mr. Churchill sitting where the former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Bexley and Old Sidcup (Mr. Heath), now sits. Were the civil servants wrong to inform Mr. Churchill? They thought they were doing a public duty. Mr. Churchill was getting information which allowed him to destroy the appeasement policy of Neville Chamberlain, in much the same way as my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) has undermined the credibility of the Government in regard to the Falklands war. But whatever view we take, we must not think that that question has always been resolved in one way.
I happen to think that civil servants, Ministers, Members of the House of Commons and political parties should never put their consciences in hock to anybody else. If we think that a course of action is wrong, we have a duty to say so. Our religious liberties in Britain would not have been won if people had not broken the law in order to worship as they wished. It was that which laid the foundation for our political liberties.
Was it right of the Attorney-General to prosecute Mr. Ponting when Mr. Ponting was informing a Member of Parliament? There is a precedent for that. I cited it the other day, Mr. Speaker, in a rather unhappy exchange with you about privilege. In 1938, Mr. Duncan Sandys, a Member of the House and a territorial officer, received information from a fellow territorial officer as a result of which he tabled questions in the House of Commons. Following that, Mr. Duncan Sandys, although an MP, was told to appear before a court martial. He sought the support of the House. The House, in a famous Select Committee report on the Official Secrets Act, published in 1939—my father was a member of that Committee, so I was brought up on the doctrine within it—made it clear that Parliament would not allow people to be prosecuted when their only offence was to tell Members of Parliament things that they should know in order to perform their parliamentary duties. Indeed, the House laid down clearly in that decision in 1939 that to prosecute in regard to information falling under the Official Secrets Act, when it is given to a Member of Parliament, is in itself a breach of privilege. Indeed, I believe that the Attorney-General, in bringing that prosecution, was guilty of a contempt of the House.
A great deal of correspondence took place last week between the Leader of the Opposition and the Prime Minister concerning the method of prosecution. The Prime Minister spoke as if it were a terrible thing that there should have been any consultation. But the Prime Minister is head of the Civil Service and head of the Armed Forces — indeed, with the nuclear button, she is especially responsible, without any holidays as part of the package. The Prime Minister is also head of the security services and, of course, she is the head of the Government. Therefore, it is inconceivable with the Whitehall network that exists that any contemplated prosecution, under section 2 of the Act, of a most senior civil servant, known to the Prime Minister personally, would not have been reported to No. 10 along the network. The prosecution would not have taken place if the Prime Minister had not given assent. Perhaps, like Henry II, all she said was

Who will rid me of this turbulent priest?
and left it to others to do what was necessary. No one will persuade me that the Prime Minister was not involved. But in any event she should have been involved.
There is a precedent for everything. In 1924 the Labour Government fell over the Campbell case because the Labour Prime Minister intervened to bring about the dropping of a prosecution. There was a general election and Labour was defeated. Mr. Baldwin, the Conservative Prime Minister, in answering a question about prosecutions, said that
when the proposed prosecution is of such a character that matters of public policy are, or may be, involved, it is the duty of the Attorney-General to inform himself of the views of the Government or of the appropriate Ministers before coming to a decision."—[Official Report, 18 December 1924; Vol. 179, c. 1214.]

Therefore, if the Attorney-General did not tell the Prime Minister of his intention, he was in breach of a clearly established rule set down by a previous Conservative Prime Minister.
There are other aspects, all of which bear on the relationship between the Cabinet, the courts and Parliament. Where a Minister says to a judge, "That is a matter of national security", I believe that the judge has a duty not to disregard fairness. In his judgment in the GCHQ case Lord Fraser said:
The decision on whether the requirements of national security outweighed the duty of fairness is for the government and not for the courts; the Government alone has access to the necessary information, and in any event the judicial process is unsuitable for reaching decisions on national security.
If a Minister, using the prerogative that he has temporarily acquired by election, says, "This is a matter of national security", the courts now will not even attempt to be fair. Indeed, in the Ponting case, Mr. Justice McCowan said that
the interests of the state
were the same as
the policy of the Government of the day".

That is a doctrine that every dictator in history would have liked to enshrine in capital letters above his presidential palace. It would be a deadly danger for any party, Conservative, Labour or other, to allow such judgments of the courts to go unchallenged. If we were to accept, in the Commons, that doctrine about national security, the Commons would be capitulating to a Government who had decided to rule by prerogative instead of by accountability to the House of Commons. That is what the debate is about, and it is much more important than whether we can catch each other out with little quotations.
The Secretary of State for Defence has made great play —I am not being personal—about the need to protect the troops. What he is clearly saying is that the Government received all their information about the movements of the General Belgrano from United States intelligence. Everybody who knows anything about such matters knows that we do not have satellite intelligence in the South Atlantic; the Americans do. The Americans intercepted the Argentine messages and sent them to GCHQ. We are not talking about protecting a soldier from being shot tomorrow by a sniper. That is what is usually meant by protecting the boys in uniform in the middle of a war. At the insistence of the Americans, the Government are protecting the fact that it was American intelligence that won the Falklands war by giving us the necessary


information. I believe that as a quid pro quo the trade unions at GCHQ—which is a part of that international intelligence system—had to be abandoned.
These are central questions that reopen matters that I was brought up to believe were settled in the 17th century — that the prerogative could not be used so that Ministers could take matters to the courts and get the judgments that they wished; that the prerogative could not be used in Parliament to buy the silence of the Commons in order to accept whatever a Government said; that the prerogative could not be used to put at risk a man of conscience who chose that course rather than his career. Unless this House comes back to those questions and resolves them, we shall find that the so-called Belgrano-Ponting case will turn the clock back not to Victorian days but to a much earlier, less glorious and less democratic period in our history.

Mr. Michael Mates: I was not intending to mention the name Ponting in my short remarks because, unlike the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn), I want to concentrate on the main issue for debate tonight the Belgrano incident. (Interruption.] But I cannot forbear from mentioning one aspect that came out of the trial which has not so far been mentioned, because I feel very deeply that the worst offence that Mr. Ponting committed was when he was being questioned by Detective Chief Inspector Hughes. It was mentioned in court and I have the transcript here. Chief Inspector Hughes said:
I have good reason to suspect that you are involved in passing confidential documents to Mr. Tam Dalyell … For that reason I am going to caution you".

Mr. Ponting said:
Good God, you don't suspect me".

Then he went on to imply that his own personal staff might have photocopied and leaked those documents. He implied that Mararet Aldred, his principal, Nick Darms, his HEO, and even his own PA, Mrs. Ritchie, might have been the persons who committed the leak. If that is the way that that senior, trusted, civil servant behaved towards his own staff, we are well rid of him.
What saddens me is that two senior right hon. Members who have both held high office, the right hon. Members for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) and for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees)—alas, only one of them is here, and I am friendly with and respect the other greatly—should rejoice and drink champagne with that sort of a man. It is not worthy of them.
The second thing that Mr. Ponting said, I am afraid, made my blood rise even higher and made me glad that I said what I said yesterday about some of the feelings within the Royal Navy about what was going on. This comes out of yesterday's edition of The Observer:
I was asked to rephrase the letter (to be sent to Denzil Davies) placing greater emphasis on the Argentine attacks on 1 May. This proved somewhat difficult because the level of attacks had actually been very low and ineffective.
What arrogance that from a comfortable seat in Whitehall Mr. Ponting can judge the effect that the Argentine air force had on our sailors down there who were trying to fight a war. That is why I said yesterday —I do not want to go all through it again today as there is not the time —that some constituents of mine who were down there and did fight came to tell me that they felt very badly indeed that the feeling is still around that

all was not quite well over the sinking of the Belgrano. They were in the ships that were attacked. The particular individual who was down below in the Glamorgan when those two bombs went off thought that his end had come. He thought that either they had hit a mine or that they had been torpedoed, so great were the shock waves from those two 1,000 lb bombs from the Argentine air force. In nobody's mind who was there was that a minor or light incident. It was after that that they went to do another job away from the main part of the task force. They were closer to the Belgrano than perhaps has been admitted.
I do not take issue with the Ministry of Defence about that. I do not quarrel with its decision not to give away the position of any of our ships because once it has done that it must give the position of them all. It is the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) who has been constantly trying to find out where our submarines and ships were, all information that would be of the greatest value to the enemy, that would give away our——

Mr. Heseltine: There has been a certain amount of interest in this matter. My hon. Friend has taken a great deal of interest in it and asked some questions on the assumption that some of our ships were much closer than it was assumed that they were. We have examined the matter again, and I believe that that is not the case. The issue is clear. The House will understand that calculations were made not only on the precise position of the ships but on the rate at which they could close. Sir John Nott, who was Secretary of State at the time, gave the figure of about 200 miles. I think that it was probably more than that. Perhaps the closest was about 260 miles from the task force. The issue was one of calculation—how quickly the ships could converge. It was because the calculations within the Ministry showed clearly that the risk existed that the answers were given in the way that they were.

Mr. Mates: I do not wish to quarrel with what my right hon. Friend said, nor do I expect him to come out with any of the details. The reason why I am saying this is that I want to make this point. It was perfectly clear to every single member of the task force who was at sea that every single Argentine ship was a threat, wherever it was, because the ships were not out there for any reason other than to threaten our task force and to attack it. At the end of the day, when our men have come back home, they resent very deeply what the hon. Member for Linlithgow says, such as "The Belgrano was going home", "The Belgrano was no threat", "The Belgrano was too old to do any damage to any of our ships". Those facts are simply not the case. The threat was real and not imagined. From what I have been told, the fear in which those brave sailors lived was very real as well.
However, there is one source to which we can go. I know that this has been said before, but it was a long time ago, and most people, I believe, have forgotten it. It is what the Argentines said that they were doing. It all came out in a "Panorama" programme when Fred Emery was describing the events. He said:
It was 'go' for the Argentine fleet. Then he described how the fleet set sail. Then the Argentine admiral Lombardo said:
'We thought that the British were going to concentrate near Port Stanley and we tried to attack isolated ships or small groups of ships out of that region'.
That description applies exactly to the small group of ships to which I referred. He continued:
The Air Force were going to attack the ships near Port Stanley".



Fred Emery said:
and the same order to attack isolated British ships that was given to the 'Belgrano' and her ships as well?
Lombardo said:
Not up to this moment because she … and the other two escort ships, were going to make an—I don't know how to say in English …
Fred Emery suggested "A pincer movement?" and Lombardo said "Yes". Emery said:
That's the first Argentine admission the 'Belgrano' was part of the pincer movement to join battle with the British.
What could be clearer than that? What could be clearer than the Argentine naval chief of staff himself setting out on British television what the Belgrano and its group were about? The interview goes on, and once again we refer to the words of the admiral. This is fairly crucial because it is connected with the change of course. Lombardo said that at about midnight the ships were given orders to come back. Emery asked, "To come back where?" and the admiral said:
To their former positions. That is to say, the two groups in the north to their continent and the group in the south to their States island.
Emery asked:
Was that a political decision or just a military decision?
Lombardo replied: "Military decision, sir." The fleet was ordered to turn around for military purposes for one reason and one reason only, that the Argentines had got our intentions wrong. We were not landing when the Argentines thought we were landing or where they thought we were landing. They realised, too late as it turned out, that they were in mortal danger of attack from the task force. That is the sole reason why the Belgrano was ordered to turn round. Anyone who says that it was going home on a Sunday afternoon, back to port, does not know what he is talking about because there it is out of the mouth of the Argentine admiral himself. The captain of the Belgrano himself, captain Bonzo, said:
If I changed course, it was to complete an anti-submarine tactic so as not to maintain a predictable course for a long time.
If there are hon. Members who will not believe my right hon. Friend or who did not believe Sir John Nott, and they can honestly tell us that they do not believe the naval chief of staff of Argentina either, all that I can say is they do not want to know the truth. The truth is that that ship was a danger. It was a great danger to our task force, particularly to those parts of it that were close to it. At the end of the war the fact that the Belgrano was sunk and the entire Argentine navy went home must have saved countless British lives.
In the middle of all that, for Opposition Members to quibble about the time, place and course, the detail and the distance, is to miss the main point because Opposition Members who were staunchly behind the Government during the war—I am happy to say that that is most Opposition Members—accepted the needs and risks of that war. It is only the few who have sought to make mischief, who have consorted with people who are prepared to deceive and to lie, simply to try to discredit my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister's handling of the war, who do no service to this country. When they laugh and joke about mistakes and when they rejoice that errors have been made, they do no service to this country either.
I hope that the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) will be as responsible and statesmanlike when he winds up today as he was when he

spoke about the terrorist attack in Brighton. We would look forward to hearing from him that this war was conducted honourably and responsibly because he knows that that is the truth. I hope that he will share that truth with us.

Mr. Ian Mikardo: If it is thought that this debate should be about what happened during the weekend when the Belgrano was sunk, I should point out that there is no reason to have a debate on that today. We could have debated it at any time in the past year or so with as much knowledge and authority as we now have. The time to debate that matter is not now but in a few weeks' time when we have the report of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs which has been going into the matter in great detail.
When I hear dogmatic views expressed, as we heard from the hon. Member for Hampshire, East (Mr. Mates), I recall that having spent months going through a mountain of evidence I still cannot make up my mind about the truth of the matter and I look forward to considering it further. How hon. Members who have not looked at the evidence can be so sure and so dogmatic passes my comprehension. As a member of the Select Committee, I take the view that the Government are throwing a grave insult at that Committeee. Having already insulted it by withholding information from it, the Government are now gravely insulting the Select Committee by trying to get the House today to pre-empt and thus devalue its work and its report.
I appreciate, Mr. Speaker, that I may refer only to those parts of the Select Committee's work that are already publicly available. It is well known that the Select Committee has been working on this inquiry for some time — well known to everyone except, apparently, the Secretary of State. The right hon. Gentleman said today that the only thing being investigated by the Select Committee—he even read out the terms of reference—was the future of the Falklands and the peace process. We concluded that inquiry months ago and issued a report. The Secretary of State himself gave evidence to the Committee. The report itself, under the heading
Foreign Affairs Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Wednesday 7 November 1984, right hon. Michael Heseltine MP
has the following title in bold type:
The events surrounding the weekend of 1–2 May 1982".
When it became clear that the Secretary of State did not even know to what inquiry he had given evidence, I began to doubt the creditworthiness of the rest of his speech.
We are still taking evidence and the Secretary of State has today promised us two further pieces of evidence. He seemed to be claiming some special credit for letting us see the "Crown Jewels" — more than somewhat belatedly, as we had to drag it out of him—but no credit is due to the Secretary of State as it would have been unthinkable for him to withhold that evidence from the Select Committee. If it was not devastatingly damaging for the judge, the jury, the lawyers and their staff and the court officials and servants to know what was in that document, there can be no reason to withhold it from two right hon. and nine hon. Members of this House. I am surprised that the Secretary of State is not requiring us to be vetted by an Old Etonian as was the jury in the Ponting case.
When the House has the Select Committee report, irrespective of the conclusion that we reach about the


Belgrano—I do not yet know what conclusion that will be—the House will clearly be in a much better and more informed position to pronounce on the matter than it is today.
The justification for today's debate is a justification for a debate on a quite different subject—the revelations and the things that crawled out of the woodwork during the Ponting trial. Those disclosures have confirmed and supplemented what we already knew about the Government's lying to the House, lying to the Select Committee and lying to the country. I use the word "lying" advisedly, strong though it is, because it is a cardinal principle that suppressio veri is equivalent to suggestio falsi, if only because it violates the second of the three requirements—the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
The Legge minute has been mentioned several times. In that minute, a civil servant advised his Ministers to deceive the Select Committee by withholding information. What must concern the House is not that Mr. Legge offered that shabby advice to the Minister for the Armed Forces but that the Minister, with the consent of the Secretary of State, accepted and acted upon it. We now know from the evidence that the Minister for the Armed Forces accepted it enthusiastically—a good deal more enthusiastically than his boss the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State today listed the reasons which Mr. Legge gave for deceiving the Select Committee and which the Minister accepted. Those reasons were wholly bogus, hollow and meretricious and were clearly exposed as such in the Select Committee's examination of the Secretary of State, to which I referred earlier. If any hon. Member doubts my word about that, he should read the evidence, which makes it absolutely clear that those reasons did not stand up under questioning.
As time is limited, I mention just one of the reasons given by Mr. Legge for withholding the information. He said that the rules of engagement
would have to be paraphrased at some length since their format would be almost incomprehensible to the layman".

Yet those rules were given to the War Cabinet, and all the Ministers who were members of the War Cabinet were laymen. I cannot imagine why it should be thought that what was intelligible to the laymen in the War Cabinet would be beyond the understanding of those on the Select Committee. Was the Chairman of the Select Committee, the hon. Member for Stroud (Sir A. Kershaw), for instance, assumed to be less intelligent and not so quick on the uptake as, say, Lord Whitelaw? The very idea is enough to make a cat laugh. The Secretary of State himself subsequently admitted that it was nonsense when, despite all the reasons that he listed for not giving the rules of engagement to the Select Committee, after much travail he finally gave them to us a few weeks ago. Layman though I am, I had no difficulty at all in understanding them.
One further matter arises out of the Ponting trial. I mention it again as it deserves special attention. A number of people have said that they could not understand why the Government made the mistake of prosecuting Mr. Ponting and that they could not understand what the Government hoped to get out of it. I was not sure myself when I first thought about it. In the light of what has happened, I now know what the Government hoped to get out of putting Clive Ponting in gaol. They hoped to establish, as the judge tried to establish, that their lying to the House was

in the national interest. They wanted to protect themselves against any criticism from the Select Committee or anyone else and to be able to say that, however reprehensible the deed, it was done in the national interest.
The aquittal gets rid of all that well and truly. Twelve British citizens have summarily dismissed the judge's monstrous opinion — clearly shared by the Prime Minister and at least some of her Ministers—that the national interest is whatever the Government of the day want to do. That is a monstrous doctrine, because if confers on a Government a cachet of papal infallibility. I do not doubt that all Governments do what they judge to be in the national interest, but no Government have the right to assume that their judgment can never be wrong.

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman has reached the end of his time.

Mr. Mikardo: I shall just finish my sentence, Mr. Speaker, if I may. No Government should assume that they can never be wrong and that what they do cannot sometimes therefore vary from the national interest. As has been said, that is the cherished doctrine of General Pinochet and of General Jaruzelski. It is the codex of all courts in police states. Before the time of our present Prime Minister and Mr. Justice McCowan, that doctrine was unheard of in our country.

Sir Anthony Grant: First, I assure the right hon. Member for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees)—for whom I and the whole House have great respect, and who made the only worthwhile contribution from the Opposition Benches—that I would not join in any chorus of criticism of the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell). I have known the hon. Gentleman for a long time. I think that he is a bit cracked, if he does not mind my saying so, but I believe that he is absolutely sincere. However, the trouble with people who have bees in their bonnets—and it is right that there should be such people—is that they often find themselves unable to see the wood for the trees.
At least the hon. Gentleman's position is more honourable than that of the Opposition. He consistently opposed the sending of the task force to the Falklands. The Opposition were in favour of sending the task force. However, their amendment shows that they are not even prepared to agree that
the protection of our Armed Forces must be the prime consideration in determining how far matters involving national security and the conduct of military operations should be disclosed.
In that respect the Labour party suffers by comparison with the Liberal party, whose amendment recognises that factor.
As the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) said, the Ponting trial is over and done with. It has given rise to a great deal of nonsense. Anyone who believes in trial by jury — as I certainly do — must accept the verdict, and that is the end of the matter so far as the courts are concerned. Whether it was right to prosecute is, with hindsight, a matter that can be discussed, but it would be a bad day for British justice if prosecutions authorised by the Attorney-General were automatically assumed to merit conviction, and it would also be a bad day for British justice if an Attorney-General were deterred from prosecuting for fear of an acquittal and a row in Parliament.
However, that is not the important issue, nor is the absurd accusation that the Prime Minister lied to the House. The antics of the Opposition over the prosecution were especially ridiculous. Everyone with the slightest intelligence knows that the Attorney-General authorises all prosecutions. The tedious correspondence has bored the pants off everyone and resulted in the Leader of the Opposition making an ass of himself and having to climb down. Likewise, Mr. Ponting himself is not the main issue. However, we are entitled to express nausea at the ridiculous attempt in some quarters to canonise a thoroughly dishonourable man.
Mr. Ponting talks about the right to know, but he did not want anyone to know of his sneaky activities. He did not have the guts to resign, he was prepared to employ double standards in the advice that he gave to Ministers, and he posed as a hero only when he was caught out. Far from regarding him as a hero, I believe that most people would regard him as an unprepossessing and sanctimonious creep. We need not worry about Mr. Ponting. He will soon be a gimmick candidate for the Social Democratic party and will appear endlessly on BBC panel and parlour games.
The Opposition have fallen over themselves to praise Mr. Ponting. I do not mind the hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Mr. Smith) defending his constituent. However, the Opposition's attitude is in marked contrast to the treatment of my constituent, Mr. Robin Page, a DHSS civil servant, when Labour was in office 15 years ago. Mr. Page was disturbed at the way in which the Labour Government were misleading the House over supplementary benefit frauds. He wrote an article — I accept that he was wrong to do so under a pseudonym —in which he criticised the misleading of the House. He was dismissed by the late Dick Crossman and threatened with the Official Secrets Act. He lost his job and all his pension and gratuity benefits.
The Labour doctrine at that time was as follows. The then Minister of State, Department of Health and Social Security, now Lord Ennals, said:
It is intolerable for anyone to feel such confidence in his own righteousness that he is entitled to break the rules of the Civil Service confidence and at the same time stay in his job and denounce the Department in which he serves. I do not see how any Government could work if civil servants were permitted to behave in that way."—[Official Report, 23 February 1970; Vol. 796, c. 955.]

Will the Leader of the Opposition support the re-establishment of my constituent, who has written to him with that request, or will he apply double standards to the cases of the two civil servants? If he does so, the Opposition will be guilty of humbug.
The direction in which the Belgrano was sailing—or, indeed, with respect to my hon. Friend the Member for Hampshire, East (Mr. Mates), its distance from our ships—is another irrelevancy. It is not of any more vital current importance than the direction in which the Bismarck was sailing in the second world war. The matter is interesting to military historians and to the hon. Member for Linlithgow, but everyone else — especially those whose relatives served in the task force — is simply relieved that it was sunk.
What Ministers reveal to the House is, however, a matter of importance. Undoubtedly the maximum information should be disclosed, but there is a very real

dilemma that cannot be ignored. Not everything can be revealed. The public understand that, even if the media do not. Where the security of the nation and the safety of service men are at risk, the right to know must take second place. The public would never forgive Ministers who put at risk a single life merely to satisfy the whims of cranks and political opportunists.
As the right hon. Member for Chesterfield said, the important issue for the future is the relationship between Ministers and civil servants. When I was at the Department of Trade and Industry, I was warned by a senior civil servant that the old standards of loyalty were disappearing and that one would be wise not to rely on civil servants in the future as one had done in the past. I found that very sad. I did not really believe it, but that change of atmosphere led to the increased use of political advisers.
The right hon. Member for Chesterfield brought in powerful Left-wing political advisers, who cocooned him from the civil servants. I do not think that he was wrong to do so, because I do not believe that the present leak will be an isolated case. Leaks will occur again, and will lead to parties, of whichever complexion, bringing in their own Civil Service, on the lines of the system in the United States, the French Chef du Cabinet system, or, indeed, the more extreme systems of other countries. I believe that that would be a retrograde step, as a responsible Civil Service acts as a shock absorber to ambitious and over-excitable ministerial springs. Our Civil Service has given us an enviable stability in comparison with other nations.
Ministers may disregard all the other nonsense talked in the debate, but they should address themselves to the problem of how to deal in future with relations between officials and Ministers. The Government must consider the general morale within a service upon which we depend. Is all well in that connection? Only Governments can put matters right.
I remind the House again of the wise words of Lord Ennals:
I do not see how any Government could work if civil servants were permitted to behave in that way.
I take precisely the same view of Mr. Ponting in this case. Much deeper issues are raised in the debate than what happened in the South Atlantic two years ago. Ministers should apply their minds to those issues, and the House should reject the Opposition's absurd amendment.

Mr. Dick Douglas: I am sorry that the hon. Member for Hampshire, East (Mr. Mates) is absent, as he referred to the Lombardo interview on "Panorama". The hon. Gentleman is a member of the Select Committee on Defence and I assume that he has read the note written by one of the advisers to that Committee, which says of the "Panorama" interview:
This interview has been seized upon by the government as confirming their fears of 1 and 2 May. It was mentioned for example in the Prime Minister's letter to Mr. Foulkes. It has, however, been suggested that Lombardo now feels his remarks were quoted out of context. The phrase 'pincer movement' is probably an overstatement. The Belgrano's Task Group 79.3, comprising some of the least modern ships of the Argentine Navy, was clearly not earmarked for a major offensive role. The sort of manoeuvres described do not conform to a classic pincer movement.

Mr. Speaker: Order. Has this evidence been published?

Mr. Douglas: It is not evidence. It is a note of advice given to hon. Members. I should not quote evidence.

Mr. Speaker: Order. I must warn the hon. Gentleman that it is not normal to report the internal proceedings of a Select Committee.

Mr. Douglas: You have my assurance, Mr. Speaker, that I have not quoted evidence. It is a note or observation, and I am prepared to submit it to any hon. Member. I have quoted it merely to contradict some of what the hon. Member for Hampshire, East said.
I do not propose to follow the events of 1 and 2 May because the Select Committee on Defence and others might prise the information out of the Government in due course. I see no reason why the so-called "Crown Jewels" should not be made available to Select Committees that are interested in these matters. Having accepted that view, I trust that the Government will ensure that such information is speedily given to the Select Committees.
I accept that intelligence and operational matters must be kept secret, but the House has not considered how we were operating during Operation Corporate. We never declared war on Argentina but operated under article 51 of the United Nations charter. There might have been good reasons for our not declaring war. My right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) gave some. One is that, if we had declared war, the United States would have had to make its stance clear; and in those circumstances security and intelligence information from the United States might have been withheld. We should be clear about what we were safeguarding in trying to bottle up the events of 30 April to 2 May 1982. It is one thing to do that at the time, but quite another to do it two or three years after the event.
The kernel of the case against the Government has little to do with Ministers but a lot to do with the Prime Minister's presidential style of government. The nation will be suspicious that she, who is a tenacious lady—much respect has been paid to her today — surrounds herself with people who give her the answers that she wants. That is extremely dangerous. Hon. Members have referred to the dogs that have not barked. I do not mean to be disrespectful to Conservative Members, but some of those dogs are conspicuously absent from this debate. I refer to the right hon. Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East (Mr. Pym) and the Chairman of the Defence Select Committee, the right hon. Member for Spelthorne (Sir H. Atkins). When Lord Carrington and the right hon. Member for Spelthorne faced difficulties concerning Operation Corporate, they took the opportunity to resign, but the right hon. Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East got no such opportuntity. The nation will recognise that in this cover-up. The Government operated under perhaps a mistaken view of the diktat of the Prime Minister. Ministers gave her the information that she wanted. That might have involved the Attorney-General. My right hon. Friend the Member for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) gave a potent view of what ought to have happened in regard to the political considerations that should have been in the Attorney-General's mind. There are real dangers in the Prime Minister's approach, which must be halted.
I should like finally to consider the views of my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell). One of the reasons why we have parliamentary privilege is to

defend our constituents, not ourselves. I have told my constituents and my constituency party that if everyone else in the land thinks that they are wrong but they can convince me that they are right, it is my obligation, with the use of parliamentary privilege, to defend their interests in the House of Commons. My hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow takes the view that his responsibility is to prise the truth out of the Government. That might annoy or upset the Government, but that is what we come here for. There is a distinction between the will of Government, the will of the House and the good of the nation. Through this debate, we are getting a clearer understanding of how the Prime Minister operates. The hon. Member for Cambridgeshire, South-West (Sir A. Grant) questioned the use of "civil servants" in Cabinet. We have a 10 Downing street Cabinet Office which is stacked full of yes-men and women for the Prime Minister. There are dangers in this form of elective dictatorship, especially when the party in government has a large majority.
I welcome this debate and the exposure of the Government's misleading the House and the Select Committee, but I shall welcome it even more if it is clearly understood that some members of the Cabinet should occasionally stand up to the Prime Minister.

Mr. John Browne: What greater test can any Government face than to fight a military campaign and have a disloyal adviser in a key area of defence? I am reminded of the betrayal of the Spartans at Thermopylae to the Persians.
In what other country would the Government have to balance disclosure against national security in such a blaze of examination, comment and publicity?

Mr. Mikardo: The United States.

Mr. Browne: No, not the President.

Mr. Mikardo: Yes.

Mr. Browne: What party would place its own fortunes so obviously above the national interest to try to bring down a democratically elected Government who, above all others since the war, have faced and continue to face our national interests with courage and integrity?
The Falklands campaign was relatively small but involved intelligence and tactics that still form part of the everyday and overall defence of our nation. We should never forget that, daily, we face a struggle to retain our freedom. Our armed forces must remain vigilant constantly. Our intelligence and tactics are of great interest to the enemies of our freedom.
The Falklands campaign was one of the finest feats of arms in our entire history, in which a decisive factor was the sinking of the Belgrano, which itself was based on intelligence. It would be greatly against the interests of our country to disclose the sources of that intelligence. The right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) talked brazenly about the United States being the source of that intelligence. What does he hope to achieve by saying that? If it were true, and I emphasise if it were true, its disclosure could only damage the interests and influence of the United States throughout Latin and South America. It would also damage our relationships with the United States.
We must remember that the Falklands campaign is still operational. We have soldiers, sailors and airmen there


today, who must live in a state of war readiness. The disclosure of the source of the intelligence and the tactics are still appropriate to them.
The Government must daily live under the unenviable burden of balancing disclosure and secrecy in the national interests. I listened to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, and I am convinced that the Government have balanced disclosure and secrecy in the national interests. I wholly support them in continuing to do so. They have achieved this balance, despite a thoroughly devious and disloyal adviser in a senior position in a key Ministry.
Let us now consider what our constituents think about this matter. I do not believe that the general public care when the Belgrano was sighted, where it was facing when it was engaged, or how far it was from our ships. Most of them do not give a hoot. They are extremely glad that it was sunk.
Our constituents could be excused for feeling that Mr. Ponting was treacherous, especially in the light of our debate. It appears that he did not act in search of a political idealistic truth, nor even for political reasons, but for party political reasons. I accept the court's decision, but I have a big job in persuading some of my constituents to accept it.
The Ponting case has many effects. First, it adversely affects the relationships between Ministers and civil servants. We have an excellent Civil Service, which has extremely high standards, is basically non-political and acts in the national interests. We now have a problem of confidentiality, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) pointed out. Secondly, the case has the effect of causing potential delays in political decisions in future wars. That is serious. We face daily the problems of Queen's Order No. 2, and, as my right hon. and hon. Friends will know, I often ask questions about it. In certain circumstances, it may be considered too dramatic a move to mobilise our reserve forces under that order. It would take a major political decision to do that. That is the fear of many military planners, and that presents a genuine risk in our defence posture. The case will affect adversely difficult political decisions that will have to be made in future for the exercise of Queen's Order No. 2.
The debate makes it clear that the decision to sink the Belgrano was utterly correct. Even the Argentinian admiral agrees that he would have done the same in the circumstances. Nevertheless, correct or not, the decision took courage and decisive action. What of the future? We may not be in the fortunate position of having such a decisive and courageous Prime Minister. The effects of this scrutiny of and back biting about a tactical decision in a battle serve our country ill.
Finally, the right hon. Member for Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale (Mr. Steel) criticised section 2 of the Official Secrets Act. Many hon. Members realise that there are things wrong with it, but his credibility vanished when he made a naive statement about GCHQ. Many hon. Members have known about GCHQ, but we have also known that the institution had been infiltrated. It is a top secret location instituted for communications, yet union rules forbade even the searching of brief cases of those leaving the base. It was an amazingly insecure place. Undoubtedly it took courage to re-establish security there. However, I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that

section 2 needs to be replaced or substituted, but, until hon. Members can agree on an effective substitute, it should remain.
This debate has shown conclusively that the Government acted decisively, correctly and courageously, and they should be praised for it.

Mr. Gavin Strang: Unlike the hon. Member for Winchester (Mr. Browne), but like many of my right hon. and hon. Friends who have spoken, I opposed the decision to recapture the Falkland Islands by force. All the information that has subsequently been given to the House has more than confirmed my judgment.
It was obvious to any layman at the outset that the task force was embarking on an objective which involved great dangers. The information shows that we were lucky that only 255 members of the task force and 754 members of the Argentine forces lost their lives. Many more could have been killed. Inherent in the decision to recapture the Falklands by force was the fact that the Government would subsequently embark on their Fortress Falklands policy. We are spending thousands of millions of pounds a year on that policy, which is indefensible. I say that not in an attempt to be wise after the event but because it is important that the House should learn the lessons of the Falklands exercise. In so far as I would criticise Governments about what happened in the Falklands, the main responsibility lies not with this Government but with all the Governments since 1965, who failed to respond to the resolution carried in the United Nations General Assembly, which called on Argentina and Britain to resolve the issue through negotiations. The sovereignty of the Falkland Islands should have been negotiated, and the best deal obtained, during those years when there were democratically elected Governments in Argentina.
The debate is not a general debate about the Falklands, nor the sinking of the Belgrano, but about the circumstances of the trial of Clive Ponting. This afternoon the Secretary of State went to great lengths to discredit Mr. Ponting. To some extent he seemed to attempt to retry him with himself as the prosecuting counsel. Most Conservative Members were clearly convinced by the Secretary of State, but I was not. Time will tell, but the crucial issue that the Secretary of State did not address himself to was the verdict of the trial. The decision was a historic vindication of the jury system. As the defence solicitor for Mr. Ponting said, it was a political verdict at a political trial. That decision is historic because the crucial issue in the trial was the constitutional one, which involved the decision of Ministers to provide misleading information to the House. It is no use the right hon. Gentleman seeking to make out that civil servants made suggestions that resulted in misleading information. That has been the policy for months. At one point it almost seemed as if the right hon. Gentleman was trying to criticise Mr. Ponting for coming forward with proposals to continue the Government's policy of misleading the House of Commons.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies), who opened the debate so effectively for the Opposition, quoted the answer which the Prime Minister gave my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) on 21 February. Indeed, my hon. Friend has pursued these matters diligently over the years. That was an important answer. It was not just a spontaneous answer


to a supplementary question. It will be recalled that that question had stood on the Order Paper for two weeks. It specifically asked the Prime Minister why she would not set up a public inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the sinking of the Belgrano. We know that the Prime Minister's answer was far from the truth. There is also the whole question of the so-called Stanley memorandum.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Bow and Poplar (Mr. Mikardo) said, this is not about the Legge minute or about what civil servants wrote. They were simply doing what the Government wanted. The issue is that the Government chose to submit the memorandum to the Select Committee. That memorandum was designed to mislead the Select Committee, which had asked for information on the changes in the rules of engagement.

Dr. Hampson: Surely the Select Committee asked for a document that was not classified, and that is what it got. When it asked for a classified document with full information, it got that.

Mr. Strang: If the hon. Gentlman reads the Legge minute, he will understand what I am referring to. That memorandum was at best intended to prevent the Select Committee from getting the information that it sought.
It would be churlish not to acknowledge that the Government have now decided to allow the Select Committee to see the document known as the "Crown Jewels". When the Secretary of State gave evidence to the Select Committee, he was most adamant that it should not see that document. It is obviously important that the Government have now decided to make it available. When the Minister of State replies, I hope that he will make it clear that there is no qualification other than that of the most elementary precautions that one might take, and that all members of the Select Committee will see the whole document.
The crucial issue is the Government's responsibility to Parliament. Our unwritten constitution does not work if Parliament cannot depend on Minister's telling the truth. They have not told the truth on this issue. Incidentally, I hope that the Select Committee will explain why the truth has not been told. I still find it mysterious that the Government should have maintained this deception for so long if, as the Secretary of State has said, there was nothing to hide. That is the task of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, and we shall see whether it is able to provide an answer to that question.
This whole debate will be a tragic, wasted opportunity if it does not lead the Government to reconsider their position and to abandon the approach whereby they are prepared deliberately to mislead this House. That is the crucial historic lesson of that vetted jury which declared Mr. Clive Ponting innocent.

Mr. Robin Maxwell-Hyslop: Three dates are crucial to the argument about the sinking of the Belgrano. The first is 2 April 1982, when Argentine armed forces invaded the Falkland Islands, engaged in combat with the British armed forces there, captured the British armed forces and expelled our governor. That was every bit as much an act of war as when Germany invaded Poland in 1939. From that moment onwards, the armed forces of the Crown were perfectly entitled to sink any Argentine warship anywhere, except in neutral waters.
They needed no permission in international law from the Prime Minister, or any declaration of war. War came into existence when Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands.
The second date — and this has not yet been mentioned in the debate—is 25 April 1982. On 26 April 1982 The Times carried an article from Nicholas Ashford, dated Washington, 25 April, and headed:
Costa Mendez says it is technically war".

It stated:
Senor Costa Mendez underlined how seriously he considered the situation when he told reporters on his arrival in New York that Argentina was now technically in a state of war with Britain.
Therefore, for the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) to refer to the sinking of the Belgrano in a state of war as "murder" is forgivable only in someone who is not responsible for the words that he utters.
This is crucial. Why should the House want to debate the sinking of the Belgrano, any more than the shooting down of an aircraft? Time and again, at Question Time and in defence debates, Opposition Members have come back to the sinking of the Belgrano and have used words which they knew to be untrue when they described it. It was a perfectly legitimate act of war, as would have been the sinking of the aircraft carrier The 25 of May, whatever course she was on and whatever orders she had received. This is the central truth of the matter.
My only other comment is to invite the House to recollect how even the Israeli intelligence forces were wholly deceived by the signals put out by the Egyptians before they attacked in the last war between Israel and Egypt. If the House remembers those two things, it will have grasped the central point and the complete justification for the sinking of the Belgrano.

Mr. Nigel Spearing: The hon. Member for Tiverton (Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop) is a long-term Member of the House. He will know that the Opposition are not refighting the war. We are concerned with the fact that Ministers have sought to conceal information from the House of Commons and its Foreign Affairs Select Committee.
If Conservative Members vote for the motion tonight, they will do so before having the benefit of a White Paper — which has often been called for—and before they have the benefit of the report of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee.
I wish to draw the attention of the House to a number of matters relating to the attempt of Ministers to keep certain material from the House and its Foreign Affairs Select Committee. We know that the Minister of State for the Armed Forces was not too keen on divulging material. Indeed, we know that he was less keen than was his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State.
We were told in court evidence last week that the Minister of State for the Armed Forces went to No. 10. The private secretary to the Secretary of State, Mr. Mottram, was examined by Mr. Laughland, counsel for the defence, and we know that Mr. Mottram wrote the following memorandum to the Minister of State for the Armed Forces. The evidence states:
The Secretary of State"—
for Defence—
would prefer to reserve the argument that you could not reveal operational matters for those cases where it was the professional judgment of those concerned within the department that there were genuine security objections to giving that information?


Mr. Mottram replied:
Yes.
It is a pity that neither Minister is here, because it is clear from that that the Minister of State for the Armed Forces was, in common words, trying to use the formula of "operational matters", contained in this memorandum, rather than the well-tried formula, subsequently used by the Secretary of State, of, "I have nothing to add to the letter that my right hon. Friend sent to the hon. Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies)." From that court evidence alone, it can be seen that the Minister of State for the Armed Forces was attempting to keep information out of parliamentary answers, beyond rules and precedent.
I wish particularly to look at the matters relating to the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs. It was the Legge minute, about which we have already heard, that caused Mr. Ponting to reveal this information to the Select Committee, and so to the House. The Legge minute told Ministers that they should not reveal, or if they did it would be more than they had done already, the rules of engagement of 30 May and the extent of the changes in the rules of engagement of 2 May. These matters were in the Legge minute, and it was these matters which this afternoon the Secretary of State claimed were matters of security. I believe that he was attempting to put up a false front to defend, not the safety of our armed forces, but the conduct of Her Majesty's Government and, in particular, the conduct of the Prime Minister.
In the court case, evidence was given not only by Mr. Mottram but by the secretary who wrote that minute, Mr. Legge, himself. Mr. Legge was cross-examined by Mr. Laughland about the matter. Mr. Legge had received a minute on this matter from Mr. Darms of another Department, and Mr. Laughland said:
No. Even that would show that on 30th April the Government had authorised what is called 'the engagement of', that means the attack on, the carrier even outside the total exclusion zone?

A. It was permitted, yes.

Q. Was there, to your knowledge, some disadvantage of a national nature, security nature, in revealing that that had been authorised from the 30th April?

A. Not that single piece of information, but the grounds on which it was taken.

Q. And also, of course, the danger to which you were being alerted was that the change on the 2nd May wasn't just to sink the Belgrano, but really authorised attacking all or any Argentine warships over a very large area, whether inside or outside the TEZ.

A. Again, the reasons — — The fact itself would not be sensitive, it is the reasons for the decision.
The House will remember that this afternoon the Secretary of State—I am glad that he has now come into the Chamber — implied that he had declined to answer the questions of the Select Committee, which asked for the dates, the reasons for and the outcome of the changes of the rules of engagement, because security was involved. In the evidence from the trial that I have read, no less than the assistant secretary, on oath, said that those matters were not security sensitive. That backs up the amendment of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition because it shows, beyond question, that the Secretary of State, backed up by the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, acting on the advice of Mr. Legge's minute, was attempting, and initially successfully attempting, to withhold information from the House. That is what my right hon. Friend's amendment is about.
If that is so, it is up to the Minister of State for the Armed Forces when he winds up the debate to deny those facts, or they stand. If they stand, they are bound to raise further questions, which Conservative Members should ask themselves. They will raise questions which the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs will be bound to ask. What is more important, they will raise questions which people outside the House will continue to want answered.
Before Conservative Members vote for the motion, they should ask themselves some questions. First, why has this motion been rushed on to the Floor of the House before a more considered one? Why are the Government trying to fight the battle of the Falklands again on the results on a court case at the Old Bailey? I can only suggest that the defence that they are trying to make—on security—is really a defence of the Government's past conduct rather than an attempt to defend the rights of the House and of the British people.
The last question that I put to Conservative Members is one that they will be asked in due course. Events will take their course, more will be revealed and there will be questions. At the next general election, this is one of the questions which the electorate will ask of all hon. Members who vote for the Government's motion: why was this motion put down, on what basis of evidence did you vote for it, and why did you not vote for the Opposition's amendment? The person who will have to answer those questions more than any other is the right hon. Member for Finchley (Mrs. Thatcher), the Prime Minister.

Lord James Douglas-Hamilton: I thank the hon. Member for Newham, South (Mr. Spearing) for having allowed me four minutes.
This is not the first time that we have considered an issue of this nature. The closest parallel was the sinking of the French fleet by the Royal Navy at Oran in 1940. On that occasion, 1,297 French sailors lost their lives. Sir Winston Churchill said:
This was a hateful decision, the most unnatural and painful in which I have ever been concerned … No act was ever more necessary for the life of Britain and for all that depended upon it.
That act was regarded as regrettable, but it was not regarded with remorse.
We should look on the Belgrano episode in the same light. I shall point out some evidence that has not yet been mentioned. Lord Lewin said in the Sunday Telegraph on 8 April 1984 that
the Belgrano constituted a potential threat to the Task Force and she had been used to direct aircraft which scored near misses on Task Force ships.
I take it that he meant by that that the Belgrano had been helping to direct the aircraft that attacked the Glamorgan, and only just missed it with two 1,000 lb bombs.
The role of the civil servant was referred to by the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) at the conference that he addressed at the weekend. He spoke of Mr. Clive Ponting having a higher duty. It is only fair to remind the House of what the right hon. Gentleman said to me when he was a Minister some years ago and I thought that he had overruled his civil servants. On 17 June 1976, the right hon. Gentleman said:
As the hon. Gentleman knows, officials of the Department give evidence on behalf of Ministers. Officials have


no views. They are the spokesmen of the Government of the day." — [Official Report, Standing Committee D, 17 June 1976; c. 419.]
If it was the view of the right hon. Gentleman on 17 June 1976 in the Committee which considered the Health Services Bill that officials had no views, it is obvious that he has changed his mind. But in the very unlikely event that he obtains office again, how may we be certain that he will not revert to his old role of treating civil servants as having no views?
When a great deal of circumstantial evidence is provided about an act—and during my brief stay with the Army this struck me very forcefully—it is possible to discern the pattern or secret behind it. But, to be absolutely safe, it is difficult to know with certainty how much evidence can be safely provided without revealing the nature of the secret or secrets. I suggest that where the lives of a great many British service men are at risk, they must be protected by keeping those secrets intact and safe. It is my view that the satisfaction of the obsessional curiosity about intelligence of anyone is not worth the life of a single British soldier.

9 pm

Mr. Gerald Kaufman: This has been a debate in which there have been several speeches of high quality. However the most significant speeches are those which have not been delivered. In the Conan Doyle story, "Silver Blaze", Sherlock Holmes drew attention to what he called the curious incident of the dog in the night time. Watson replied that the dog did nothing in the night time, to which remark Holmes responded, "That was the curious incident." In this debate, there have been not one but two silent dogs — the Prime Minister and the Attorney-General. Their silence is as significant as anything that they might have said had they spoken. It is as though we have sat through a performance of "Hamlet", but without Gertrude and without Guildenstern—though, of course, we are about to hear from Yorick.
With the failure of the Prime Minister either to speak today or to answer the detailed questions put to her in correspondence by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, I suppose that we shall never know the full truth behind the decision to prosecute Mr. Ponting. What is perfectly obvious is that there are a lot of people who want to make it clear that they had nothing to do with it.
The Prime Minister memorably told the House last week that she was on holiday when the decision was taken. The Attorney-General owned up that he, too, was on holiday. During a press conference at Rosyth dockyard, the Secretary of State for Defence declared mysteriously that he was out of his office at the time, but the Prime Minister later said that he, too, was on holiday or, as she put it, "on leave" — rather appropriately for someone who likes to dress up in combat gear. As for the Minister for the Armed Forces, he was on holiday as well.
One can imagine the inter-office memorandum that flew around Whitehall that carefree August:

"We're all going on a summer holiday
No more working for a week or two."

The House will recall that the words go on:

"Everybody has a summer holiday
Doing things they always wanted to
So we're going on our summer holiday
To make our dreams come true."


All these vacationing Ministers have carefully worked out alibis. So what is the solution to the mystery? The answer is that the person responsible for the decision to prosecute was the Solicitor-General. Yes, the butler did it.
But we all know that the Secretary of State for Defence wanted it done. He told Sir Ewen Broadbent, his second permanent secretary, that in his view Mr. Ponting should be prosecuted, and I understand that a minute of that meeting was taken.
What was it that made the Secretary of State so convinced that this civil servant should be put on trial. After all, Mr. Ponting was not the only person who had prima facie broken the Official Secrets Act by revealing information about the sinking of the Belgrano. Commander Christopher Wreford-Brown, the captain of the Conqueror, the submarine that sank the Belgrano, revealed the true date of the sighting of the Belgrano nearly a year before the Government admitted it. He was in clear breach of section 2 of the Official Secrets Act, yet nearly two years later he has not been prosecuted. In June 1984, Lord Lewin, the former Chief of the Defence Staff, revealed to journalists details of the role of the top secret hydrophonic towed array system in detecting the Belgrano, information that the Secretary of State said today it was unthinkable to reveal. And eight months later Lord Lewin has not been prosecuted.
Even if one considers only the papers that Mr. Ponting leaked, the person who received those papers—my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell)—was liable for prosecution, yet he, too, remains at large. Nor has it been suggested by anybody that Mr. Ponting violated national security. Indeed, prosecuting counsel at the trial said specifically:
It is not suggested that the disclosure, in fact, damaged national security.
This assertion was clearly repeated by the judge at the trial who, it is fair to say, sought scrupulously not to bias the jury in favour of Mr. Ponting. The judge said:
Mr. Amlott, for the Crown, has at all stages made clear that it is not suggested by the Crown that the disclosure made by the defendant to Mr. Dalyell in fact breached national security.
So why was it Mr. Ponting who had to be put on trial and, if at all possible, sent to gaol? It was because he had committed the unpardonable sin of drawing the attention of a Member of Parliament to the fact that for months on end Ministers of the Crown had not only been misleading Parliament but that their action had not been inadvertent or accidental, for those two leaked documents demonstrated that certain information had either been deliberately withheld from Parliament, even though hon. Members had asked for it and it was not classified information, or else had been supplied to Parliament in a form and manner that were calculated to mislead. That is why the discredited section 2 of the Official Secrets Act had to be brought into operation, a section which the present Home Secretary in this House described, when in opposition, as "simply indefensible." Mr. Ponting had blown Ministers' cover and disclosed their cover-up, so he had to be the subject of a political trial—a show trial.
The hope of Ministers must have been that a verdict of guilty would vindicate all they had done. It could also be politically useful in reviving the patriotic fervour of the Falklands period itself. The Government, after a favourable verdict, could once again drape themselves in the White Ensign, even though their true colours were the Jolly Roger. So the Ponting trial was all set to be a


triumphant revival of that successful favourite, "Oh, What a Lovely War!" Unfortunately for the Government, its real title turned out to be "The Man Who Knew Too Much."
It has repeatedly been pointed out today that until April of last year the Government had consistently given the impression that the Belgrano was sighted on 2 May 1982, the day on which it was sunk. That was the information supplied to this House by Sir John Non, then Secretary of State for Defence, on 4 May when the sinking of the Belgrano was announced. In fact, the Belgrano was sighted on 1 May and located on 30 April.
It was only in her reply to a letter sent from my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli. (Mr. Davies) dated 4 April 1984, a reply that took more than four weeks to draft, that the Prime Minister finally admitted the correct date. That letter also purported to provide for the first time information relating to the change in the rules of engagement that authorised the sinking of the Belgrano. But even after that letter the Government still refused to give to the House details of the course of the Belgrano before she was sunk or of the public warning that was issued in connection with her sinking.
It was the problem of how to reply to my right hon. Friend, together with a letter from my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow, that led to a series of grubby, squalid meetings at the Ministry of Defence and in Downing street.
Before the spring of last year, Ministers had regularly seen to it that false information about the sinking had been communicated to Parliament and to the country. On 14 December 1982 a White Paper on the Falklands war was published. Paragraph 110 of that White Paper opened with the words:
On 2 May HMS Conqueror detected the Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano".
When Sir John Nott told Parliament, two days after the sinking of the Belgrano, that she had been sighted on 2 May when it was really 1 May that mistake was excusable in the aftermath of the engagement and taking into account possible difficulties in communication. But by the time of the publication of the White Paper the true date was known. What was a pardonable mistake in May had become an untruth in December.
Moreover, on that same date, 14 December, a dispatch on the war from Sir John Fieldhouse, the Chief of Naval Staff, was published in the London Gazette. Sir John had wanted to put the true date of the sinking, 1 May, into the dispatch, but his dispatch was doctored in circumstances which are still not clear, and the false date was substituted for the true one.
As time went on, further items of false information were supplied to the House by Ministers. Statements remained in Hansard, in a White Paper presented to the House and in the London Gazette which not only were misleading but which Ministers knew to be misleading. No effort was made in the usual and accepted way to correct them. They were simply left on the record. Not a single correction has ever been volunteered by the Government. Every admission has had to be squeezed out of them.
Then the letter arrived from my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli. The first reaction that came from the Secretary of State was creditable. Being relatively new to his post he wanted to know the facts about the Belgrano and that is why Mr. Ponting was asked to compile the

background brief that became known as the Crown Jewels. The Secretary of State is reported to have said at the time that he did not want another Watergate. There is one considerable difference, among others, between this affair and Watergate. At least Nixon had the tapes to help him remember what lies he had told.
At the end of March, the Secretary of State and the Minister of State finally got round to considering what advice to give to the Prime Minister on the reply that she should send to my right hon. Friend. Two meetings were held at the Ministry of Defence, one on 30 March and the other on 1 April. What emerges clearly from the trial evidence, not simply from Mr. Ponting, but just as plainly from Mr. Mottram, the Secretary of State's private secretary, and also from internal memoranda which were produced, is that the aim of those meetings was not to decide how best to tell the truth to Members of Parliament. No, Mr. Speaker. The objective of Ministers throughout was to see what they could get away with; what they could palm off on Parliament.
Indeed, the Minister of State had asked for two draft replies to be prepared——

Mr. Heseltine: rose——

Mr. Kaufman: I shall give way when I have finished my passage, as the Secretary of State said.
The Minister of State had asked for two replies to be prepared, one of which would give a truthful account of the events and the other which would not. That request caused such bewilderment that the Minister of State confirmed his instruction in writing. Which draft did the Minister of State prefer? The game is given away by the documents placed in the Library today by the Secretary of State. In his minute accompanying those drafts, Mr. Ponting wrote: "Minister (AF)"—that is the Minister of State—
asked me to prepare a draft admitting for the first time that Belgrano was sighted on 1 May and not 2 May, this is draft 2 attached.
The Minister of State could not wait to scribble next to that the words
No. Drafts on both bases were sought.
Would he have scrawled those words if he was content with the truthful version?

Mr. Heseltine: The House will have noticed that the right hon. Gentleman has skipped time in order to give credibility to a wholly misleading account of the events. The purpose of those two meetings that took place on the Friday and the Sunday was to decide how to cope with the request for information in the light of Mr. Ponting's advice that the answers were to do with intelligence and operational information.

Mr. Kaufman: Mr. Ponting is not answerable to the House, but the Secretary of State is. It is he whom we are holding to account this evening. The trial evidence—

Mr. Heseltine: Why does not the right hon. Gentleman tell the truth?

Mr. Kaufman: The right hon. Gentleman can no doubt give lessons in that.
The trial evidence makes it quite clear that the Minister of State wanted the evasive version to be sent. The information that my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli had requested was unclassified, but the Minister of State insisted that it was classified. When the meeting decided that at any rate the true date of the sighting should


be supplied, the Minister of State disagreed. The Secretary of State, with the permanent secretary, then went across the road to see the Prime Minister. They left at 4.30 pm and returned at 7.30 pm. In his evidence to the Select Committee on 7 November 1984 the Secretary of State said:
the only time that I have been to the Prime Minister to reveal something that I felt had to be put right in terms of the record of the House of Commons, she could not have been quicker in urging me to make the earliest possible rectification.
Nearly three hours seems a long time to make a decision that could "not have been quicker".
Even so the answer sent to my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli was in part misleading due to the intervention of the Minister of State. It was he who recommended that there be inserted in the Prime Minister's reply an extract from a lecture by Admiral Woodward, which included the statement:
I therefore sought, for the first and only time throughout the campaign, a major change to Rules of Engagement to enable Conqueror to attack Belgrano outside the Exclusion Zone.
The letter from the Prime Minister went on:
Ministers agreed to the proposed change in the Rules of Engagement at about 1 pm London time on 2 May.
It is quite true that that is what Admiral Woodward asked for, but it is not what he got. The War Cabinet certainly agreed to a change in the rules of engagement, but the minute leaked by Mr. Ponting pointed out that
the change on 2 May was not restricted to Belgrano but included all Argentine warships over a large area.
Conservative Members cheer. But that is why Sir Clive Whitmore, the permanent secretary at the Ministry of Defence, supported inclusion of this passage with the memorable justification that it was "not a direct lie." Sir Clive is, of course, a former private secretary to the Prime Minister.
So, content that they were not telling a direct lie, the Ministers approved the draft and sent it across to the Prime Minister. She then, at noon on 2 April, held a meeting with Lord Whitelaw and the Chief Whip
to consider the political aspects of the letter",
or, to put it another way, to consider the political risks of telling part of the truth even if part of it was not a direct lie. That letter was duly sent to my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli.
The problem still remained of what reply to send to my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow. Mr. Ponting offered a draft which would have for the first time admitted that the Belgrano had reversed course on the day she was sunk. That information was unclassified, but the Minister of State opposed its being provided and the Secretary of State accepted the Minister of State's advice. In dealing with that letter, the Minister of State opposed providing the requested information and said in a memorandum:
It is not our practice to comment on military operational matters.
The memorandum went on:
Mr. Stanley personally has no difficulty whatsoever on operational grounds in declining to give this information. The text of the draft letter to Mr. Dalyell attached to Head of DH5 Minute abundantly illustrates, in Minister AF's view, the depth of the water the Secretary of State would get into were he to send it.
The Minister of State said that it would be "a danger to answer." A reply was sent which provided no information. My hon. Friend was not to be put off, and tabled a series of parliamentary questions. It was then that the Minister of State suggested that a reply should say:
It is not our practice to comment on military operational matters or details of military operations.

But Mr. Ponting pointed out that it was not possible to sustain that line because the Prime Minister had provided operational information. The Secretary of State rejected the Minister of State's suggested reply, but he did not provide the information that my hon. Friend had requested.
Again, seeking further to avoid providing information to my hon. Friend, the Minister of State sent a minute, which stated:
The Minister has subsequently discussed a slight variation in the Secretary of State's answer with No. 10 so as to provide a justification for effectively declining to answer Parliamentary Question 3143C.
On another occasion when two writers, Mr. Arthur Gayshon and Mr. Desmond Rice, put a series of questions on the Belgrano sinking to the Ministry of Defence, officials prepared replies. But the Minister of State prevented the replies from being sent, saying that he did not wish to encourage any debate whatever about the Belgrano.
Yet again the Minister of State held a meeting with Admiral Sir Peter Stanford, Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff. He asked Sir Peter to agree with him that all information relating to the Belgrano was classified. Sir Peter refused to do so.
In May of last year the Minister of State sent a minute to Mr. Ponting saying that all future questions on the Belgrano should be given the reply that it was not the Department's practice to comment on military operational matters. But that was not so. The Department frequently comments on military operational matters.
Then last June came the request from the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs for a note
listing all the changes which had taken place in the Rules of Engagement for the Task Force during the conflict, together with the dates and the reasons for the outcome of those changes.
Such was the climate of deception and misinformation in the Ministry of Defence that one official, Mr. Baker, sent a minute saying:
I should be grateful for any corrections of fact or emphasis, particularly from DS5B, with relation to the Belgrano aspects lest I have departed inadvertently from the public line and risk a breach in our united front.
That was a united front against a Select Committee of this House — [Interruption.] — and Mr. Legge submitted another minute which offered a series of reasons for not providing the information requested, among which was:
a full list of changes would provide more information than Ministers have been prepared to reveal so far about the Belgrano affair.
The Secretary of State said that that reason was irrelevant. If it was irrelevant, why did Mr. Legge feel it necessary to give it?
So on the instructions of the Minister of State a draft reply was prepared for the Select Committee which very specifically and very deliberately did not provide what was requested. What is more, it repeated in paraphrase a passage in the Prime Minister's letter which had been dubbed by Sir Clive Whitmore as "not a direct lie". The Secretary of State agreed that that unsatisfactory and misleading memorandum should be sent.
It was not only the Minister of Defence who was involved; we have also to consider the role of the Prime Minister herself for a period of nearly two years. The Prime Minister, in a series of parliamentary answers and letters to MPs, provided information that was inaccurate, misleading or both.
The Prime Minister stated:


The 'General Belgrano' and her escort had made many changes of course during 2 May." — [Official Report, 16 December 1982; Vol. 34, c.199.]

But, in fact, the Belgrano made one major change of course, reversing her direction away from the task force.
When my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow asked the Prime Minister to make available, on Privy Councillor terms, a full account of the events leading up to the sinking of the Belgrano, the Prime Minister replied:
No. There is nothing that can usefully be added to what has already been said."—[Official Report, 28 February 1983; Vol. 38, c.11.]

But there was a great deal which could usefully be added, and the Prime Minister herself added it, not on Privy Council terms but in letters to my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli 13 months later and to my hon. Friend the Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley (Mr. Foulkes) five months after that. So that reply from the Prime Minister was also misleading.
When my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow asked about the circumstances of the sinking of the Belgrano, the Prime Minister said:
The full facts were given in several replies in the House. All the facts were there."—[Official Report, 21 February 1984; Vol. 55, c. 695.]

But the full facts had not been given; all the facts were not there. Within six weeks more facts were given to my right hon. Friend, and in the following September more facts still were published, so again the Prime Minister's remarks were false.
On 4 April came the Prime Minister's letter to my right hon. Friend which included the alleged information about the rules of engagement—the information described as "not a direct lie"—so that was a misleading answer.
In a reply yet again to my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow, the Prime Minister said:
The circumstances leading to the sinking of the Belgrano were described in my letter to the right hon. Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies) on 4 April."—[Official Report, 17 May 1984; Vol. 60, c. 225.]

But, quite apart from the misleading passage in that letter, the right hon. Lady had not described all the circumstances that could be published, since more information was provided in her letter of 19 September to my hon. Friend the Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley. My hon. Friend received that response following a letter that he sent to the Prime Minister after the documents leaked by Mr. Ponting had been published in the New Statesman.
It was only at that very late point, with the facts already published against the Prime Minister's wishes, that the Prime Minister could bring herself to come clean, but even so she could not control her penchant for peddling misleading information. In a letter dated 8 October 1984 to the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) she said:
The Belgrano certainly made many changes of course during May 2nd.
That reply was in direct contradiction to paragraph 10 of the annex to her letter of 19 September.
In the light of that conglomeration of misleading answers—[Interruption.]—how can the Prime Minister possibly justify the statement that she made last Thursday, when she said:
There has been no attempt whatsoever to mislead the House.
She was much nearer the mark when she said on the same day:

I think that if there is a charge to be made against me, it is that I have given too many facts that might best not have been given." — [Official Report, 14 February 1985, Vol. 73, c. 479–80.]

Yes indeed. The trouble is that all the facts are different. The fact is that this Government prosecuted Mr. Ponting, but it is the Government who were convicted. The Government who prosecuted Mr. Ponting are a contemptible Government. They are a dangerous Government. They are a Government fashioned in the image of their Prime Minister. They are a Government who must go.

The Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. John Stanley): The accounts that the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) has given of the events in the Ministry of Defence are a complete travesty of what occurred. In his speech this afternoon, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State gave his view, and our view, of what occurred, and I am confident that reasonable people in the House—I hope, on both sides—will find in favour of the views given by my right hon. Friend.
As the right hon. Members for Gorton and for Llanelli (Mr. Davies) referred to the two drafts, which is a matter of importance to me, I shall refer to it. It is the case that I requested Mr. Ponting to produce two drafts in response to the letter of the right hon. Member for Llanelli. I shall explain why once again. The chronology starts with a question that the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) asked in 1982. The question was:
at what time contact with the 'General Belgrano' was first made by one of Her Majesty's submarines.
The question fell to my predecessor, my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool, South (Sir P. Blaker), to answer. My right hon. Friend was advised in writing that the information sought was classified, and he was advised not to give it. My right hon. Friend therefore replied on 10 December 1982:
It would not be in the public interest to give this information."—[Official Report, 10 December 1982; Vol. 33, c. 621.]

That was the existing public position, coupled with a statement made by the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office in another place on 13 July 1983, when my noble Friend said that the reference to 2 May in the Falklands White Paper
was not intended to indicate when the cruiser was first located." —[Official Report, House of Lords, 13 July 1983; Vol. 443, c. 884.]

When the letter from the right hon. Member for Llanelli arrived, I could have asked Mr. Ponting to prepare just one draft in accordance with existing ministerial statements, and it was perfectly proper for me to ask for a draft on that basis. But I actually went further. I took the initiative, and I was the first Minister to do so, in asking Mr. Ponting to go further than Ministers had done before and to prepare a draft acknowledging that the Belgrano was sighted on 1 May rather than 2 May. To twist and distort my request into saying that I asked for two drafts to be prepared, one telling the truth and one telling a lie, is frankly a monstrous slur—[Interruption.]
The debate has centred on information and on the responsibilities of Ministers for the disclosure of information to Parliament. I shall devote my remarks to that central issue. In deciding how much information to disclose surrounding the sinking of the Belgrano,


Ministers in fact had three options. They had the option of full disclosure, the option of no disclosure and the option of partial disclosure.
Full disclosure was only a theoretical option. In practice, the security and operational sensitivities surrounding the sinking were such that it would clearly have been wholly irresponsible to go down the path of full disclosure. I do not believe that that is seriously challenged.
A policy of non-disclosure was, however, an option. It would have been a perfectly respectable option and one well grounded in the statements of successive defence Ministers in successive Governments. The last time this issue was addressed by a Select Committee of the House was in the 1971–72 Session when it was considered by the Select Committee on Parliamentary Questions. That Committee's report listed in appendix 9 all the matters about which successive Administrations had refused—I quote the word "refused"—to answer questions. It is a remarkably long list. In the list of matters on which the Ministry of Defence had refused to answer questions is "operational matters".
Since that Select Committee report, successive Secretaries of State for Defence have been asked to list the subjects on which it is not their practice to answer parliamentary questions. On each and every occasion when that question has been asked, the Secretary of State concerned has included "operational matters" among his subjects. That was true of the answer given by Mr. Mulley, as he then was, on 2 May 1978. It was true of the answer given by my right hon. Friend the Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East (Mr. Pym) on 9 November 1979, it was true of the answer given by Mr. Nott, as he then was, on 11 November 1982, and it was true of the answer given by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State on 5 June last year. When my right hon. Friend gave his answer that it is not the practice to provide information on operational matters, that answer occasioned no comment, no criticism and no challenge.
Against that background, Ministers would have been perfectly justified from the outset in adopting a policy of non-disclosure, certainly in anything like the operational detail that has been given both in this Parliament and in the last Parliament well before Mr. Ponting commenced his activity. The fact is that from the very beginning Ministers went considerably further than they strictly need have done in disclosing the details of this particular operation. The easy option of non-disclosure was rejected and the difficult option of partial disclosure was adopted from the outset. That was a very creditable decision on the Government's part and should be recognised as such.
Having rejected non-disclosure, it may be asked why Ministers had to stop at partial disclosure and not go the whole way. Some say that the reasons were political. We argue that they were of a genuine security and operational nature. I will take the political aspect first.
The thesis that the Belgrano was torpedoed for political reasons to torpedo the Peruvian peace initiative is, I believe, now completely discredited and has even been repudiated by Mr. Ponting. No other significant political reason has ever been advanced as to why Ministers should have something to hide in relation to the Belgrano. The thesis that there has been a cover-up for political reasons, big or small, does not wash, never has washed and never will wash.
The House might reasonably conclude, therefore, that the only conceivable reason why successive Ministers since May 1982 have been forced to adopt a policy of only partial disclosure is that of security and operational considerations of the very highest importance. The House would be right to come to such a conclusion.
I will now deal with those considerations as best I can in this public forum. I am grateful to my hon. Friends the Members for Ruislip-Northwood (Mr. Wilkinson), for Banbury (Mr. Baldry) and for Cambridgeshire, South-West (Sir A. Grant), and to others of my hon. Friends, for stressing the key importance of protecting sensitive operational information.
Whether on Belgrano matters one takes as one's watchword the words of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, or whether, as is apparently the case on the other side of the House, one takes as one's watchword the words of Mr. Ponting, one cannot escape the conclusion that issues of the very highest security importance surrounded the sinking of the Belgrano.
In her letter to the hon. Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley (Mr. Foulkes) on 19 September last year, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said:
I must make it clear that it would be, and will remain, quite wrong for me to disclose all the material that was available to Ministers at the time. To do so would still risk irreparable damage to national security and could put lives at risk in the future.
These words were chosen very deliberately and with immense care. They represent not one degree of exaggeration.
Those who prefer the words of Mr. Ponting need look no further than the classification of the detailed account that he wrote for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State into aspects of the sinking of the Belgrano. As the originator of that account, Mr. Ponting was responsible for its classification. He classified it "TOP SECRET — CODEWORD", the highest security classification that there is. Mr. Ponting was therefore equally clear that issues of the highest security importance were at stake.
However, there is one further aspect of security matters in relation to Mr. Ponting of which the House should be aware, as it bears directly on the view that the House may take of how Ministers have acted. I have seen it widely reported that Mr. Ponting knew all. Mr. Ponting did not know all, and Mr. Ponting did not know the most important of all.
I do not think that any reasonable Member of this House can doubt that from the time when the Belgrano was sunk a very real security constraint has materially affected how much information Ministers could give to Parliament. The constraints on Ministers in disclosing information about the sinking of the Belgrano have also had a vitally important naval operational dimension. This was a submarine operation. Of all the conventional weapon systems — on land, sea and air — there is no system where it is more crucial to protect information about capabilities and about the conduct of operations than submarines.
The Falklands conflict represented far and away the most important operational deployment of the Royal Navy's submarines since the second world war. By the same token it represented, and it still represents, far and away the most important opportunity for hostile intelligence—Soviet intelligence as well as Argentine


intelligence—to obtain an insight into our submarine capabilities and into their methods of operation. [Interruption.]
All the public attention has tended to be focused on just one of our submarines—HMS Conqueror.

Mr. Paddy Ashdown: rose——

Mr. Stanley: In the words of the debate, I will complete my passage. Then I will give way.
In fact, it was just one of our submarines that deployed to the South Atlantic during the conflict; we deployed a total of six—HMS Conqueror, HMS Courageous, HMS Onyx, HMS Spartan, HMS Splendid and HMS Valiant. One conventional submarine and no fewer than five SSNs, the nuclear powered attack submarines, were deployed.
In dealing with parliamentary questions, we had therefore to take into account that what questions were answered about one SSN would prospectively have to be answered about the others. And we have indeed had questions about the activities of HMS Splendid and HMS Spartan as well as about HMS Conqueror. We had to take into account that what we revealed — even on an unclassified basis—might be prejudicial to our conduct of SSN operations in the future.
We had to take into account the exceptionally important and sensitive roles of SSNs in the NATO theatre.

Mr. Willie W. Hamilton: Answer the debate.

Mr. Speaker: Order.

Mr. Stanley: We had to take account of the fact that our SSNs have certain capabilities in common with our Polaris SSBNs and that therefore insight into the capabilities and methods of operation of one could have implications for the other. [HON. MEMBERS: "Answer the debate."] We also have to take account of the fact that, however much information we gave, more and more questions were asked in more and more detail. Those questions took us into every major area of the capabilities of our submarines.

Mr. Ashdown: rose——

Mr. Stanley: Those questions took us into their sources of intelligence, their methods of communication, the capabilities of their sonar and the performance of their tactical weapons system. Ministers have been accused of being cautious about the giving of information in relation to the Belgrano. [HON. MEMBERS: "Answer the debate."] Against the background——

Mr. Speaker: Order. I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, but it is intolerable that he should be interrupted from a sedentary position by so many hon. Members. He has a right to be heard.

Mr. Willie W. Hamilton: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Hon. Members would like the Minister to answer the debate, which is about the Old Bailey trial and how it came about.

Mr. Speaker: Order. The Minister is endeavouring to answer the debate.

Hon. Members: No, he is not.

Mr. Stanley: I am indeed trying to answer an issue of central and fundamental importance. Ministers have been accused of being cautious about giving information in regard to the Belgrano.

Mr. Ashdown: rose——

Mr. Stanley: I regard caution not as a matter for criticism but as a matter for commendation. Yes, we have been cautious. We will continue to be cautious. We are right to be cautious and we should be failing in our responsibilities if we were to be anything other than cautious.

Mr. Ashdown: I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. The Minister has read us a long passage explaining the high national importance of deepest security for our submarines. Will he explain whether that is the true reason for the necessity for the security of our submarines? If so, how come one of the logs went missing?

Mr. Stanley: As the hon. Gentleman knows, we are still conducting the inquiry. [Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order.

Mr. Stanley: I wish now to deal with the Leader of the Liberal party, the right hon. Member for Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale (Mr. Steel). I have heard him argue that as it is now nearly three years since the conflict ended, the security objections have surely fallen away and all can now be revealed. [Interruption.] I have heard him say that many times on the radio, and I am glad if it is not his view. Anyone who thinks that, because almost three years have passed since the Falklands conflict, the security objections have fallen away shows no understanding of defence and security realities. A key job of hostile intelligence is to assess how we may carry out future submarine operations by analysing those that we have conducted in the past. We are not in the business of giving gratuitous help to those people.

Mr. Steel: I have never dissented from my view. When did Ministers first know that the information they were giving was wrong?

Mr. Stanley: As I have said before, the 1 May date was classified and held to be classified virtually until my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister replied to the right hon. Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies). That was the advice that we had.

Mr. Kaufman: rose——

Mr. Speaker: Order. The Minister was not giving way.

Mr. Stanley: I assume that Ministers will have been aware during 1983.

Mr. Kaufman: rose——

Mr. Stanley: That is why my noble Friend the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs gave the answer that she did in another place.

Mr. Kaufman: If the date of the sighting of the Belgrano was classified until the Prime Minister revealed it on 4 April 1984, why was not Captain Wreford-Brown prosecuted for revealing it a year before that?

Mr. Stanley: As the right hon. Gentleman will recognise, that is a happy question for the Law Officers, not for me.

Dr. Owen: rose——

Mr. Speaker: Order.

Mr. Douglas: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. All hon. Members heard the Minister say that that was a happy question for the Law Officers. As a Law Officer is present, perhaps he can give us an answer now.

Mr. Speaker: I cannot answer that point of order. Mr. Stanley.

Dr Owen: rose— —

Mr. Stanley: This will be the last time I give way.

Dr. Owen: On 14 December the Commander in Chief, Admiral Fieldhouse, submitted his dispatch, which he had presumably written a few days earlier and which included that date. Why would he have included that date if he thought that it was highly secret information which should not be revealed?

Mr. Stanley: My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister answered that question during Prime Minister's Question Time, when she said:
I understand from Admiral Fieldhouse that during the drafting of his dispatch from Northwood he queried the date in the sentence on the detection of the Belgrano but agreed that it should be left as 2 May in order to protect sensitive operational and intelligence information."—[Official Report, 12 February 1985; Vol. 73, c. 164.]

That was the position.
It has been suggested that the dilemma of answering the key question in this debate of how much operational information should be released could be resolved by releasing everything that is itself unclassified and withholding only that which is classified. That has a certain superficial attraction. Unhappily, security and intelligence matters are very much more complicated, as the previous Government recognised in its 1978 White Paper on the Official Secrets Act. The key passage which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has already highlighted bears repeating, because it is a policy statement by the previous Government of profound importance, and one which we ourselves endorse.
The previous Government said:
The Government has concluded that information relating to security and intelligence matters is deserving of the highest protection whether or not it is classified. This is pre-eminently an area where the gradual accumulation of small items of information, apparently trivial in themselves, would eventually create a risk for the safety of an individual or constitute a serious threat to the interests of the nation as a whole.
That is a very important statement. Intelligence is the business of completing a jigsaw, in which some of the pieces are kept secret and some of them become public. The more public pieces one puts on the board, the easier it is to deduce the remainder.

Mr. Merlyn Rees: The Minister quoted from the 1978 White Paper and the statement that I made in the House. I used those words, but said that, as with Franks, whatever the subject—be it defence, intelligence associated with it or law and order — what matters was that it was serious. That does not apply to Ponting, which is what we are concerned about tonight. I fully agree with the right hon. Gentleman on what he has said, but that is not what the Ponting case is about.

Mr. Stanley: The right hon. Gentleman must distinguish between the security dimension in relation to the Ponting case, which I agree was not a significant element, and the security dimension relating to the sinking of the Belgrano, which was of profound importance.

Mr. Spearing: rose——

Mr. Stanley: I shall not give way again.
It is for the House to decide whether, in pursuing a policy of partial disclosure in relation to the Belgrano, Ministers have got the balance right between giving too much information and too little. My personal view, for what it is worth—[Interruption.]—is that in no way can it reasonably be claimed that Ministers have given too little information. It could well be argued that in our attempts to allay the Belgrano mania the information we have already given is too much. As the Prime Minister said in reply to questions last week, we may indeed have erred on the side of giving too much. The House should be mindful of that.
I hope that the House will not mind if I conclude on a personal note. Over the last fortnight or so, I consider that I have been subjected to a campaign of character assassination, the like of which I would not have believed possible if I had not been the object of it. I have been accused of more or less everything under the sun, except of actually sinking the Belgrano myself. The accusations have ranged from the ludicrous, like the claim of the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) that I had altered Admiral Fieldhouse's official despatch when I was still a Minister in the Department of the Environment, to other accusations that I take with the utmost seriousness. The accusation that I take most seriously is that I have somehow behaved improperly towards this House of Commons. That accusation I completely reject.
The Opposition's amendment to the Government's motion refers to the responsibility of Ministers to Parliament, but it wrongly assumes that Defence Ministers have only one responsibility to Parliament — the responsibility to give information. Defence Ministers have two responsibilities to this House, not one, and that second responsibility is the overriding one upon them. We have the overriding responsibility to this House for the proper discharge of our duties as Defence Ministers, for the protection of the defence interests of our country and for the protection of the lives of our service men in any future conflict. We have discharged those duties responsibly and properly.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The House divided: Ayes 202, Noes 350.

Division No. 110]
[10 pm


AYES


Abse, Leo
Brown, Gordon (D'f'mline E)


Alton, David
Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)


Anderson, Donald
Brown, N. (N'c'tle-u-Tyne E)


Archer, Rt Hon Peter
Brown, Ron (E'burgh, Leith)


Ashdown, Paddy
Bruce, Malcolm


Ashley, Rt Hon Jack
Buchan, Norman


Ashton, Joe
Caborn, Richard


Atkinson, N. (Tottenham)
Campbell, Ian


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Campbell-Savours, Dale


Barnett, Guy
Carlile, Alexander (Montg'y)


Barron, Kevin
Carter-Jones, Lewis


Beckett, Mrs Margaret
Cartwright, John


Beith, A. J.
Clark, Dr David (S Shields)


Bell, Stuart
Clarke, Thomas


Benn, Tony
Clay, Robert


Bennett, A. (Dent'n &amp; Red'sh)
Clwyd, Mrs Ann


Bermingham, Gerald
Cocks, Rt Hon M. (Bristol S.)


Bidwell, Sydney
Cohen, Harry


Blair, Anthony
Coleman, Donald


Boothroyd, Miss Betty
Conlan, Bernard


Boyes, Roland
Cook, Frank (Stockton North)


Bray, Dr Jeremy
Cook, Robin F. (Livingston)






Corbyn, Jeremy
McCartney, Hugh


Cowans, Harry
McDonald, Dr Oonagh


Cox, Thomas (Tooting)
McGuire, Michael


Craigen, J. M.
Mackenzie, Rt Hon Gregor


Crowther, Stan
Maclennan, Robert


Cunningham, Dr John
McNamara, Kevin


Dalyell, Tarn
McTaggart, Robert


Davies, Rt Hon Denzil (L'lli)
Madden, Max


Davies, Ronald (Caerphilly)
Marek, Dr John


Davis, Terry (B'ham, H'ge H'l)
Marshall, David (Shettleston)


Deakins, Eric
Mason, Rt Hon Roy


Dewar, Donald
Maxton, John


Dixon, Donald
Maynard, Miss Joan


Dobson, Frank
Meacher, Michael


Dormand, Jack
Meadowcroft, Michael


Douglas, Dick
Michie, William


Dubs, Alfred
Mikardo, Ian


Duffy, A. E. P.
Millan, Rt Hon Bruce


Dunwoody, Hon Mrs G.
Miller, Dr M. S. (E Kilbride)


Eadie, Alex
Mitchell, Austin (G't Grimsby)


Eastham, Ken
Morris, Rt Hon A. (W'shawe)


Edwards, Bob (W'h'mpt'n SE)
Morris, Rt Hon J. (Aberavon)


Ellis, Raymond
Nellist, David


Evans, John (St. Helens N)
Oakes, Rt Hon Gordon


Ewing, Harry
O'Brien, William


Fatchett, Derek
O'Neill, Martin


Faulds, Andrew
Orme, Rt Hon Stanley


Field, Frank (Birkenhead)
Owen, Rt Hon Dr David


Fisher, Mark
Park, George


Flannery, Martin
Parry, Robert


Foot, Rt Hon Michael
Patchett, Terry


Forrester, John
Pavitt, Laurie


Foster, Derek
Pendry, Tom


Fraser, J. (Norwood)
Penhaligon, David


Freeson, Rt Hon Reginald
Pike, Peter


Freud, Clement
Prescott, John


Garrett, W. E.
Radice, Giles


Gilbert, Rt Hon Dr John
Randall, Stuart


Gould, Bryan
Redmond, M.


Gourlay, Harry
Rees, Rt Hon M. (Leeds S)


Hamilton, James (M'well N)
Richardson, Ms Jo


Hamilton, W. W. (Central Fife)
Roberts, Allan (Bootle)


Hancock, Mr. Michael
Roberts, Ernest (Hackney N)


Hardy, Peter
Robertson, George


Harman, Ms Harriet
Rogers, Allan


Hart, Rt Hon Dame Judith
Rooker, J. W.


Hattersley, Rt Hon Roy
Rowlands, Ted


Haynes, Frank
Ryman, John


Healey, Rt Hon Denis
Sheldon, Rt Hon R.


Heffer, Eric S.
Shore, Rt Hon Peter


Hogg, N. (C'nauld &amp; Kilsyth)
Short, Ms Clare (Ladywood)


Holland, Stuart (Vauxhall)
Short, Mrs R.(W'hampt'n NE)


Home Robertson, John
Silkin, Rt Hon J.


Howell, Rt Hon D. (S'heath)
Skinner, Dennis


Howells, Geraint
Smith, C.(Isl'ton S &amp; F'bury)


Hoyle, Douglas
Smith, Rt Hon J. (M'kl'ds E)


Hughes, Dr. Mark (Durham)
Snape, Peter


Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)
So ley, Clive


Hughes, Roy (Newport East)
Spearing, Nigel


Hughes, Sean (Knowsley S)
Steel, Rt Hon David


Hughes, Simon (Southwark)
Stewart, Rt Hon D. (W Isles)


Janner, Hon Greville
Stott, Roger


John, Brynmor
Strang, Gavin


Johnston, Russell
Straw, Jack


Jones, Barry (Alyn &amp; Deeside)
Thomas, Dafydd (Merioneth)


Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald
Thomas, Dr R. (Carmarthen)


Kennedy, Charles
Thompson, J. (Wansbeck)


Kinnock, Rt Hon Neil
Thorne, Stan (Preston)


Kirkwood, Archy
Tinn, James


Lambie, David
Wainwright, R.


Lamond, James
Warden, Gareth (Gower)


Leadbitter, Ted
Wareing, Robert


Leighton, Ronald
Welsh, Michael


Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)
White, James


Lewis, Terence (Worsley)
Wigley, Dafydd


Litherland, Robert
Williams, Rt Hon A.


Lofthouse, Geoffrey
Winnick, David


Loyden, Edward
Woodall, Alec





Wrigglesworth, Ian
Tellers for the Ayes:


Young, David (Bolton SE)
Mr. John McWilliam and



Mr. Robin Corbett.




NOES


Adley, Robert
Dover, Den


Aitken, Jonathan
du Cann, Rt Hon Sir Edward


Alexander, Richard
Dunn, Robert


Alison, Rt Hon Michael
Durant, Tony


Amery, Rt Hon Julian
Dykes, Hugh


Amess, David
Edwards, Rt Hon N. (P'broke)


Ancram, Michael
Eggar, Tim


Arnold, Tom
Emery, Sir Peter


Atkins, Rt Hon Sir H.
Evennett, David


Atkins, Robert (South Ribble)
Eyre, Sir Reginald


Baker, Rt Hon K. (Mole Vall'y)
Fallon, Michael


Baker, Nicholas (N Dorset)
Farr, Sir John


Baldry, Tony
Favell, Anthony


Beaumont-Dark, Anthony
Finsberg, Sir Geoffrey


Beggs, Roy
Fletcher, Alexander


Bellingham, Henry
Fookes, Miss Janet


Bendall, Vivian
Forman, Nigel


Benyon, William
Forsyth, Michael (Stirling)


Best, Keith
Forsythe, Clifford (S Antrim)


Bevan, David Gilroy
Forth, Eric


Biffen, Rt Hon John
Fowler, Rt Hon Norman


Biggs-Davison, Sir John
Fox, Marcus


Blackburn, John
Franks, Cecil


Blaker, Rt Hon Sir Peter
Fraser, Peter (Angus East)


Bonsor, Sir Nicholas
Freeman, Roger


Bottomley, Peter
Fry, Peter


Bottomley, Mrs Virginia
Gale, Roger


Bowden, A. (Brighton K'to'n)
Galley, Roy


Bowden, Gerald (Dulwich)
Gardner, Sir Edward (Fylde)


Boyson, Dr Rhodes
Garel-Jones, Tristan


Braine, Rt Hon Sir Bernard
Gilmour, Rt Hon Sir Ian


Brandon-Bravo, Martin
Glyn, Dr Alan


Bright, Graham
Goodhart, Sir Philip


Brinton, Tim
Gorst, John


Brooke, Hon Peter
Gow, Ian


Brown, M. (Brigg &amp; Cl'thpes)
Gower, Sir Raymond


Browne, John
Grant, Sir Anthony


Bruinvels, Peter
Greenway, Harry


Bryan, Sir Paul
Gregory, Conal


Buchanan-Smith, Rt Hon A.
Griffiths, Peter (Portsm'th N)


Budgen, Nick
Grist, Ian


Bulmer, Esmond
Ground, Patrick


Burt, Alistair
Grylls, Michael


Butcher, John
Gummer, John Selwyn


Butterfill, John
Hamilton, Hon A. (Epsom)


Carlisle, John (N Luton)
Hampson, Dr Keith


Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)
Hanley, Jeremy


Carlisle, Rt Hon M. (W'ton S)
Hannam, John


Carttiss, Michael
Hargreaves, Kenneth


Cash, William
Haselhurst, Alan


Chalker, Mrs Lynda
Havers, Rt Hon Sir Michael


Channon, Rt Hon Paul
Hawkins, C. (High Peak)


Chapman, Sydney
Hawkins, Sir Paul (SW N'folk)


Chope, Christopher
Hawksley, Warren


Churchill, W. S.
Hayes, J.


Clark, Hon A. (Plym'th S'n)
Hayhoe, Barney


Clark, Dr Michael (Rochford)
Hayward, Robert


Clark, Sir W. (Croydon S)
Heath, Rt Hon Edward


Clarke, Rt Hon K. (Rushcliffe)
Heddle, John


Clegg, Sir Walter
Henderson, Barry


Cockeram, Eric
Heseltine, Rt Hon Michael


Colvin, Michael
Hickmet, Richard


Conway, Derek
Hicks, Robert


Coombs, Simon
Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L.


Cope, John
Hind, Kenneth


Corrie, John
Hogg, Hon Douglas (Gr'th'm)


Couchman, James
Holt, Richard


Cranborne, Viscount
Hordern, Peter


Critchley, Julian
Howard, Michael


Crouch, David
Howarth, Alan (Stratf'd-on-A)


Currie, Mrs Edwina
Howarth, Gerald (Cannock)


Dickens, Geoffrey
Howe, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey


Dicks, Terry
Howell, Rt Hon D. (G'ldford)


Dorrell, Stephen
Howell, Ralph (N Norfolk)


Douglas-Hamilton, Lord J.
Hubbard-Miles, Peter






Hunt, David (Wirral)
Newton, Tony


Hunt, John (Ravensbourne)
Nicholls, Patrick


Hunter, Andrew
Normanton, Tom


Irving, Charles
Norris, Steven


Jackson, Robert
Onslow, Cranley


Jenkin, Rt Hon Patrick
Oppenheim, Phillip


Jessel, Toby
Oppenheim, Rt Hon Mrs S.


Johnson Smith, Sir Geoffrey
Ottaway, Richard


Jones, Gwilym (Cardiff N)
Page, Richard (Herts SW)


Jones, Robert (W Herts)
Parkinson, Rt Hon Cecil


Jopling, Rt Hon Michael
Parris, Matthew


Joseph, Rt Hon Sir Keith
Patten, John (Oxford)


Kellett-Bowman, Mrs Elaine
Pattie, Geoffrey


Key, Robert
Pawsey, James


King, Roger (B'ham N field)
Peacock, Mrs Elizabeth


King, Rt Hon Tom
Pollock, Alexander


Knight, Gregory (Derby N)
Porter, Barry


Knowles, Michael
Portillo, Michael


Knox, David
Powell, Rt Hon J. E. (S Down)


Lamont, Norman
Powell, William (Corby)


Lang, Ian
Powley, John


Latham, Michael
Prentice, Rt Hon Reg


Lawler, Geoffrey
Price, Sir David


Lawrence, Ivan
Prior, Rt Hon James


Lawson, Rt Hon Nigel
Proctor, K. Harvey


Lee, John (Pendle)
Pym, Rt Hon Francis


Leigh, Edward (Gainsbor'gh)
Raffan, Keith


Lennox-Boyd, Hon Mark
Rees, Rt Hon Peter (Dover)


Lightbown, David
Renton, Tim


Lilley, Peter
Rhodes James, Robert


Lloyd, Ian (Havant)
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon


Lloyd, Peter, (Fareham)
Ridley, Rt Hon Nicholas


Lord, Michael
Rippon, Rt Hon Geoffrey


Luce, Richard
Roberts, Wyn (Conwy)


Lyell, Nicholas
Robinson, Mark (N'port W)


McCurley, Mrs Anna
Ross, Wm. (Londonderry)


McCusker, Harold
Rossi, Sir Hugh


Macfarlane, Neil
Rost, Peter


MacGregor, John
Rowe, Andrew


MacKay, Andrew (Berkshire)
Rumbold, Mrs Angela


MacKay, John (Argyll &amp; Bute)
Ryder, Richard


Maclean, David John
Sainsbury, Hon Timothy


McNair-Wilson, P. (New F'st)
St. John-Stevas, Rt Hon N.


Madel, David
Sayeed, Jonathan


Maginnis, Ken
Scott, Nicholas


Major, John
Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)


Malins, Humfrey
Shaw, Sir Michael (Scarb')


Malone, Gerald
Shelton, William (Streatham)


Maples, John
Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)


Marland, Paul
Shepherd, Richard (Aldridge)


Marlow, Antony
Silvester, Fred


Marshall, Michael (Arundel)
Skeet, T. H. H.


Mates, Michael
Smith, Tim (Beaconsfield)


Maude, Hon Francis
Smyth, Rev W. M. (Belfast S)


Mawhinney, Dr Brian
Soames, Hon Nicholas


Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin
Speed, Keith


Mayhew, Sir Patrick
Speller, Tony


Mellor, David
Spencer, Derek


Merchant, Piers
Spicer, Michael (S Worcs)


Meyer, Sir Anthony
Squire, Robin


Miller, Hal (B'grove)
Stanbrook, Ivor


Mills, Iain (Meriden)
Stanley, John


Mills, Sir Peter (West Devon)
Steen, Anthony


Miscampbell, Norman
Stern, Michael


Mitchell, David (NW Hants)
Stevens, Lewis (Nuneaton)


Moate, Roger
Stevens, Martin (Fulham)


Molyneaux, Rt Hon James
Stewart, Allan (Eastwood)


Monro, Sir Hector
Stewart, Andrew (Sherwood)


Montgomery, Sir Fergus
Stewart, Ian (N Hertf'dshire)


Moore, John
Stokes, John


Morris, M. (N'hampton, S)
Stradling Thomas, J.


Morrison, Hon C. (Devizes)
Sumberg, David


Morrison, Hon P. (Chester)
Tapsell, Sir Peter


Moynihan, Hon C.
Taylor, John (Solihull)


Mudd, David
Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)


Murphy, Christopher
Tebbit, Rt Hon Norman


Neale, Gerrard
Terlezki, Stefan


Needham, Richard
Thatcher, Rt Hon Mrs M.


Nelson, Anthony
Thomas, Rt Hon Peter


Neubert, Michael
Thompson, Donald (Calder V)



Thompson, Patrick (N'ich N)
Warren, Kenneth


Thornton, Malcolm
Watson, John


Thurnham, Peter
Watts, John


Townend, John (Bridlington)
Wells, Bowen (Hertford)


Townsend, Cyril D. (B'heath)
Wells, Sir John (Maidstone)


Tracey, Richard
Wheeler, John


Trippier, David
Whitfield, John


Trotter, Neville
Whitney, Raymond


Twinn, Dr Ian
Wiggin, Jerry


van Straubenzee, Sir W.
Wilkinson, John


Vaughan, Sir Gerard
Winterton, Mrs Ann


Waddington, David
Winterton, Nicholas


Wakeham, Rt Hon John
Wolfson, Mark


Waldegrave, Hon William
Wood, Timothy


Walden, George
Woodcock, Michael


Walker, Cecil (Belfast N)
Yeo, Tim


Walker, Rt Hon P. (W'cester)
Young, Sir George (Acton)


Wall, Sir Patrick
Younger, Rt Hon George


Waller, Gary



Walters, Dennis
Tellers for the Noes:


Ward, John
Mr. Carol Mather and


Wardle, C. (Bexhill)
Mr. Robert Boscawen.

Question accordingly negatived.

Main Question put:—

The House divided: Ayes, 351, Noes, Nil.

Division No. 111]
[10.13 pm


AYES


Adley, Robert
Chalker, Mrs Lynda


Aitken, Jonathan
Channon, Rt Hon Paul


Alexander, Richard
Chapman, Sydney


Alison, Rt Hon Michael
Chope, Christopher


Amery, Rt Hon Julian
Churchill, W. S.


Amess, David
Clark, Hon A. (Plym'th S'n)


Ancram, Michael
Clark, Dr Michael (Rochford)


Arnold, Tom
Clark, SirW. (Croydon S)


Atkins, Rt Hon Sir H.
Clarke, Rt Hon K. (Rushcliffe)


Baker, Rt Hon K. (Mole Vall'y)
Clegg, Sir Walter


Baker, Nicholas (N Dorset)
Cockeram, Eric


Baldry, Tony
Colvin, Michael


Beaumont-Dark, Anthony
Conway, Derek


Beggs, Roy
Coombs, Simon


Bellingham, Henry
Cope, John


Bendall, Vivian
Corrie, John


Benyon, William
Couchman, James


Best, Keith
Cranborne, Viscount


Bevan, David Gilroy
Critchley, Julian


Biffen, Rt Hon John
Crouch, David


Biggs-Davison, Sir John
Currie, Mrs Edwina


Blackburn, John
Dickens, Geoffrey


Blaker, Rt Hon Sir Peter
Dicks, Terry


Bonsor, Sir Nicholas
Dorrell, Stephen


Bottomley, Peter
Douglas-Hamilton, Lord J.


Bottomley, Mrs Virginia
Dover, Den


Bowden, A. (Brighton K'to'n)
du Cann, Rt Hon Sir Edward


Bowden, Gerald (Dulwich)
Dunn, Robert


Boyson, Dr Rhodes
Durant, Tony


Braine, Rt Hon Sir Bernard
Dykes, Hugh


Brandon-Bravo, Martin
Edwards, Rt Hon N. (P'broke)


Bright, Graham
Eggar, Tim


Brinton, Tim
Emery, Sir Peter


Brooke, Hon Peter
Evennett, David


Brown, M. (Brigg &amp; Cl'thpes)
Eyre, Sir Reginald


Browne, John
Fallon, Michael


Bruinvels, Peter
Farr, Sir John


Buchanan-Smith, Rt Hon A.
Favell, Anthony


Budgen, Nick
Finsberg, Sir Geoffrey


Bulmer, Esmond
Fletcher, Alexander


Burt, Alistair
Fookes, Miss Janet


Butcher, John
Forman, Nigel


Butterfill, John
Forsyth, Michael (Stirling)


Carlile, Alexander (Montg'y)
Forsythe, Clifford (S Antrim)


Carlisle, John (N Luton)
Forth, Eric


Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)
Fowler, Rt Hon Norman


Carlisle, Rt Hon M. (W'ton S)
Fox, Marcus


Carttiss, Michael
Franks, Cecil


Cartwright, John
Fraser, Peter (Angus East)


Cash, William
Freeman, Roger






Fry, Peter
Lawler, Geoffrey


Gale, Roger
Lawrence, Ivan


Galley, Roy
Lawson, Rt Hon Nigel


Gardner, Sir Edward (Fylde)
Lee, John (Pendle)


Garel-Jones, Tristan
Leigh, Edward (Gainsbor'gh)


Glyn, Dr Alan
Lennox-Boyd, Hon Mark


Goodhart, Sir Philip
Lightbown, David


Gorst, John
Lilley, Peter


Gow, Ian
Lloyd, Ian (Havant)


Gower, Sir Raymond
Lloyd, Peter, (Fareham)


Grant, Sir Anthony
Lord, Michael


Greenway, Harry
Luce, Richard


Gregory, Conal
Lyell, Nicholas


Griffiths, Peter (Portsm'th N)
McCurley, Mrs Anna


Grist, Ian
McCusker, Harold


Ground, Patrick
Macfarlane, Neil


Grylls, Michael
MacGregor, John


Gummer, John Selwyn
MacKay, Andrew (Berkshire)


Hamilton, Hon A. (Epsom)
MacKay, John (Argyll &amp; Bute)


Hampson, Dr Keith
Maclean, David John


Hancock, Mr. Michael
Maclennan, Robert


Hanley, Jeremy
McNair-Wilson, P. (New F'st)


Hannam, John
Madel, David


Hargreaves, Kenneth
Maginnis, Ken


Haselhurst, Alan
Major, John


Havers, Rt Hon Sir Michael
Malins, Humfrey


Hawkins, C. (High Peak)
Malone, Gerald


Hawkins, Sir Paul (SW N'folk)
Maples, John


Hawksley, Warren
Marland, Paul


Hayes, J.
Marlow, Antony


Hayhoe, Barney
Marshall, Michael (Arundel)


Hayward, Robert
Maude, Hon Francis


Heath, Rt Hon Edward
Mawhinney, Dr Brian


Heddle, John
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin


Henderson, Barry
Mayhew, Sir Patrick


Heseltine, Rt Hon Michael
Mellor, David


Hickmet, Richard
Merchant, Piers


Hicks, Robert
Meyer, Sir Anthony


Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L.
Miller, Hal (B'grove)


Hogg, Hon Douglas (Gr'th'm)
Mills, Iain (Meriden)


Holt, Richard
Mills, Sir Peter (West Devon)


Hordern, Peter
Miscampbell, Norman


Howard, Michael
Mitchell, David (NW Hants)


Howarth, Alan (Stratf'd-on-A)
Moate, Roger


Howarth, Gerald (Cannock)
Molyneaux, Rt Hon James


Howe, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey
Monro, Sir Hector


Howell, Rt Hon D. (G'ldford)
Montgomery, Sir Fergus


Howell, Ralph (N Norfolk)
Moore, John


Hubbard-Miles, Peter
Morris, M. (N'hampton, S)


Hunt, David (Wirral)
Morrison, Hon C. (Devizes)


Hunt, John (Ravensbourne)
Morrison, Hon P. (Chester)


Hunter, Andrew
Moynihan, Hon C.


Irving, Charles
Mudd, David


Jackson, Robert
Murphy, Christopher


Jenkin, Rt Hon Patrick
Neale, Gerrard


Jessel, Toby
Needham, Richard


Johnson Smith, Sir Geoffrey
Nelson, Anthony


Jones, Gwilym (Cardiff N)
Neubert, Michael


Jones, Robert (W Herts)
Newton, Tony


Jopling, Rt Hon Michael
Nicholls, Patrick


Joseph, Rt Hon Sir Keith
Normanton, Tom


Kellett-Bowman, Mrs Elaine
Norris, Steven


Kennedy, Charles
Onslow, Cranley


Key, Robert
Oppenheim, Phillip


King, Roger (B'ham N'field)
Oppenheim, Rt Hon Mrs S.


King, Rt Hon Tom
Ottaway, Richard


Knight, Gregory (Derby N)
Owen, Rt Hon Dr David


Knowles, Michael
Page, Richard (Herts SW)


Knox, David
Parkinson, Rt Hon Cecil


Lamont, Norman
Parris, Matthew


Lang, Ian
Patten, John (Oxford)


Latham, Michael
Pattie, Geoffrey





Pawsey, James
Stradling Thomas, J.


Peacock, Mrs Elizabeth
Sumberg, David


Pollock, Alexander
Tapsell, Sir Peter


Porter, Barry
Taylor, John (Solihull)


Portillo, Michael
Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)


Powell, Rt Hon J. E. (S Down)
Tebbit, Rt Hon Norman


Powell, William (Corby)
Terlezki, Stefan


Powley, John
Thatcher, Rt Hon Mrs M.


Prentice, Rt Hon Reg
Thomas, Rt Hon Peter


Price, Sir David
Thompson, Donald (Calder V)


Prior, Rt Hon James
Thompson, Patrick (N'ich N)


Proctor, K. Harvey
Thornton, Malcolm


Pym, Rt Hon Francis
Thurnham, Peter


Raff an, Keith
Townend, John (Bridlington)


Rees, Rt Hon Peter (Dover)
Townsend, Cyril D. (B'heath)


Renton, Tim
Tracey, Richard


Rhodes James, Robert
Trippier, David


Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon
Trotter, Neville


Ridley, Rt Hon Nicholas
Twinn, Dr Ian


Rippon, Rt Hon Geoffrey
van Straubenzee, Sir W.


Roberts, Wyn (Conwy)
Vaughan, Sir Gerard


Robinson, Mark (N'port W)
Waddington, David


Ross, Wm. (Londonderry)
Wakeham, Rt Hon John


Rossi, Sir Hugh
Waldegrave, Hon William


Rowe, Andrew
Walden, George


Rumbold, Mrs Angela
Walker, Cecil (Belfast N)


Ryder, Richard
Walker, Rt Hon P. (W'cester)


Sainsbury, Hon Timothy
Wall, Sir Patrick


St. John-Stevas, Rt Hon N.
Waller, Gary


Sayeed, Jonathan
Walters, Dennis


Scott, Nicholas
Ward, John


Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)
Wardle, C. (Bexhill)


Shaw, Sir Michael (Scarb')
Warren, Kenneth


Shelton, William (Streatham)
Watson, John


Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)
Watts, John


Shepherd, Richard (Aldridge)
Wells, Bowen (Hertford)


Silvester, Fred
Wells, Sir John (Maidstone)


Skeet, T. H. H.
Wheeler, John


Smith, Tim (Beaconsfield)
Whitfield, John


Smyth, Rev W. M. (Belfast S)
Whitney, Raymond


Soames, Hon Nicholas
Wiggin, Jerry


Speed, Keith
Wilkinson, John


Speller, Tony
Winterton, Mrs Ann


Spencer, Derek
Winterton, Nicholas


Spicer, Michael (S Worcs)
Wolfson, Mark


Squire, Robin
Wood, Timothy


Stanbrook, Ivor
Woodcock, Michael


Stanley, John
Wrigglesworth, Ian


Steen, Anthony
Yeo, Tim


Stern, Michael
Young, Sir George (Acton)


Stevens, Lewis (Nuneaton)
Younger, Rt Hon George


Stevens, Martin (Fulham)



Stewart, Allan (Eastwood)
Tellers for the Ayes:


Stewart, Andrew (Sherwood)
Mr. Robert Boscawen and


Stewart, Ian (N Hertf'dshire)
Mr. Carol Mather.


Stokes, John





NOES


Nil


Tellers for the Noes:



Mr. Robert Atkins and



Mr. Kenneth Hind

Question accordingly agreed to.

Resolved,
That this House recognizes that the sinking of the General Belgrano was a necessary and legitimate action in the Falklands Campaign; and agrees that the protection of our Armed Forces must be the prime consideration in determining how far matters involving national security and the conduct of military operations can be disclosed.

Agricultural and Horticultural Co-operation Scheme

The Minister of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. John MacGregor): I beg to move,
That the draft Agricultural and Horticultural Co-operation Scheme 1985, which was laid before this House on 4th February, be approved.

The main purpose of the draft order is to introduce changes in the rates of grant paid to agricultural cooperatives. The House will recall that reductions have been made recently in the capital grant rates available to individual farmers and businesses. These have been fully discussed and approved by both Houses.
As I told the Standing Committee which discussed these changes on 23 January—these are the broad and most important changes—three factors guided us in making our decisions. First, there was the desirability of reflecting changing priorities as the situation in agriculture develops, especially in relation to products in surplus. Secondly, there was the need, to which we give increasing attention, to take account of the conservation aspects. Thirdly, there was the need for agriculture to play its part in the Government's programme of restraint on public expenditure.
The first and third factors are both directly applicable to the subject under discussion tonight. We believe it right that the co-operative scheme should also bear its share of the global savings that are being made, but we are applying a policy of priorities in deciding on the changes.
Before dealing with the details of the new rates, I shall comment on the level of Government support for cooperation. The co-operative development division of Food for Britain has a statutory responsibility to encourage, develop and promote agricultural co-operation, and in the current year Government financial support towards those activities will amount to just under £2 million. That expenditure is separate from that on the co-operative grants scheme, the AHCS, under which Food for Britain makes recommendations to the Agriculture Departments on the worthwhileness and merit of applications.
In the last two financial years, 1982–83 and 1983–84, those recommendations—which we have accepted and on which we are thus committed to pay—came to just under £4·5 million and £5 million respectively — an indication that producers are fully aware of the benefits which can accrue through co-operation and that they are prepared to invest to achieve them.
Grant aid plays a part in stimulating this producer investment, and it is right, therefore, that, in taking decisions about where any necessary reductions should fall, we should be mindful of the particular needs of different sectors and of the priorities we attach to their expansion in conditions which continue to develop and change. It is for that reason that we have decided not to reduce the level of grant rates for horticultural co-operatives.
The reasons for making horticulture an exception are, first, to recognise the particular needs of the sector; second, further to improve horticultural marketing; and, third, to take account of its priority status in Food for Britain's co-operative development division's operating strategy. There is a continuing need to improve our

marketing ability and competitiveness in that area, and horticultural co-operatives are gearing themselves well to meet the increasing and more sophisticated demands of their customers. We hope that by holding grants at existing levels this development will continue.
For sectors other than horticulture we are reducing the grant rates for buildings by five percentage points, from 15 to 10 per cent. for cereals co-operatives and from 30 to 25 per cent. for others. I should emphasise that no other changes are being made. At presently estimated levels of demand, savings should amount to about £300,000 in a full year.
As I have just said, in reaching those decisions we have been guided by the desirability of reflecting changing priorities as the situation in agriculture develops. One aspect of this is the need to take into account the surpluses of some commodities—and cereals is a good example. Due to the highly successful efforts, aided by substantial support in a variety of ways, we have moved in 10 years from being a net importer to being a substantial exporter of cereals. Moreover, it cannot be disputed that the cereals sector is better able to withstand lower rates than others. Indeed, Food for Britain's draft co-operative development strategy recognises that major advances have been taken in this sector and that over 600,000 tonnes of sophisticated central storage are now owned by specialist co-operatives. Grants at 10 per cent., together with the commercial benefits which will accrue, should be sufficient to ensure that essential investment continues.
One particular feature of the AHCS is that grant rates generally are about 10 percentage points above those which apply to individual farms under the AHDS scheme. That is what is commonly termed the co-operative premium, which was introduced about five years ago to recognise the need for structured co-operative marketing. I know that Food for Britain regards the premium as an important aspect of the scheme and welcomes its retention.
The draft order that we are debating tonight is somewhat longer than would otherwise be the case for an amendment of this nature. There have been several amendments made since the scheme was last drawn up in 1971, and we are therefore taking the opportunity to consolidate at the same time. Perhaps I may draw the attention of the House to the main difference—indeed, the only one to which I intend to draw the attention of the House at this stage—between this draft and the 1971 order as subsequently amended.
Paragraph 2 now includes a definition of horticultural produce for the purpose of distinguishing those activities which attract the rates of grant set out in division C of column 2 of the schedule. As I have explained, rates for those horticultural co-operatives remain unchanged. The definition is the same as that used in the agricultural and horticulture grants scheme.
The paragraph also contains a definition of "recognised group". That relates to items 14 °and 15 of the schedule and to grants of 15 per cent. and 25 per cent. respectively for tractors and other machinery purchased by forage groups in certain hill areas. Although fairly small amounts of grant have been paid to such groups for a number of years under EEC directive 75/268, we have been advised that authority for such payments should now be provided for in the main scheme. At present those grants apply to the original less favoured areas but not to the extension


sought for so successfully by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and agreed by the Council of Ministers in 1984.
I am pleased to announce, however, that after the scheme comes into operation, proposals will be considered from forage groups in those marginal areas. This, I believe, is a useful extension of Government support, and one that will be of benefit to livestock farmers in the more exacting parts of the country.
There are some other technical changes, but no others of substance from the 1971 order, and I commend this scheme to the House.

Mr. Brynmor John: When I was listening to wind-up of the debate in Committee, I wondered how in this debate the Minister of State could keep to the same emotional level of intensity. I am grateful for the fact that in his speech he did not even try to do so.
We did the Government a favour, because in asking that the matter be dealt with on the Floor of the House we gave the Government the opportunity to withdraw the original scheme and relay it. Basically, as the Minister said, it is in line with the earlier scheme on capital grants. It is right to record that that has had a singularly mixed reception, particularly in the poorer farming areas. I welcome the part of the scheme that pertains to horticulture because, as the Minister rightly said, there is no cut in the capital grant there, and if those people are to adapt to markets, they need an adequate level of capital grant.
I should like to deal with the second reason that the Minister aduced for restructuring the grants in the way that the Government have chosen. They are aligning grants more accurately with the environmental pressures on farming. That point has been made repeatedly not only by the Minister of State but by the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. When he introdued the changes, he said:
In making these changes we are reflecting the Government's declared aim of achieving a closer integration of conservation and agricultural policies". — [Official Report, 11 December 1984; Vol. 69, c. 434.]

The Minister of State said:
The second feature also reflects changing priorities. The changes take an important step forward in the integration of conservation and agriculture." — [Official Report, Fifth Standing Committee, 23 January 1985; c. 7.]

When the matter was debated in Committee, a great deal of heat and not much light was created by the fact that hon. Members were arguing about whether some people were trying to compare Governments, good or ill. That is not the matter in hand. I am prepared to accept what the Minister of State said, that as a matter of Government policy that they should try to deal with the changing balance in favour of the environment, but I must ask whether the structure of grants and the way in which the grants have been changed achieves that object.
What the capital grants have done in this scheme as in the other one, is to discourage the unsatisfactory things that are being done on farms today which are adversely affecting the environment, but the Government have not taken the further step, which is equally necessary, of encouraging good things to be done on the farms. Although it is not relevant to the debate, stonewalling, which was in the original grant, is academic if fencing is

cheaper. If there is a significant difference, that is so much dressing to the debate and will not play any particular part in it.
Capital grants can play a role in environmental care, but we must recognise that capital grants of themselves have a limited impact. Instead of mere discouragement of bad practice—although that is a part of better environmental care — we should have had a series of proposals for grants, if we are to rejig the whole system, which recognised that positive measures can be taken.
I shall give just one example of Welsh woodlands. It is now generally accepted that the oak trees in several Welsh woodlands are becoming overmature because of damage by animals to the young oak trees. A fencing grant to preserve the younger trees and woodlands could have been introduced specifically to encourage conservation. Machinery could also have been devised to help in the covering of bare peat areas, again encouraging conservation. But nothing of that kind has been done. My criticism is not that the Government have failed totally, but that they have wasted a chance. Having decided to rejig the capital grants, they should have done the job properly and rejigged them in such a way as to give proper encouragement to the good things rather than merely discouraging the bad things.
The Minister must accept that the main way to promote conservation is through management grants rather than capital grants. The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds has commented that farmers cannot live on capital grants for dry stone walls. They need an alternative income if they are to be encouraged to take conservation measures. We should therefore be looking for management schemes with a direct and significant conservation element.
The Select Committee on the Environment was a great deal harsher on the Ministry than was the RSPB. Its report make it clear that the present capital structure, far from encouraging conservation in agriculture, is one of the greatest factors in discouraging it. Paragraph 29 states:
Nearly all witnesses were agreed that the present grant and price support structure was the major obstacle in the way of a comprehensive and successful conservation programme in this country.
The Government must look at the financial structure of capital grants—they have missed an opportunity this time, but I hope that it will not be long before the matter is examined again—to try to promote conservation. It emerged in paragraph 31 of the Select Committee report, which said:
All of our witnesses, except MAFF, recognise the need for a serious change in direction.
The Select Committee concluded:
We recommend that MAFF fundamentally change its approach on financial structures so that resources are redirected away from environmentally damaging operations and towards conservation-conscious methods.
Two things are therefore needed, but only one has been attempted by the Government in their reorganisation of the capital structure on this occasion.
I appreciate that this may not be the best time to mention the National Farmers Union annual conference to Conservative Members, but Farmers Weekly reported on it as follows:
Extra grants to help farmers in their conservation efforts and to control pollution were demanded at the NFU annual meeting. The recently imposed cuts in farm capital grants were strongly


criticised. Speakers suggested that if the Government really wanted farmers to improve the environment, there would have to be extra money to do so.
The NFU has committed itself to a process and a policy of conserving the environment, but farmers often working at the margins in hill areas must have an alternative source of income if they are to he encouraged in that. The gravamen of our disappointment is that the Government have neglected an opportunity to put this right.

Mr. Nicholas Lye11: I am happy to show that there is support across the Floor of the House for the remarks of the hon. Member for Pontypridd (Mr. John). The headquarters of the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds is in my constituency and the postbag of my hon. Friend the Minister of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food is full of letters urging him to promote positive management schemes for the protection of the environment and the benefit of farmers in marginal areas. I welcome what the hon. Member for Pontypridd has said.
I wish to address myself to capital moneys for cooperatives coming not from capital grants but from the co-operatives themselves. The tax treatment of moneys which represent profits of co-operatives are treated much less favourably than the profits that a farmer achieves on his own farm. I ask my hon. Friend the Minister of State to treat with the Treasury on this matter so that the profits that are earned in a co-operative can be reinvested in the cooperative with the same tax benefit to the farmer who is selling his produce through the co-operative as would be achieved if they represented the profits from his own farm.
This issue has been drawn to my attention by Bedfordshire Growers, which my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and my hon. Friend the Minister of State will recognise as one of the best and most effective horticultural co-operatives in the country. At a time when we are having to reduce the capital grant, it is nonsensical that we should not be doing everything in our power to ensure that moneys from the best of all possible sources — the profits of the co-operatives—are reinvested in the co-operatives.
If a farmer is a member, for example, of Bedfordshire Growers, the co-operative makes a profit and he is asked —this request is often made of farmers by co-operatives including Bedfordshire Growers—to leave in his money as working capital for the co-operative, he will not have the same beneficial tax treatment as if he ploughed the money into investment in plant or machinery on his own farm. This seems to be foolish and to have no justification.
When my hon. Friend the Minister of State approaches the Treasury he will be met with the suggestion that to allow such investment would be to permit abuses on a wider basis. The Treasury always says that sort of thing but I do not believe that it will be able to sustain the argument if my hon. Friend presses the case that I am urging. For such investment to be tax deductible by a member of a co-operative, it would be necessary to show that he was a member of a recognised co-operative and to produce accounts to show that it was in the co-operative that his money had been left. It would be for the co-operative to show that the farmer's money had been invested. In these circumstances, the chances of abuse would be extremely limited, if not nil.
My hon. Friend the Minister of State appreciates that co-operative marketing societies, whether in agriculture or horticulture, are important in enabling British farmers to compete, especially in the fresh vegetable market, both at home and in the hinterland on the Continent. I am sure that we should do all that we can to encourage them.

Mr. MacGregor: I shall reply shortly to this short debate if I may have the leave of the House to do so, Mr. Deputy Speaker. The hon. Member for Pontypridd (Mr. John) will recognise that all his comments except his opening welcome to horticulture grants were not relevant to the scheme that is before us. In the three factors that I outlined in the changes to the general capital grants scheme in Committee, the second factor, the environmental one, is not relevant to the particular changes in the co-operative sector. The co-operative grants are for a different purpose. Nevertheless, it has given me an opportunity to repeat some of what I said in Committee, and I am grateful to him for that.
The hon. Gentleman ought not to underestimate the extent to which we are shifting the balance in the capital grants system as the agricultural scene changes so that much greater attention is given to environmental considerations. We are making much more of a shift in that direction than did, the Labour Government. I admit that we are making changes in capital grants for other reasons, but I hope that the hon. Gentleman does no underestimate the extent to which we have had environmental considerations in mind when making changes this year and last. The hon. Gentleman said that the discouragement of what he described as bad practice was minimal, but I am sure that he does not underestimate the value of removing grants for pulling up hedges, land clearance and reclamation work.

Mr. John: I am happy to recognise that, and thought that I had done so in my speech. I also thought that I had eschewed comparisons of Governments and avoided mentioning the Environment Select Committee talking of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food dragging its feet, for example. As I recognise the importance of what is being done, will the Minister recognise the importance of the further steps that should be taken, by which I mean encouragement of that which is right? "Thou shalt not" is an inadequate moral basis for life.

Mr. MacGregor: We are talking about thou shalt not get grants for doing things that are environmentally damaging. The hon. Gentleman obviously support what we have done.

Dr. David Clark: Is the Minister saying that the Ministry of Agriculture ought to he under an obligation to take environmental factors in to account when pursuing its main statutory duty?

Mr. MacGregor: I listened carefully to the Second Reading debate of the hon. Gentleman's Bill two Fridays ago. He will remember what my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Environment said. On one of the clauses in the hon. Gentleman's Bill, my hon. Friend advanced a convincing argument on constitutional matters. I am saying that we are taking environmental issues into account when making changes to the capital grants schemes.
I should like to consider just one more of what might be called the negative aspect —this year's significant changes in grants for field drainage. The changes are more significant than some of the other changes in, for example, the removal of grants for hedging. I hope that hon. Members appreciate the environmental importance of that.
Last year, we introduced, in the less favoured areas, advantageous rates of grant for certain environmentally desirable investments such as the building, replacement or improvement of walls built of a material traditional in a locality and the provision or improvement of hedges and shelter belts. I admit that that was not a huge leap forward, but it is a positive step. Other changes have been made, and they build up a picture. For example, £9 million of additional money has been given to the Countryside Commission and the Nature Conservancy Council this year. It will obviously go to environmentally important subjects. Only recently, my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Environment announced a new experimental scheme for the next three years in the Hapvergate marshes in Norfolk, in which the Ministry of Agriculture is participating to the extent of 50 per cent. funding and a considerable management input. That is an interesting experiment which has important environmental connotations.
My right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food has taken the lead in the past nine months—I have been assisting him in the Council of Ministers in Brussels on the new structures directive to try to get a conservation initiative written into it. As the hon. Member for Pontypridd knows, that structure will last five years. We shall continue with that initiative at the next Council meeting next week. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will recognise that we have in mind the conservation aspects of the changes to capital grants.
My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Lyell) asked about the taxation of agricultural co-operatives. As he will know, that is essentially a matter for my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I understand that the changes introduced to capital taxation in the Finance Act 1984 were intended to maintain broad neutrality of treatment between co-operatives and other enterprises. However, the Federation of Agricultural Co-operatives, with which I have discussed the matter, has made representations to the

Chancellor that the changes bear unduly harshly on co-operatives. I shall ensure that my hon. and learned Friend's remarks are drawn to the attention of my right hon. Friend.
It has been a short debate. I have heard no criticism of the changes that we are making through the order—

Mr. Robert Maclennan: It would be a mistake to allow the debate to conclude without any criticism. I thought that the debate would be longer, and wish to interject briefly. What does the Minister believe to be the total financial savings from the cuts? He mentioned a figure of about £300,000 in connection with one part of the scheme, but I was not sure whether he was referring to the totality of savings.

Mr. MacGregor: I was referring to the totality. The figure is about £300,000 in a full year.
There seems to have been little criticism. I cannot count that intervention as a criticism, and, therefore, perhaps I can say that there is no criticism of the order. I hope that the House will approve it.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,
That the draft Agricultural and Horticultural Co-operation Scheme 1985, which was laid before this House on 4th February, be approved.

STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS, &c.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Ernest Armstrong): In order to save the time of the House, I shall put together the Questions on motions 3 to 5 on the Order Paper.

AGRICULTURE

Motion made, and Question put forthwith pursuant to Standing Order No. 79(5) (Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &amp;c.).
That the draft Amendments of the Potato Marketing Scheme 1955, as amended, which were laid before this House on 20th December, be approved.

That the Potatoes (Assured Markets) Order 1985, (S.I., 1985, No. 63), dated 21st January 1985, a copy of which was laid before this House on 23rd January, be approved.

That the Potatoes (Protection of Guarantees) Order 1985 (S.I., 1985, No. 64), dated 21st January 1985, a copy of which was laid before this House on 23rd January, be approved.—[Mr. Major.]

Question agreed to.

New London Taxicabs

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.— [Mr. Major.]

Mr. Ivor Stanbrook: Do you realise, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that the traditional London taxi is about to disappear from the streets? I discovered that shocking truth recently, and what I found since leads me to believe that the House of Commons, all Londoners and all those who live in our other towns and cities where our London model is used should be made aware of the impending disaster.
Most of us take the design of the taxi for granted. It has been with us for so long — its history reaches from Edwardian times and is based on the hackney carriage, although the present model was introduced in the 1950s — that it is easily recognisable to everyone. It is a singular design. In many cities travellers have to put up with mere saloon cars plying as taxis. That is part of the dull uniformity which is the curse of modern cities. In London we have a vehicle which was not only designed for its purpose but which over the years has been improved to meet changing needs, circumstances and standards.
The London taxi can negotiate the busiest London street and can turn round in a remarkably small space. It can take up to four passengers safely, has room for an enormous amount of luggage beside the driver, and can accommodate a wheelchair in the passenger compartment. The London dial-a-ride system for handicapped people uses it with few complaints.
As improvements have proved necessary, they have been made without altering the basic design. Taxi drivers are happy with it; Londoners love it; and foreign visitors are charmed by it. It is efficient, economical, reliable—who has ever seen a broken-down taxicab? — and popular. It is a triumph of design in that it marries practical experience of need with high aesthetic standards. Socially, it is a distinguished ornament of the British way of life. It makes a Cockney feel like a king; it is the poor man's chauffeured Rolls for a night; and top hat and tiara fit as comfortably in it as do busy businessmen with their brief cases. Why, therefore, is there any question of changing it? Why, when we have a winner, must someone insist on change for change's sake? Why must the London travelling public be forced to accept a token of dull uniformity in its place?
I have gone into this in some detail. It appears that one of the villains of the piece is Carbodies Ltd., the very firm which makes the current design. It has apparently been working on a new design since 1976, and it has produced a prototype but does not expect to go into production for another year or more because of the numerous modifications needed. It does not seem to be in any hurry.
Mr. Dennis Poore, the chairman of Manganese Bronze Holdings plc. which owns Carbodies, told me that the new model is required to meet European Community regulations. When I asked him what these were, he wrote on 8 October 1984 promising to tell me
within a week or so".

I am still waiting—on 18 February 1985. A week is a long time in business as well as in politics!
Another villain of the piece is my hon. Friend's Department, the Department of Trade and Industry. It

made the decision — incredible for a Conservative Government—to invest £.1·3 million in the new design in 1983. The GLC also paid over some money, but then we are used to the present GLC irresponsibly spending money like water.
The Government cannot be so easily acquitted. When in a parliamentary question I asked what public funds had been invested in the new model, the Minister of State replied that the details were confidential. He added:
To attract support, all research and development projects must satisfy the published criteria for assistance under the support for innovation scheme."—[Official Report, 31 October 1984; Vol. 65, c. 1023.]

Innovation indeed! At the rate it is going, Carbodies' new design will be out of date when it is produced, whereas improvements to the existing model will keep it abreast of the times. Is more taxpayers' money to be wasted on this project? Does Carbodies want more before it completes it? How much money has been spent on it so far? How much has come out of the public purse? Will my hon. Friend answer those questions?
The usual villain of these scenes — the European Community—can be acquitted. Any new taxi will have to comply with European Community regulations. But the present model has been granted exemption from European Community regulations relating to inferior fittings and exterior projections, according to the Minister of State's reply to my question on 31 October. The present London taxi meets current British national type approval requirements in all respects.
It all sounds so depressingly familiar — change for change's sake, more and more public money invested in a project whose justification gets less and less.
The new design, so far as it has been revealed in the prototypes, is unlikely to be popular with Londoners. Mr. Poore tells me that it is not based on the Range Rover, but that is the impression one gets. Taxi drivers who have seen it say that it is too small, too cramped and too low. All those whose opinions I have sought have condemned it. There has been little, if any, consultation with taxi drivers themselves, and none at all with the general public. Some organisations for the disabled have welcomed it, for it is said to incorporate a ramp and to permit the loading of a wheelchair somewhat larger than the size which the existing model can accommodate, but the difference is only slight.
I recently received a letter from a London taxi driver who has been in the job all his life, except for when he drove a tank in Germany. His father was a horse and motor cabman before him. He says:
Since the war I have carried just three wheelchairs and their occupants, one of which was quite recently. One chair went into the boot, one chair went on to the luggage platform and one went inside. In no instance did the person involved have any trouble getting into the cab for the tip up front seats are ideal for any unfortunate person who needs a wheelchair and I feel certain no other vehicle can be as satisfactory as the present FX4. It is said that the new vehicle will create more jobs. I wonder what the present builders of the FX4 think of the idea.
On the other hand, the extra features that the new design requires will add enormously to its price. One trade source told me that £10,000 was the likely minimum, and rising, compared with the lower price for the existing model. It is debatable whether all future taxis must be forced to incorporate a wheelchair feature when the demand can only ever be for a very limited proportion of the population. The very act of carrying a heavy wheelchair might involve drivers in awkward questions of


legal liability if accidents were to occur. Compared with modifications to the existing design, I doubt whether it is wise to claim, as Mr. Poore did last year, that the new model will add an extra dimension to the lives of the physically handicapped. It will be a cruel deception if, when the new model is on the streets, the process of getting wheelchairs into it via a ramp is so cumbersome and awkward that drivers will not welcome disabled passengers in wheelchairs.
Since I began taking an interest in this matter, I have received many letters and messages of support for the traditional London taxicab from all over the world. Correspondents from the United States have been particularly concerned and have often expressed themselves in ways which may interest the House. Here is part of a letter from Mr. Samuel Gorovitz, of Maryland:
Like many fellow Americans, I have great fondness for England and for London in particular, and have visited many times. I have taken hundreds of photographs during these visits over the past twenty five years. Just a few weeks ago, I proudly hung on the wall of my home a 30" by 40" enlargement of the best of these pictures — a photograph of a taxi rank in Knightsbridge, taken in March of this year when my wife and I were there to visit our daughter, then studying at the University of London. That picture more than any other, captures for us the feel and spirit of London.

The traditional London taxi is a symbol of England that is universally recognised and admired. That is not merely because of the aesthetic appeal of the design; it is also because of its association with the pervasive quality of the London taxi system —the envy of the world, and a standard of competence and civility that is unapproached anywhere else. It is thus no surprise that all those friends and neighbours with whom I have discussed this gloomy news have reacted with the same horror that prompts this letter now.

Replace the traditional taxi, and you do not merely make a change in equipment, you change the face of the city. You destroy a visual image that says 'London!' in the most welcoming possible way to people throughout the world. You desecrate a national treasure, no less than by turning a stately home into an auto parts warehouse. No newer taxi, no matter what its performance characteristics, could fill the resulting gap.

It is not that I oppose technological progress. On the contrary, I devote much of my time to advocating and facilitating it. But the best of the old must never give way to an unreasoned quest for the new. That is a lesson I had thought we Americans still needed to learn better from you British!
This is what Mr. Charles A. Cerami of Washington says:
I am sure you know the saying, 'Tout hommes a deux pays: le sien et la France'. There are countries and cities that have made themselves part of everyone's world. London has that status more than almost any other, and it benefits greatly from it. First in material ways—as British Airways and the Connaught Hotel would surely attest. More importantly in the knowledge that so many others stand with you in the love of your capital city … In this case, it is not merely a matter of sentiment. Taxicabs in most other cities are increasingly uncomfortable. Those of London are a splendid exception. Do not destroy what is good.
London taxi drivers are a splendid body of people — kind, courteous, efficient and helpful with very few exceptions. They are proud of their craft and of their vehicle. Let us not prevent them from continuing to serve the people of London and its visitors to the same high standard as we have always enjoyed in the past.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (Mr. David Trippier): I am grateful

to my hon. Friend the Member for Orpington (Mr. Stanbrook) for providing this opportunity for a debate on the new London taxi.
I have listened with great interest to my hon. Friend's arguments in favour of the existing black cab—or the FX4 to give it its proper name — and I have much sympathy with his views. The familiar London taxi is undoubtedly considered by many to be an old friend. Indeed, its familiarity on the streets of London is such that the image of the taxi has become almost synonymous with that of the capital itself, both here and overseas. Precisely because it is so familiar, however, we tend to look at the black cab as we do other, rather older and less changing, landmarks and symbols of the city.
In fact, the familiar black cab is simply the latest in a long line of mechanical, as opposed to horse-drawn, cabs which stretches back to August 1897 when the London Electric Cab company of Lambeth put on to the roads of London 14 yellow and black "Bersey" cabs nicknamed, I understand, "humming birds" and capable of attaining a speed of 9 mph. The "humming birds" lasted until 1899, when they were withdrawn on account of the noise they made and their low level of reliability, allowing horse-drawn cabs to make a comeback. The reprieve of the horse-drawn cab was only temporary, however, and in 1903 the first petrol-driven cab was licensed. Taxis initially sought to impersonate the horse-drawn cab, but as time went on other, more original, designs began to emerge, in line with the trend in motor vehicles generally.
The point that I stress, of course, is that although the current black cab is sometimes thought of as an unchanging part of the London scene, it did, in fact, follow a number of very different vehicles, each designed to reflect the needs and wishes of the time. It was actually introduced in its present form just 30 years ago, in 1955.
Although a short time in historical terms, 30 years is a long time in terms of vehicle development, and it is the age of the FX4 that is really its problem. Vehicle technology has advanced substantially over the past 30 years and, while many improvements have been built into the FX4, in the view of many the time has come for a major redesign of the London taxi to be undertaken. A number of manufacturers have been considering the design of a replacement for the FX4, and Carbodies Ltd., which, as my hon. Friend pointed out, itself manufactures the FX4, and which has been in receipt of support from the Department, is engaged in developing a new taxi, codenamed the CR6. My Department and the Department of Transport provided support for this project under the support for innovation scheme, the details of which, following usual practice, must remain confidential so I am afraid that I cannot answer my hon. Friend's specific questions. We supported the project, first, because it seemed to us to be viable and, secondly, because it satisfied the criteria applying to the scheme. The design of the CR6 is aimed at meeting both present day and anticipated legislative requirements and to give both passengers and drivers the standard of comfort and performance that we have come to expect from modern vehicles.
For instance, as my hon. Friend has already said, the CR6 has been specifically designed to allow ease of access for those confined to wheelchairs. This is an important development and one which should provide enormous benefit to those whose handicap means that at present any journey involving public transport can be achieved only


with the greatest difficulty. In a civilised society it is right that new designs of public transport should be developed to suit as many people as possible. As is apparent, taxi designs tend to have a long life and the CR6 may set the standard in this respect for the future. I think I am right in saying that it will be the first specialised taxi to have access for the disabled as a specific design objective. As such it will be well placed to take advantage of increasing international awareness and concern about the special needs of the disabled in public transport.
On the question of the external appearance of the CR6, my hon. Friend dislikes the design and of course there will be others who agree with him. Personally, I find it distinctive and appealing, but judgments about such matters are necessarily subjective. This is an area where manufacturers must make a judgment based on their expertise, experience and understanding of the market, but it is, of course, the customer—the taxi owner—who will prove whether or not their judgment is correct.
Indeed, as I have already said, I understand that other manufacturers have been considering the possibility of designing a replacement for the FX4 and I believe that at least one manufacturer is already planning to produce an alternative to the CR6. It is, of course, open to any vehicle

which meets the London conditions of fitness to operate as a licensed taxi in London. If my hon. Friend is correct in his view that the CR6 will prove unpopular, I have no doubt that other manufacturers will take advantage of the situation and ensure that alternatives are made available.
I am fairly sure that I shall not be able to change my hon. Friend's opinion of the Carbodies CR6 here tonight. I would hope, however, that he will soon have an opportunity to view one of the prototypes at close quarters and to discuss with the manufacturers some of its advantages over the present vehicle. In time, I hope that he, along with the many other taxi-users in London will come to appreciate the qualities of the CR6 and that it will eventually capture a similar place in their affections as has the present taxi. If I may nevertheless offer just one crumb of comfort, I am told that the oldest FX4 still plying for hire today on the streets of London started work some 16 years ago, in 1969. London taxis are built to last and I am sure that the black cab will be a familiar sight on our streets for a good many years yet.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at seventeen minutes past Eleven o'clock.